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ABSTRACT
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Title: The Effects of Campaign Finance Law on Donations to State Legislative Campaigns
Major Professor: Dr. Eric N. Waltenburg
Donors influence state policy development through campaign contributions to legislative
candidates. To curb this influence, states rely on disclosure requirements, campaign contribution
limits, and public finance laws to restrain campaign contributions in elections. I argue that donors
do not share the same motivations in providing campaign contributions to state legislators. For
example, business interest groups seek to build long-term relationships, while ideologically
leaning groups hope to elect like-minded candidates. I examine the effectiveness of campaign
finance laws to regulate donations to state legislative candidates. I find that the success of
campaign contribution law is dependent upon the motivations of the group providing contributions.
Using data on 65,928 legislative candidates from 1999-2014, I show that disclosure requirements,
contribution limits, and public finance laws have very different effects on state legislative
campaign contribution patterns based on their source. These findings have important policy
implications as we seek out ways to reform campaign finance regulations.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that money and state legislative politics are inseparable. For centuries,
money has been the lifeblood of nearly every state legislative campaign in the United States.
Indeed, even George Washington recognized that campaigns need to spend money to be
successful. For Washington, however, it took a relatively abysmal election return to appreciate the
importance of money on voter outreach. George Washington lost a lopsided election to the Virginia
House of Burgess in 1755 (Brusoe 2016). This outcome, however, should not cast doubt on
Washington’s political acumen. Washington’s massive loss was most likely the result of two
factors. For one, his friends entered him into the contest at the last minute, potentially without his
knowledge (Chernow 2010). Second, as was common at the time, he was largely absent from the
campaign trail (Brusoe (2016). Candidates typically relied on proxies to build an aura of “saintly
indifference to power” (Chernow pg. 67 2010), which George Washington was quite skilled at
exhibiting until his election as the first President of the United States (Burns, MacGregor, and
Dunn 2004).
George Washington had a reluctant change of heart towards campaigning following his
substantial election loss. Contrary to his previous run, he declared his candidacy for the Fairfax
County 1758 House of Burgess election quite early and with much fanfare. He quickly surrounded
his campaign with his closest friends and acquaintances to build a large and effective team of
proxies (Charnow 2010). His confidants, including local hero Colonel James Wood, urged him to
take a leave of absence from the military and engage voters in person (Charnow 2010). This advice,
however, would not sway him to interact directly with his constituents. Washington was still absent
from his Frederick County voters throughout the election, feeling too committed to his military
obligations (Winchester 1892).
In his absence, Washington’s campaign made a notable change in tactics. Washington’s
supporters decided to expand his campaign by purchasing cider and hard punch to avoid his
previous election loss (Chernow 2010). Voting was not done in secret in these elections. Each
voter had to openly declare his vote, so the campaign could easily keep track of those who were
paid off with the liquor on election day. Washington supported the move by his proxies, stating
“my only fear is that you spent with too sparing a hand” (Moss 2010).
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George Washington’s fortunes got significantly better close to election day. Voters could
cast two votes for the House of Burgess, opening the door for a local celebrity to propel
Washington to victory. Thomas Byran Marin, the cousin of Lord Fairfax, decided to make a joint
ticket with Washington (Chernow 2010). This pulled the endorsements of prominent citizens of
the county, including Lord Fairfax himself (Chernow 2010). Washington won the vote with a
resounding 309 of the 397 votes cast while he was in abstentia, partially due to his campaign’s
generous supply of spirits (Wiencek 2003).
Inadvertently, George Washington’s spending started the age of campaign finance
regulations in the United States. Washington’s campaign tactics were emulated by other candidates
across the colonies. Legislative candidates began using alcohol and other gifts to win elections at
an increasing rate. Decades passed, however, until the states started actively taking a role to combat
vote-buying. Indeed, there was hardly a rush for state governments to stop people like George
Washington from intoxicating their voters. In 1811, the Maryland legislature enacted the first
campaign finance regulations in the United States to try and ban the practice. The new laws barred
candidates from providing voters with “money, meat, drink, entertainment or provision ... any
present, gift, reward or entertainment, etc. in order to be elected” (Fuller 2014).
Over 200 years later, questions still surround the utility of state campaign finance laws in
both the scholarly and political realms. This dissertation tests the effectiveness of all three major
forms of state campaign finance regulations on stemming the flow of money to state legislative
campaigns. This study asserts donor contributing patterns must be considered to understand the
effectiveness of campaign finance laws. Thus, I seek to understand how varying donors respond
to campaign finance regulations and shift their contributing behaviors. In other words, this analysis
takes the perspective that donors react differently to campaign finance regulations based on their
underlying motivations for providing campaign contributions. To do this, I distinguish between
ideological and business interest donors. Research shows that ideological and business interest
groups employ very different contribution patterns to influence legislative policy (Snyder 1992). I
contend that these contribution patterns will relate differently to the three major forms of campaign
finance laws. At the same time, I predict that modern state campaign finance regulations are more
capable at reducing donations from business interests rather than ideological contributors.
This introductory chapter is separated into four parts. First, I provide a basic overview of
state campaign finance regulations. Second, I give a brief overview of the theoretical framework
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that will guide this research. Third, I discuss the methodological and practical contributions of this
dissertation. Finally, I outline the chapters in this dissertation.
1.1 Brief Overview of State Campaign Finance Regulations
Since the first Maryland statute, states have adopted a diverse array of campaign finance
laws to reduce the impact of money in elections (Kulesza, Witko, Waltenburg 2016). All states
currently place some form of regulations on campaign contributions (National Conference of State
Legislatures 2018). State campaign finance laws take on four forms: campaign contribution limits,
disclosure requirements, public financing, and expenditure limits (Witko 2005). Modern campaign
contribution limits are relatively uncomplicated statutes. Contribution limits bar donors from
providing campaign contributions above a certain level. Unsurprisingly, campaign contribution
limits fluctuate considerably across states. An average of twelve states placed no limits on
individuals during the 2010s. Five imposed no campaign contribution limits on donors at all. At
the opposite end, approximately half of states impose outright bans on direct donations from
corporations or unions. Many of these direct bans still allow unions and corporations to donate
through Political Action Committees (NCSL 2018).
Disclosure law is the second form of campaign finance regulations. Disclosure law enjoys
a favored status with lawmakers and the courts alike. Unlike campaign contribution limits,
disclosure laws do not directly stop donors from making contributions. Courts view disclosure
laws as a way to inform voters about contributions, which are a constitutionally protected form of
speech. This has made disclosure laws the most widespread and constitutionally upheld form of
campaign finance regulation. All fifty states enforce some type of disclosure requirements
(Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016). Disclosure requirements govern the timing of reporting
and at what monetary level a contribution must be publicized. Like campaign contribution limits,
disclosure laws vary widely. States also craft disclosure laws to reflect the costs of campaigning
in their states, generally ranging between $200-$1000.
Public financing is the third and least common campaign finance regulation currently used
by the states. Born from the Watergate corruption scandal, public financing provides subsidies to
candidates that voluntarily accept stringent campaign contribution limits and expenditure
requirements (Jones 1981). Public financing programs were far more common in the 1980s and
1990s. Recently, public financing programs have been diminishing. State legislatures and courts
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were quite hostile to public financing programs in the past two decades, causing the dismantling
of most programs (Kulesza, Miller, and Witko 2017). Five states provide public financing to state
legislative candidates today. As will be shown in Chapter 8, only Connecticut’s program enjoys
notable levels of participation. In Maine and Arizona, approximately half of the candidates enroll.
Only about 5% of candidates in Hawaii and Minnesota accept public financing.
Expenditure limits constitute the final form of campaign finance regulations. As noted,
standalone expenditure limits do not currently exist at the state level. Thus, this research does not
formally analyze expenditure limits as a separate form of campaign finance regulation.
Expenditure limits will be discussed at various points in this research since their development is
highly intertwined with the remaining three campaign finance laws. The United States Supreme
Court ruled in Buckley v. Valeo, (424 U.S. 1 [1976])1 that expenditure limits violate the Frist
Amendment, but left the remaining three forms of regulation intact. The only expenditure limits
presently enforced by states are tied to public financing. In a few rare instances, states
unsuccessfully implemented expenditure limits after Buckley, only to be struck down in federal
court later.
1.2 Literature and Theoretical Approach
There is little sign that campaign finance regulations helped stem the flow of money to
candidates even though there is a slow trend that they are strengthening (Kulesza, Witko, and
Waltenburg 2016). The importance of money in state legislative campaigns has caused many
cynics to claim that campaign finance laws are meaningless (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and
Snyder 2003). According to the Institute on Money in State Politics, donors provided state
legislative candidates with over $1 billion in direct contributions for the 2014 election alone.
While the increasing importance of money in elections has worried the public and scholars
alike, nothing suggests that the flow of donations to state legislative races will decrease in the
foreseeable future. Indeed, political parties, businesses, interest groups, and private donors have
placed a higher emphasis on winning state legislative seats in the past decade (Bush 2017; Byler
2014; Epstein 2018). Both the Republican and Democratic Parties now have well-funded political
action committees solely designed to shape state legislative campaigns (Epstein 2018).

1

Referred to as Buckley throughout the rest of this dissertation.
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Contributions to state legislative campaigns is not inherently problematic. Campaigns need money
to spread their message to voters.
Unsurprisingly, campaign finance laws attracted adamant supporters and critics alike
throughout their history. Critics of campaign finance laws, including the Independence Institute,
maintain that campaign finance regulations run the risk of making elections uncompetitive if they
are too stringent. Many also argue that campaign finance laws run afoul of free speech protections
in the First Amendment. As noted, campaigns need money to spread their message to voters.
Campaign finance laws can make messaging for campaigns unreasonably difficult if they place
burdensome restrictions on donors. In these instances, sitting legislators can theoretically use their
incumbency status to coast to reelection.
On the opposite end, campaign finance regulations are the central tools used by state
governments to keep an inordinate amount of money from flowing into state legislative elections.
The attention given by donors to state legislative campaigns is not surprising for two reasons. First,
partisans on both sides of the aisle recently experienced a realization that they can gain power over
redistricting by winning majorities in state legislatures (Epstein 2018). Most state legislatures are
responsible for drawing congressional districts. Majority party state legislators can gerrymander
U.S House of Representatives seats. State legislative redistricting gives donors influence over
federal politics by shaping the makeup of the federal House of Representatives.
Second, donors try to influence state policy through their campaign contributions to
legislators (Powell 2012). Political science research suggests that it is easier to influence state
legislative policy through campaign contributions over Congress. The relative ease of influencing
state legislative policy is well reflected in political science research. Congressional scholars only
enjoyed mixed success demonstrating that donors influence roll call votes (Peoples 2013; Roscoe
and Jenkins 2005). The relationship between state legislators and donors is relatively more
straightforward. State politics research demonstrates that donors have significant sway over the
policy outputs of legislatures through their campaign contributions (Glatnz and Begay 1994;
Powell 2012). Research shows that interest groups are largely unable to influence roll call votes at
the federal level (Austen-Smith 1995, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003, Wawro
2001). The professionalized nature of Congress helps insulate members from outside influences.
Unlike Congress, most state legislators have a limited staff and are in session for only a fraction
of the year (Squire 2017). State legislators do not typically have the resources to gather information
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without the assistance of donors. This can make state legislators especially susceptible to the
influence of their contributors when shaping public policy (Powell 2012).
Under ideal circumstances, each of the major forms of campaign finance laws should
reduce the flow of money into state legislative campaigns. Campaign contribution limits and public
financing ought to legally bar donors from contributing as much as they desire. Disclosure laws
should dissuade donors from providing inordinate amounts of donations by shining a light on their
campaign contributions. Consequently, as donations are impeded in states with strong campaign
finance regulations, interest group influence over policy should weaken.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the donors themselves are relatively unaffected by
campaign finance laws. Donors rarely contribute up to campaign contribution limit maximums.
Indeed, around 90% of campaign donations are made below statutory contribution limits. State
campaign contribution bans usually allow businesses and unions to establish Political Action
Committees to redirect donations. Theoretically, disclosure will only be effective if voters are
paying attention to who is contributing to their legislators. Most voters do not pay attention to
politics, however, weakening the case for disclosure requirements. As noted, public financing is
hardly utilized by candidates. Only Arizona, Maine, and Connecticut operate programs that
regularly entice candidates to forgo private campaign contributions. The others – including
Wisconsin, Nebraska, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and Minnesota – were either gutted by courts or
largely defunded (Kulesza, Miller, Witko 2017). There should be plenty of candidates for donors
to influence even in the presence of public financing.
The importance of money in state elections has led to a robust field of research on campaign
finance regulations. Studies have investigated the effects of state campaign finance law on
donations (Apollonia and LaRaja 2004; Bardwell 2003; Gooch and Rackaway 2014; La Raja and
Shaffner 2015), partisan competition (Hall 2016), elections (Gross, Goidel, and Shields 2002;
Hamm and Hogan 2008; Stratmann 2010; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2006). Most of this
work is focused on campaign contribution limits and public financing, not disclosure.
Scholars show that campaign finance laws enjoy mixed levels of effectiveness. Results
indicate that campaign contribution limits can play a key role in increasing electoral competition
(Besley and Case 2003; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2006) and make legislative policy more
reflective of constituent attitudes (Flavin 2015). Campaign contribution bans against businesses
may severely hinder Republican fundraising efforts (Hall 2016). Public financing and campaign
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contribution limits have no meaningful effect on the equality of political representation (Flavin
2014). Scholars disagree, however, on the effects of public financing on attracting new candidates
(Hamm and Hogan 2008; La Raja 2009; La Raja and Wiltse 2015; Malhotra 2008).
Not much emphasis is placed on how donors themselves respond to campaign finance laws.
Recent scholarship, however, has acknowledged that donor group differences matter in relation to
campaign finance regulations. For example, Barber (2016) demonstrates that limits on ideological
donors may moderate the makeup of state legislatures. Hall (2016) showed that bans on direct
contributions from businesses harm Republican election chances. La Raja and Schaffner (2015)
similarly called for an increase in stringency of campaign finance laws on ideological donors.
Their study reported that campaign contribution limits shifted the percentage makeup of campaign
contributions from various donors during the 2005-2006 election cycle. Their focus, however, was
not specifically on how these donor groups interacted with the campaign finance laws themselves.
Rather, they proposed that campaign finance should be shifted to political parties to reduce the
influence of “purists.”2 Further, they did not analyze the effectiveness of disclosure or public
financing laws.
This dissertation greatly extends the view that donor differences matter in the context of
campaign finance regulations. I argue that campaign finance regulations will be more effective
against certain donors over others based on their underlying contribution strategies. Donors do not
all use the same strategy for building influence in state legislatures. Indeed, contributors have
distinct reasons for providing money. Various political science researchers divide contributors into
business and ideological oriented donors (Snyder 1992).3 Business interest groups donate to
campaigns to receive economic benefits, primarily seeing their donations as investments (Grenzke
1989). Ideology is described by Kalt and Jupan (1990: 104) as "political actors' personal definitions
of the public interest, pursued as a consumption good that yields satisfactions in the form of moral
sentiments.”
Businesses and ideological donors utilize very different methods for shaping policy in
legislatures (Snyder 1992). Seeing campaign contributions as an investment, business interest
Purists are defined by La Raja and Schaffner (2015) as “outsiders whose primary focus is to push policies in
government” whose “principles should trump practical considerations when choosing to give money.”
3
These classifications vary among researchers. For example, La Raja and Shaffner (2015) classify donors into four
groups; parties, unions, ideological groups, and businesses. The more common is the two-group split between
ideological and business groups. Some of my models in Chapters 6-8 break the ideological group down into parties,
unions, businesses, and ideological groups.
2
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groups consistently provide campaign contributions to state legislative candidates throughout their
tenure. They are much more concerned with building a relationship with incumbents that have
relatively more certain reelection chances. Typically, business interest groups do not differentiate
between political parties. They give indiscriminately to whichever party or candidate can provide
them with economic benefits through policy.
Ideological donor campaign contributions are relatively more volatile than those from
business interest groups (Snyder 1992). The amount ideological groups provide to candidates can
shift drastically among candidates. They are not as concerned with building long-term
relationships with incumbents. Instead, ideological donors provide campaign contributions to new
and endangered candidates that conform to their beliefs. Candidates are not likely to make dramatic
shifts in their ideology once in office; thus, there is no need to provide donations to mold their
attitudes. Most ideological group donations are made during a candidates’ first run for office or
when an incumbent is in danger of losing their seat.
I predict that business and ideological groups will not react to campaign finance regulations
in the same way. Specifically, I anticipate that business interest groups will be relatively more
negatively affected by campaign contribution limits, disclosure law, and public financing and
ideological groups. As will be expanded in the next chapter, I argue that campaign contribution
limits are not well suited to the donation patterns of ideological groups. Campaign contributions
are set at a constant level that is not sensitive to members’ tenure. Since ideological groups provide
donations at only one phase of a legislators’ tenure and when legislators are electorally vulnerable,
they are not likely to be phased by campaign contribution limits like business interest groups.
Business groups consistently provide money to candidates. Thus, they are more likely to
consistently meet state campaign contribution limits.
Disclosure laws shine a light on campaign contributions. I argue that publicity for business
group donations is quite different than ideological group donations. Campaign contributing is a
prime reason why ideological groups exist. Donations from ideological groups suggest that they
are taking an active role in our political process. Thus, there is no need for ideological groups to
be concerned about their donations being made public. On the other hand, public opinion polling
shows that the public is highly concerned about the growing influence of corporations in our
political process (Glibert 2016). Thus, I predict that additional publicity will have a negative
impact on business group contribution levels.
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Lastly, I anticipate that public financing laws will cause business interest group donations
to drop more severely than ideological group donations. If a sufficient number of candidates enroll
in public finance programs, there are fewer ways for donors to influence elections. As will be
detailed in chapter 4, business interest groups provide more money to candidates than ideological
groups. Thus, business interest group donation should fall more if public financing programs are
meeting their objectives. That said, if public financing programs are not effective, there should be
no noticeable effect on donations from either group.
1.3 Methodological and Practical Contributions
This dissertation is methodologically unique from other work on campaign finance laws in
several important ways. First, this work directly looks at the interactions between the campaign
finance regulations and the donor. It is not concerned about how campaign finance law can stop
money to affect election (Gross, Goidel, and Shields 2002; Hamm and Hogan 2008; Stratmann
2010; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2006) or policy outcomes (La Raja and Shaffner 2015).
Instead, it is purely interested how donation behaviors are related to the effectiveness of campaign
finance regulations.
Second, this research tests all campaign finance laws simultaneously in the same study.
This allows us to understand the relative impacts of disclosure law, public financing, and campaign
contribution limits against the other forms. I will be able to directly ascertain which campaign
finance regulation is most impactful at shifting contributing patterns among donor groups from the
same underlying donor data source.
Third, this work will test the effects of specific facets of campaign finance regulations on
donations. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the primary dependent variable of this
analysis is an updated Witko Index (2005). The Witko Index (2005) breaks state campaign finance
regulations down into twenty-two individual regulations. The comprehensiveness of the Witko
Index (2005) provides an opportunity to investigate the broad diversity of state campaign finance
law that is unmatched in current research. Not only will I be able to assess the full relative
effectiveness of the three major forms of campaign finance laws but also the distinct attributes of
each statute. Thus, I can examine which form of disclosure law, campaign contribution limits, and
public financing are most effective at achieving their objectives.
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Finally, I use an exceptionally robust dataset to understand donor behavior. To ensure
generalizable findings and assess the full impact of state campaign finance laws, I include
contribution data on all candidates running for State House/Assembly and Senate from 1999-2014
across all fifty states. The National Institute on Money in State Politics, which has compiled the
most comprehensive information on state legislative campaign contributions of any source,
provides my donation data. The complete dataset for this study contains contribution information
on 112,921 candidacies. I separated these data into business and ideological groups.
It is important to note that this dissertation only investigates direct donations to candidates,
not soft money. Including independent expenditures in this study would create problems that are
impossible to overcome. First, campaign finance laws are not typically designed to tackle
independent expenditures. State efforts to rein in independent expenditures became much more
complicated after the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (558 U.S. 310 [2010])4
decision. Even stringent disclosure requirements, which are usually upheld by federal and state
courts, are oftentimes struck down when they regulate independent expenditures. There are also
potential issues with the validity of a dataset that tries to assign independent expenditures to a
specific campaign. Admittedly, various good government groups, including the National Institute
on Money in State Politics, made great strides in finding the sources of independent expenditures.
Independent expenditures are still notoriously difficult to track and sometimes difficult to attribute
to a specific candidate.
The practical implications of the research presented here can be far-reaching. As the public
becomes more concerned with campaign contributions influencing elections at the state level, this
analysis could shed light on the best mechanisms to rein in interest group influence over policy
formation. States continuously grapple with how they should formulate their campaign finance
laws. State governments are also under significant pressure by the courts to develop campaign
finance laws that are not seen as an impediment to First Amendment rights. Any regulation that is
insignificantly related to campaign contributions will obviously suggest that it is not an appropriate
tool for removing money from state elections. Instead, policymakers can turn their attention to
enacting campaign finance regulations that will have a negative impact on donations. Further, it

4

Referred to as Citizens United throughout the rest of this dissertation.
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may point to the effectiveness of certain campaign finance regulations that regularly pass
constitutional muster in court.
1.4 Dissertation Outline
In the next chapter, I will present my theoretical approach to understanding the relationship
between ideological groups, business groups, and campaign finance regulations. I begin by
discussing the differences in contribution patterns between the two types of donors. I then describe
previous literature on the influence of interest groups. Finally, I formally present my three
hypotheses on how I expect campaign contribution limits, disclosure law, and public financing
will shift the donation behaviors of ideological and business groups.
Chapter three offers a historical background of campaign finance regulation in the
American states. While this analysis is predominately quantitative, the historical analysis will
serve two primary purposes. First, I will demonstrate that modern campaign finance regulations
were not designed to be ineffective regulations as some suggest. Rather, they were purposefully
built to impact the flow of money to campaigns. Second, the analysis will provide a background
in how campaign finance laws were made to impact specific types of donors. This will help
emphasize the importance of group differences in their relation to the three major types of
campaign finance laws.
Chapter four provides a descriptive analysis of my data. The purpose of this chapter is to
provide guidance to my model specification in chapter five. The large dataset could present unique
distribution issues that must be addressed for my hypothesis testing, making such an analysis
prudent. Further, modeling campaign contributions is a highly complex endeavor. A plethora of
national, statewide, and individual variables will inevitably affect the amount of donations
contributed to candidates. A descriptive analysis should provide important insights about which
variables I should control for in my hypothesis testing.
Chapter five will describe the methodological approach that I will use to test my
hypotheses. My models will test campaign finance laws’ ability to restrict donations to individuals
and equalize the amount of funds contributed to candidates running for the same election. Here I
will provide my rationale for how I separated the financiers of state legislative elections into
ideological and business groups. For reasons I describe in more detail in chapters four and five,
the distribution of the data calls for the use of Tobit models. Tobit models are particularly useful
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for data that do not take on a value less than zero. Based on the results from the descriptive analysis,
the errors in each model will be clustered around the states to not overstate the effect of campaign
finance laws on donations.
I test my hypotheses in chapters six through eight. Campaign contribution limits, disclosure
law, and public financing will each be given their own thorough analyses. In each of these chapters,
I will provide a basic overview of the respective sub-indexes and test their validity. Further, I will
systematically describe in these chapters how I expect each individual regulation in the sub-index
to affect campaign contributions.
Chapter nine will conclude with the potential implications of the findings in this research.
I will discuss which campaign finance regulations tended to have the strongest impact on campaign
contributions. I will also provide ideas where this research can be expanded for future projects.
Specifically, I suggest that future research on campaign finance laws would benefit from
incorporating the contribution patterns of donors into explanatory models.
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CHAPTER 2. THEORY

2.1 Overview of Primary Theory
Campaign money has fascinated and worried students of state politics for decades. These
worries typically are coupled with calls to enact more stringent campaign finance regulation. States
do not heed these calls uniformly. Indeed, the American states vary wildly in the stringency of
their campaign finance law statutes (Hogan 2005; Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016;
Stratmann 2010; Witko 2005). Higher legislative professionalism, more progressive citizens,
increased incidence of scandal, and state initiative processes shape state campaign finance law
(Witko 2007). Conversely, states with more expensive campaigns are likely to resist any change
in state campaign finance law, ensuring that candidates will be able successfully to raise enough
funds to mount a serious campaign (Witko 2007). Still, campaign finance law has become more
stringent over the past two decades, particularly regarding statutes on public finance and campaign
contribution limits (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016).
The amount of money donated and spent in state legislative elections continues to increase
with each passing election cycle, even in states with relatively stringent campaign finance
regulations. To some, the amount of money donated and spent during elections signals that
campaign finance regulations are ineffective (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003).
Indeed, it would not be too surprising to find through formal testing that campaign finance laws
are nothing more than a public relations façade. In most cases, the state legislators tasked with
designing and enacting the new campaign finance regulations are those who will be affected by
them the most. Legislators have every opportunity to design campaign finance regulations that are
loophole-ridden with limits far above what they would expect to receive for their reelection efforts.
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, history shows that under many instances, numerous campaign
finance regulations were purposefully designed to be ineffective or to provide a political party with
a competitive advantage in elections. These loopholes could allow donors to contribute to state
legislative candidates unhindered.
I assert that it is a mistake to suggest that all campaign finance laws are worthless. Instead,
I argue that the effectiveness of campaign finance regulation is dependent upon the activities of
the donor that the law is meant to regulate. Thus, my work investigates the relationship between
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donors’ contribution behaviors and campaign finance law. I base my argument on two underlying
assumptions. First, I contend that the effectiveness of the campaign finance regulation is based on
the motivation of the donor seeking to influence legislators. Political scientists have long
recognized that donors have different ambitions for providing money to campaigns. The most
common classification originated from the works of Welch (1982) and Snyder (1992). Snyder
(1992) classifies donors into “investor PACs” and “ideological PACs” According to Snyder
(1992), the first group typically has narrow economic interests and is made up of corporations,
trade associations, unions, and farming cooperatives. The second group in Snyder’s (1992)
classification, ideological PACs, has “broad ideological goals” and hopes to shape election results.
I extend Snyder’s (1992) theoretical framework to better understand the effectiveness of
campaign finance law with one slight adjustment. Very similar to the Snyder (1992) classification,
I refer to contributors driven by economic motives as “business interest” groups and ideologically
motivated donors as “ideological” groups.5 Political scientists understand that donor behavior
differs between contributors, previous work has not investigated how these different strategies
interact with campaign finance law. The central contribution of this work is to test if the different
donations strategies between business and ideological groups will interact differently with
campaign finance law.
The relevance of this dichotomy to the underlying effectiveness of campaign finance law
may not seem obvious at first. Previous research shows that these two divergent motivations for
building influence translate into starkly different contribution strategies. Business interest groups
provide funds to incumbents on a consistent basis hoping to develop long-term relationships. For
a brief example to demonstrate this point, the long-standing relations between business groups and
legislators may be revealed under disclosure law, putting pressure on businesses to withhold
contributions. Ideological groups provide most funds to ideologically similar new candidates and
those who may lose reelection (Snyder 1992). Once these candidates are elected, ideological
groups assume that newly minted legislators will maintain ideological consistency (Barber 2016;
Ensley 2009). Contributing for ideological groups is central to their participation in politics.
Disclosure will not likely change ideological groups’ contribution behaviors.

5

This slight change in language reflects that I investigate all donations from contributors, not only those originating
from PACs.
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I also contend that legislators have different incentives for regulating ideological and
business interest groups. It is unlikely that legislators would be willing to pass campaign finance
regulations on their most ardent political supporters, including political parties, individual
contributors, and other candidates. Thus, I argue that campaign finance regulations should be more
effective for groups seeking access than ideological leaning donors. These strategies are also likely
to interact differently with one size fits all campaign finance regulations.
In this chapter, I present my hypotheses on campaign finance regulation. First, I will
discuss how groups differ in their donation strategies to build influence. Then I shall review the
literature on how states have attempted to limit and dissuade donations and present my hypotheses.
I argue that campaign finance regulations are designed to affect business interest groups more than
ideological groups. Legislators have less incentive to regulate ideologically leaning groups over
business donors.
2.2 Differences in Contribution Strategies Among Donors
Campaign finance regulation is only substantively meaningful if money donated from
interest groups translates into influence over policy. If donors had no sway over legislators, there
would be no need for the states or the federal government to regulate campaign contributions.
Unfortunately, most work that tests how much influence interest groups have over the legislative
process has been conducted on Congress, not the state legislatures. Congressional research
literature is still relevant beyond the institutional parallels that they share. At its heart, it speaks to
an ongoing debate on how interest groups and donors influence policy and can easily be applied
to the state legislatures.
Over the past few decades, evidence on how much interest groups can directly or indirectly
influence Congress through campaign contributions has been exceptionally mixed, generating
highly contradictory results that cannot easily be reconciled (Austen-Smith 1995; Bergan 2010;
Peoples 2013; Smith 2015). Following conventional wisdom, early political science scholarship
mostly assumed that interest groups have a great deal of influence over the legislative process
through their contributions (Austen-Smith 1995). Logically, since legislators wish to get reelected
(Mayhew 1974), campaign contributions provide an essential inroad for these groups to sway
legislative behavior (Clawson et al. 1998; Powell, 2012; Peoples 2013; Groseclose and Snyder
1996; Schram 1995).
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Assuming that interest groups are unable to affect roll call votes as most literature suggests;
the question becomes what other benefits can they receive from legislators? Tullock (1972)
initially viewed contributions as an investment in political outcomes. Limited work suggests that
campaign contributions could be considered as consumption rather than investment
(Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003). Most campaign contributions from interest
groups are well below the maximum amounts allowed by state and federal law.6 They also mostly
originate from individuals, not from interest groups (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder
2003). Under the view that donations are consumption, donors provide contributions to be an
active part of the political process. Lobbyists and special interests are seeking to be an accepted
part of the political establishment, eager to take part in the social aspects of politics. This
explanation has enjoyed the same level of attention and empirical scrutiny as other theories.
A more common and likely explanation of why donors contribute suggests that groups
differ in the way they influence policy7. Political Action Committees (PACs) and business interest
groups provide campaign contributions to Congressional candidates to gain access to their
lobbyists (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Although lobbying itself does not directly buy influence, it
does allow interest groups to provide substantial information to candidates that may frame their
perception of specific policy areas (Smith 2015). Interest groups pour significant funds into their
lobbying efforts in addition to providing candidates with direct campaign contributions. Specific
work has demonstrated that lobbying activities are tied to the amount of campaign funds available
to a firm (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Sabato 1984). Firms that donate
substantial funds to candidates tend to also spend more on lobbying activities (Ansolabehere,
Snyder and Tripathi 2002; Bergen 2010; Smith 2015).
Access seeking groups (primarily businesses) have a few discernable qualities that differ
from ideological groups. For one, these groups tend to be mostly disinterested in ideological
causes. Instead, access seeking groups tend to favor moderation and incumbency (Barber 2015;
Fouirnaies and Hall 2014). These groups also tend to provide campaign contributions consistently
throughout the tenure of the member of the legislator (Snyder 1992). This strategy is founded on
the idea that it takes time for legislators to craft policy and to learn about the policy positions of
6

. This point will be discussed in great detail later and is central to hypotheses on campaign contribution finance law.
As will be discussed more in detail later, ideological groups also wish to be an active part in the political process. I
assume that contributing is a central part of their existence, unlike business groups where the primary motive is
profit making.
7
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the donor (Barber 2015). Business interest groups also do not usually care which political party
receives resources (Herrnson 1995). They typically provide campaign contributions to any
candidate that can forward their policy agenda, regardless of party membership.
Ideologically motivated donors have starkly different attitudes on providing campaign
contributions. Instead of giving these funds throughout a members’ tenure, they mostly donate to
new candidates and legislators at risk of losing their seat (Snyder 1992). These groups typically
include individuals, single-issue groups, political parties, other candidates, and unions. Legislators
rarely change their ideological position with time (Poole 2007), so ideological groups do not need
to consistently provide campaign contributions to garner their support. Ideological donors’ focus
is to keep likeminded individuals in office so that these individuals will pass policy that is
consistent with their preferences (Snyder 1993).
As noted, donor behavior is primarily investigated at the federal level. In a sense, this
research bias towards Congress is for the sake of convenience. It is easier for researchers to test
hypotheses on two fully professionalized legislative chambers as opposed to ninety-nine that
substantially differs from one other (Powell 2012). That said, states are critical actors in designing
policy (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). It is essential to understand if campaign finance
regulations, which are intended to break money’s influence over the electoral process, meet their
objectives.
The next section details recent research at the state level. As will be discussed, campaign
finance research shows that donors have sway over the state legislative policy outcomes. Further,
evidence shows that campaign finance regulation may have a key role in ensuring that policy
reflects constituent policy preferences. This gives a critical clue that campaign finance regulations
affect donor behavior.
2.3 Interest Group Lobbying at the State Level
As discussed, campaign finance laws only matter for researchers if they break donors’
influence on legislators. Before testing this assertion, it must be shown that state legislators are
swayed by campaign contributions. Among political science scholarship, Powell (2012) provides
the most conclusive evidence that interest group contributions affect state legislative policy
outputs. Powell’s (2012) theoretical framework tackles the relationship between donors and
legislators in a unique way. Powell (2012) assumes that state legislatures take the time to approach
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interest groups to extract campaign contributions. Legislators' time is not unlimited, however
(Powell 2012). Members must balance their time between legislating and fundraising for their
reelection efforts. As legislators decide to put more time into fundraising, they may be harming
their chances to connect with constituents and understand their constituents’ policy preferences.
Instead, their time is used by interacting with influence seeking interest groups. With this, Powell
(2012) finds that donors seeking access can directly influence policy through their campaign
contributions by purchasing access while legislators spend time seeking funds.
The question then becomes: why does political science research demonstrate that interest
groups are influential in the state legislatures and not Congress? Some of this difference in donor
group influence at the state versus federal levels comes down to simple differences in
professionalism levels between the state legislatures and Congress. Among the most dramatic ways
state legislatures differ from Congress is the inability for most members of State
Houses/Assemblies to work full time as legislators. Most state legislators serve in chambers that
provide limited financial or professional benefits (Squire 1993). Staffs help shield legislators from
interest group influence. State legislators are not policy experts in all fields, needing to rely on
others to get information to create policy. This provides donors with a vital opening to sway
individual members. Interest groups’ relative importance in providing this information to a state
legislator, however, is somewhat reliant upon how much legislative staff is provided. Both
legislative staff and interest groups provide an integral service in informing state legislators about
the policies they are voting on. Without a large fulltime staff (which is the norm for most state
legislators), legislators will give more attention to interest groups and donors for information,
giving donors significant sway over policy decisions (Ozymy and Rey 2011).
Professionalized legislatures are not as susceptible to donor pressure. Professional
legislatures have the capital to shield their members from interest group influence. Since
professionalized legislatures have access to resources to attain better career prospects, there is less
of a need for these members to rely on interest groups to provide post-elective employment
(Ozymy and Rey 2011). Members of professionalized legislatures can also count on the ample
support provided by their relatively large staffs to make policy decisions (Berkman 2000). Interest
groups in professionalized legislators are no longer as necessary when state legislators are seeking
policy information, potentially weakening one conduit interest groups have in exerting influence.
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From this research on state campaign contributions, I can conclude that donors influence
state legislative policy. Thus, state campaign finance regulation is a noteworthy topic to study. Of
course, donor influence over policy is not solely dependent upon the professionalism of the state
legislature. Rather, lower professionalism levels only partially explain why donors are more
influential at the state level rather than in Congress. Donors’ campaign contribution patterns must
be considered to understand how they build influence fully. Like at the federal level, donations to
state legislators are variable. As will be shown in more detail in the next chapter, ideological and
business group campaign contributions patterns are identical at the state and federal levels (Berber
2016). At the state level, ideological groups donate to candidates primarily in their first term in
office, while business interest groups and PACs provide consistent campaign contributions.
2.4 Campaign Finance Laws
Campaign finance laws are the primary way that states break the relationship between
contributor money and policy. How differences in campaign contribution strategies interact with
campaign finance regulations, however, have not been fully studied. Campaign finance regulations
must be able to meet their basic function in reducing the flow of money to donors to ensure that
legislators are not unduly influenced by donors over constituents, regardless of the underlying
motivations for providing funds. This can be complicated, however, if campaign contributions
from groups vary and the campaign finance regulations are not designed to account for these
differences.
Political science research recognizes three types of campaign finance law currently used
by state governments to reduce money in campaigns: contribution limits, public finance law, and
disclosure requirements (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016; Primo and Milyo 2006; Witko
2005, 2007). The attention that is placed on each of these regulations by scholars is unbalanced,
however. Following federal and state court challenges, scholars have largely been focused on
campaign contribution limits and public finance laws. Both types of regulations have exceptionally
well-developed and distinct literatures. Each campaign finance regulation has significantly
different effects on elections, interest group influence, and campaign donations, but no research
literature has investigated how interest groups are affected differently based on their donation
strategies.
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Research does not definitively show that campaign finance law stringency significantly
alters state legislative campaigns, leading some to believe that campaign finance laws are useless.
Some scholars show that campaign finance law stringency can heighten electoral competition, but
only under certain conditions (Hamm and Hogan 2008; Malhotra 2008; Mayer and Wood 1995).
For example, evidence has demonstrated that public finance law has been effective in leveling the
playing field for challengers seeking office, particularly when these laws are coupled with strict
campaign contribution limits (Stratmann 2010). The number of challengers increases with higher
levels of public finance law for gubernatorial (Bardwell 2003), but not necessarily for state
legislative elections (La Raja and Wiltse 2015; Hamm and Hogan 2008). The number of
challengers in an election is only a single facet of electoral competition, however. Ultimately, the
most direct measure of electoral competition is the amount of turnover in a chamber. Even as more
challengers announce their candidacy, it does not suggest that incumbents will lose their advantage
and be defeated in an election. As campaign finance law stringency is strengthened, however, there
tends to be a negligible effect in lowering incumbency reelection rates (La Raja and Schaffner
2014). These programs may only encourage challengers to run.
Early literature suggested that legislators create regulations that can be easily worked
around by the incumbent legislators who designed them (Malbin and Gais 1998). Since this initial
research, there has been little evidence that campaigns are easily able to avoid state campaign
finance regulation (Hogan 2000; Stratman 2010). Indeed, various scholars have argued that
incumbents use campaign finance law to depress challenger fundraising, effectively using a law
intended to increase incumbent accountability to their electoral advantage (Lott 2006; Stratman
2010; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2006). Incumbents, who use name recognition and office
related benefits (e.g., mailers, constituent services, and their legislative records), can achieve an
election win without needing to spend funds directed at building a campaign organization and
improving their name recognition (Gierzynski and Breaux 1996). This incumbency advantage has
been demonstrated in campaign finance literature with both state legislative and judicial elections,
where campaign contribution limits tend to provide the incumbent with a significant competitive
advantage over challengers (Bonneau and Cann 2011; Kousser and LaRaja 2002). Since
challengers are typically less well known by the public, campaign funds are necessary to provide
information to voters about their policy positions (Gierzynski and Breaux 1996). Without this
information, voters will be more likely to vote for the familiar incumbent (Carey, Niemi, and
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Powell 2000; Jewell and Breaux 1998; Stratman and Aparicio-Castillo 2006). Certain early
campaign finance work demonstrated that incumbents might also rely on campaign finance law to
build public trust in government (Coleman and Manna 2000).
Most importantly, research suggests that campaign finance law stringency can play a key
role in reducing contributions from interest groups, potentially reducing their influence over the
policy process (Flavin 2015). As Powell (2012) indicated, interest groups can influence policy
decisions in the state legislature through campaign contributions. If the state legislatures are
affected by interest groups through campaign contributions (Monardi and Glantz 1998; Powell
2012), campaign finance law can play a vital role in ensuring legislative responsiveness to a greater
number of constituents, thus shifting the policy preferences of the chambers (Flavin 2015). By
reducing the influence of wealthy donors, candidates take policy directions that are more in line
with their constituents (Flavin 2015). This link strongly suggests that interest groups are affecting
campaign finance regulations themselves.
2.5 Campaign Contribution Limits
The effects of campaign contribution limits on donations should be relatively
straightforward. For contribution limits to be successful, total donations should decrease, and
electoral competition should rise. Previous research has yet to investigate a central impetus that
could complicate the relationship between campaign finance laws and their effectiveness on
donations – viz., that the underlying motivations for providing the campaign contribution are not
the same among donors. This leads to my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis One: Campaign contribution limits will affect ideological group
contributions less than business group donations.

Since ideological and business interest groups have separate and distinct reasons for
providing donations to legislative campaigns, I contend that they will be affected differently by
campaign finance law. I hypothesize that campaign contribution limits will affect ideological
group contributions less than business group donations. This includes both the amount of money
they raise and the potential for contribution limits to force candidates to raise equal amounts of
money. In some sense, the question of the effectiveness of campaign contribution limits to
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constrain donations has already been shown. Berber (2016) demonstrated that overall campaign
contributions and the average donation size were sensitive to the level of limits. Berber (2016) was
interested in how these limits lead to more ideological legislators conditional on whether limits
were placed on ideological or PAC donations. Interestingly, the study did not fundamentally see
if the effects of the underlying regulations were different.
There are two reasons why I believe business groups will be more affected by campaign
contribution limits over ideological groups. The first reflects basic campaign contribution patterns
of business interest groups. Since ideological groups seek the election of like-minded legislators,
campaign contributions from ideological groups will be highest when candidates are running for
their first term. Campaign contribution limits will be most impactful for ideological groups at this
time since they are providing the highest level of donations in the first term. Simply, by
maximizing their contribution totals, ideological groups are more likely to run against the
contribution limit. On the other hand, business interest groups must consistently provide relatively
elevated levels of campaign contributions to build and maintain influence with legislators. Thus,
campaign contribution limits will be more effective at removing money originating from business
interest groups in later terms of a state legislator’s tenure simply because they are proving more
donations than ideological groups.
The second a related reason concerns the potential political consequences of campaign
contribution limits. As will be further expanded upon in the next chapter, there are important
partisan electoral consequences that result from campaign contribution limits. As noted, state
campaign finance limits can be specifically tailored to affect particular groups. For example, states
can design their campaign contribution limits to impact unions, corporations, individuals, or parties
separately (Witko 2007). This can have electoral consequences for the groups hoping to influence
election outcomes. For example, direct corporate contribution bans are linked to more success for
Democrats in state legislative elections (Hall 2016). Hall (2016) states that corporations primarily
provide campaign contributions to Republican candidates. Thus, bans on corporate campaign
contributions will disproportionally affect contributions to Republican state legislative candidates,
putting them at a disadvantage at building their vote share.
All candidates are unlikely to limit campaign contributions from their closest personal
friends and political allies, particularly political parties, single-issue groups, and other candidates.
Previous research has shown that ideological donations and campaign contributions interact

23
differently than business limits. As noted, Berber (2016) demonstrates that higher campaign
contribution limits to individual/ideological groups led to more ideological members of the state
legislature. If these legislators are tasked with designing campaign finance laws, it is even more
unlikely they will hinder ideologically motivated groups from donating, thus limiting the impact
of these limits. There is no constitutional way for state law to distinguish between Democratic and
Republican supported groups. Thus, I predict that donations from these ideologically leaning
groups should less affected by campaign contribution limits.
I should note that this hypothesis deviates significantly from previous work on campaign
contribution limits. Traditionally, state legislative scholars only investigate campaign contribution
totals across all donors (Apollonia and LaRaja 2004; Bardwell 2003) or include a very specific
and limited number of interest group types in their research (Gooch and Rackaway 2014; Hall
2016). As such, previous work suggests that campaign contribution limits can affect the flow of
money to incumbents quite effectively, potentially leveling the playing field for challengers
(Hogan 2004). Challengers and those running for open seats tend to be relatively unaffected by
campaign contribution limits, considering they traditionally begin with a disadvantage in
fundraising relative to incumbents (Hogan 2000). These models explained only a very small
portion of the total variance, however, at R^2=.081 (Hogan 2000).
Interestingly, spending tends to have a low (Gerber 1998) or no effect on vote share for
both incumbents and challengers (Palda and Palda 1998). Campaign contribution limits tend to
make spending more productive for both challengers and incumbents, however (Stratmann 2003).
Specifically, campaign spending between challengers and incumbents is nearly equally effective
in building vote share in states with strict campaign contribution limits (Stratmann 2003).
My hypothesis introduces the differences in contribution patterns between donors. Very
little work integrates the diversity of donors and how they may be affected by campaign
contribution limits differently. As discussed by Welch (1980), Snyder (1992), and Cassie and
Thompson (1998), campaign contribution patterns are distinctly different among interest groups
based on the types of policy outcomes they hope to achieve. To recap, business interest groups
seek to make changes in the law that will benefit profit-seeking organizations. Members with more
experience in office are more likely to receive contributions from these interest groups. Senior
members are more likely to be successful in passing legislation that benefits these groups, giving
incentive to regulatory groups to provide these members with funds to keep them in office. On the
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other hand, ideologically based groups, who are more concerned about building a majority in the
state legislature, primarily use their funds to assist new candidates and endangered incumbents
seeking election. Thus, they are unlikely to provide a significant amount of campaign contributions
to incumbent state legislators, unless they are likely to lose their seat (Wright 1985), leading them
to provide fewer campaign funds after the first term in office.
2.6 Disclosure Requirements
The underlying motivations for why business interest and ideological groups donate may
emit different perceptions of corruption to constituents and voters. I assert that the public, voters,
and candidates do not view donations from business and ideological groups the same. This leads
to the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis Two: Disclosure requirements will negatively affect contributions from
business interest groups but will not negatively impact ideological groups.

Campaign contributions from an ideological group serve as a valuable heuristic for a
candidate's supporters and opponents alike. A campaign contribution from an ideological group
demonstrates that the individual conforms to the group's beliefs. This signals other likeminded
individuals to support the candidate receiving the contribution. But most important and central to
this analysis, ideological donors seek political activity and are unlikely to shy away from
contributing. Donating to candidates demonstrates that ideological groups are active in the political
sphere. Disclosure law does nothing but show that ideological groups participate in campaigning.
Thus, it is unlikely that disclosure requirements will have a significant effect on campaign
contributions. To many of these groups, there is nothing to lose by providing their preferred
candidates with prominent levels of campaign contributions, and it is made known to the public.
Business interest groups, on the other hand, may put their candidate at electoral risk if their
contributions are revealed. As discussed, business interest group donations are primarily provided
to incumbent legislators. Business interest groups intend to use regulations to shift competition in
their favor, which is unlikely to be popular with most voters. Thus, total and average campaign
contributions from business interest groups will be negatively affected by disclosure requirements.
As reported by Gallup (2016), the American public consistently believes that corporations have
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too much influence over politics.8 Public polling from Pew (2017) shows that ideological groups,
like unions, do not suffer from the same levels of negative attitudes from the public. Gallup (2017)
showed that 39% of Americans believed that unions should have more significant influence. Of
course, there are partisan differences in these attitudes, but the general difference still holds across
the wider public (Maniam 2017).
There is a dearth of research conducted on the electoral effects of campaign disclosure
requirements compared to the other two forms of campaign finance laws (Carpenter II et al. 2014).
This is surprising considering that disclosure requirements are often found to be the most widely
accepted and least controversial campaign finance regulations by incumbents and voters alike
(Carpenter II et al. 2014; Briffault 2011; Gross and Goidel 2003). The limited research on
disclosure law demonstrates that there may be unintended consequences in reducing electoral
competition. Disclosure requirements may dissuade individuals from running for office.
Candidates and citizens are often highly unsure and unknowledgeable about the legal complexities
surrounding campaign finance law disclosure. Indeed, in an experiment conducted by Milyo
(2007), only 41% of 255 participants were willing to fill out all campaign disclosure forms, and
not even one was successful in doing so correctly (Carpenter II et al. 2014).
There is a question if voters pay attention to public campaign finance records. It is well
known that the public has minimal information about politics in general (Converse 1964: Lupia
1994; Bartels 1996). It is more unlikely that voters pay attention to campaign contribution records.
Indeed, when disclosure laws are strong, even the media pays very little attention to campaign
contributions. As disclosure laws become more stringent, reporting in the media only increases
slightly (La Raja 2007). This does not mean, however, that disclosure laws do not change the
behavior of the donors themselves. Small donors are less likely to donate when campaign
disclosure laws are stringent (La Raja 2014). Thus, it is valid to ask if donors will shift their
campaign contribution patterns under various forms of disclosure requirements.
Indeed, it is certain that the clear majority of campaign contributions provided by interest
groups go completely unnoticed. Campaign contributions from these groups are often emphasized
to paint a candidate's opponents in a negative light. Campaign contributions can be especially
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useful in negative advertisements. In recent years, both Republicans and Democrats have used
contributions as campaign fodder. Certain candidates, like Bernie Sanders, used corporate
campaign contributions as a central tenant of their campaigns (Goodman 2015). Thus, campaigns
should be careful not to be viewed by the public as being captured by business interest groups.
2.7 Public Financing
Public financing is arguably the surest way to remove donor influence in state legislative
campaigns. Candidates are required to forgo most, if not all, private donations to receive public
financing. Thus, the need for private donors is completely removed, breaking all the influence they
exert over legislative policy through their campaign contributions. Once again, I assert that public
financing will not affect all donor groups equally, leading to the third and final hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: Public finance laws will affect business interest donators more than
ideological donations.

I predict that public finance laws are more effective against business interest donations than
ideological donations. In a sense, this hypothesis is highly counterintuitive. Public finance laws
should remove most campaign contributions from both ideological and business interest groups.
There should be no discrimination between the groups that are barred from donating. Indeed, in
states such as Connecticut, candidates must typically forgo collecting funds from individual donors
to qualify for public funds.
The reason business groups are more affected may come down to party politics and history.
But first, there is a question if public financing programs are still effective after decades of
challenges in courts and the state legislatures. Research shows that the effectiveness of public
financing programs is highly uncertain (Malhorta 2008). Many of these programs have been
woefully underfunded or partially struck down in federal courts (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg
2016). Although legally in operation, the public finance laws will be ineffective if there are no
funds available. Currently, only the Connecticut program is growing in use. Wisconsin’s program
was defunded; the programs in Arizona and Maine were gutted by the Arizona Free Enterprise
Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett (564 U.S. 721 [2011]) decision, and Hawaii’s program is
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underfunded. This point can be best explained and expanded upon by detailing the history of public
financing, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.
As noted, this dissertation primarily focuses on donor behavior in the face of campaign
finance laws. This angle causes some complications for my theoretical framework on public
financing. Unlike contribution limits and disclosure laws, public financing places restrictions on
contributions that are willingly accepted by the candidate. Candidates must voluntarily enroll in
public financing. When candidates enlist in public financing, donors have no choice but to restrict
their contributions. This is especially true under Clean Elections Laws, where donors are
completely barred from contributing to state legislative campaigns. Thus, the mechanics of public
financing introduces some considerations to candidate behavior as well into this study.
Candidates’ decisions to accept public financing rests on the generosity of contributors, the
stigma of public financing, and the ease of signing up for the program (Malhorta 2008). It is
unlikely that candidates will enroll in public financing if private donors are willing to provide more
money than the subsidy total. Anecdotal evidence from the states suggests that the subsidies are
not enough to entice most candidates to forgo private donations. Indeed, in recent years, public
financing enrollment has been quite low for state legislative candidates9. Many programs, such as
those in Hawaii and Minnesota, have very little participation because the financial support
provided to candidates is wholly inadequate. Candidates who would accept public money from
these programs would mainly make their campaigns noncompetitive (Kulesza, Witko, and
Waltenburg 2016). Other states, such as Wisconsin and Massachusetts, legally maintained a public
finance program but were defunded by the legislature. This made these programs insolvent, barring
any candidates from effectively using the program.
Public finance laws are not always used by challengers even when the program is funded
by the state legislature. Public financing suffers from negative stigmas among those seeking office.
There is a concern by many candidates that public finance laws could harm their ability to have
sufficient funds necessary to run an effective campaign. Thus, public finance law program
effectiveness could be primarily determined by individual characteristics of the candidate
(Malhorta 2008).
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Public finance programs are not always well understood by candidates either, leading to
substantial underutilization of available campaign funds (Malhorta 2008). Certain candidates are
often completely unaware that public finance programs are available in their state. Often, public
finance programs are not well advertised by state governments. Candidates may also be reluctant
to use them due to their legal complexity. Public finance programs commonly place exceptionally
complicated fundraising restrictions on candidates. This dramatically reduces public finance
program used by candidates in elections that may otherwise become more competitive with higher
utilization (Malhorta 2008).
Unsurprisingly, research also demonstrated that campaign spending (Hogan 2000) and
fundraising (Francia and Hernson 2003) in state legislative races is reduced for incumbents in
states that employ public finance programs. This is to be expected, however, by understanding the
statutory provisions in most state public finance laws. Public finance programs have been
purposefully designed to reduce the total campaign spending in an election by requiring members
to comply with spending limits before accepting state funding. For incumbents who have built
relationships with interest groups, public finance programs could severely limit their ability to
collect donations. Conversely, public finance programs tend to increase spending for challengers
(Hogan 2000). Because many challengers are merely unable to fundraise at equal levels to
incumbents, public finance programs provide their campaigns with much-needed lifelines when
attempting to mount a serious campaign.
Adequately designed public financing programs, however, can have far-reaching impacts
on legislative campaigns. As noted by Powell (2012) and Francia and Herrnson (2003), fundraising
takes away considerable time from a state legislator’s schedule. By providing a reliable source of
campaign funds, public finance programs allow candidates to reduce the time they spend seeking
campaign contributions from interest groups and individual donors (Francia and Herrnson 2003).
Candidates who accept full or partial funding only spend approximately 15% of their time on
fundraising, as opposed to 30% of candidates who do not partake in the public finance program.
This allows candidates to spend time on other campaign activities with constituents as opposed to
interest groups (Francia and Hernnson 2003).
My hypothesis is founded upon on the politics behind these programs and how partisan
division shaped the design of public financing programs. Modern state public financing laws
followed the enactment of FECA, which established the federal program. As will be expanded
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upon in the next chapter, the federal public financing program was purposefully designed by
Democrats to hinder Republican fundraising efforts from business interest groups (La Raja 2008).
Since modern state programs were designed after FECA, it can be expected that their effects will
be the same. Ideological group contributions should be relatively less hindered by public finance
law.
The question becomes, why would donations from business interest groups be more
negatively impacted than ideological groups by public financing systems? The reason why
business groups will be more affected by public financing is exceptionally simple. The answer
centers around how these groups respond to candidates’ decision to accept public financing. If
public financing provides a sufficient amount of monetary support, candidates will accept
subsidies in lieu of private donations. As the proportion of candidates that take public financing
increases, the number of candidates for business and ideological groups can donate to declines.
Of course, there are always candidates that do not accept public financing.10 Neither group
of donors, however, is likely to made contributions to candidates that have a high probability of
losing the election. Business interest groups have relatively more resources to donate than
ideological groups. Thus, the effect size will inevitably be smaller for ideological groups than
business groups when testing the impacts of public financing on private contributing. At face
value, this may seem too intuitive of a hypothesis to test. If my models suggest that donations from
business groups decline more than donations from ideological groups, there is evidence that public
financing are meeting their objectives. Naturally, the success of public financing in meeting these
objections will depend partially on their design. Thus, I will control for variation in public
financing statutes.
2.8 Conclusion
In sum, political science research has presented exceptionally mixed conclusions on the
impact of campaign contributions on legislative behavior and their campaigns. Ultimately, severe
methodological differences have affected this research, generating conflicting findings on
campaign finance law. Though it is unclear if interest groups provide campaign funds to influence
state legislators, campaign contribution limits, public finance laws, and disclosure regulations have
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been enacted to break this relationship. These regulations have had mixed success in achieving
their intended goals, however. Campaign contribution limits only tend to affect election outcomes
when they are deficient, explicitly giving challengers the ability to raise similar levels of funding
to incumbents. Previous work has shown that public finance programs tend to be the most
successful at reducing campaign contributions and stemming interest group influences. On the
other hand, very little research on disclosure requirements and campaign contributions has been
conducted.
No work on campaign contribution finance stringency law has attempted to integrate the
interest group classifications used in earlier work by Welch (1980) and Snyder (1992) on Congress.
As discussed by Welch (1980), Snyder (1992), and Cassie and Thompson (1998), campaign
contribution patterns of ideological and business groups are quite different. When interest groups
perceive that benefits will not be immediately delivered, they will consistently provide campaign
contributions to state legislators (Snyder 19992). When groups are not seeking long-term benefits,
they will primarily provide campaign contributions in the first terms.
In this chapter, I provided a theoretical explanation and my primary hypotheses about how
campaign finance law stringency will affect interest groups differently. Specifically, contributions
from business interest and ideologically oriented groups will be affected differently by campaign
finance limits, public finance programs, and disclosure requirements based on their desire to build
a long-term relationship with state legislators and the potential electoral benefits of regulating these
groups.
I expand upon my arguments in the next chapter where I provide a detailed history of state
campaign finance law. I explain that under certain circumstances, campaign finance regulations
were designed to affect specific groups with political motivations. Other donors avoided effective
regulations due to built-in loopholes in state law. That said, I explain that campaign finance laws
are not merely ineffective regulations that allow contributors to donate without restriction.
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CHAPTER 3. HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

3.1 Background of Campaign Finance Laws
Campaign finance regulations have existed in the United States since the 1800s (Goidel,
Gross, and Shields 1999). Even though campaign finance laws have been enforced for centuries
in the United States, scholars still debate whether these regulations are effective at removing
money and influence from elections. Without a doubt, the effectiveness of campaign finance laws
is dependent upon the underlying motivations of the policymakers who are enacting them. If
policymakers have no intention of making campaign finance regulations effective at removing
money from politics, then there is little reason to study them. Campaign finance law cynics argue
that these regulations are merely for show for policymakers to build electoral support. The
argument that campaign finance laws are designed to be ineffective has some limited historical
backing. Political scientists, historians, and legal scholars found many instances in the early
development of campaign finance law where policymakers had no intention of enacting
regulations that would hinder their ability to raise funds. Most early campaign finance regulations
were intentionally designed to be impossible to enforce (Mutch 2014) or built with obvious
loopholes (Alexander 1991). Of course, if these statutes were still the norm, this research would
not be meaningful.
History informs political science scholars whether the research focus of this dissertation is
worthy to study. Specifically, my arguement that campaign finance regulations are more effective
at reducing contributions for certain groups of donors over others. Most current campaign finance
laws drew inspiration from these early statutes. Some early campaign finance laws, including
Montana’s, were still enforced as of the mid-2010s. Modern campaign finance law does not
necessarily fit the mold of being intentionally ineffectual. As will be expanded upon below, a shift
in campaign finance law design in the mid-20th century changed the focus of these regulations. In
many instances, campaign finance regulations were designed to target specific donors (La Raja
2008). These targeted statutes were sometimes intentionally built to provide one party with an
advantage, usually under the guise of fighting corruption in elections (La Raja 2008), particularly
those aimed at unions and corporations. Since this dissertation is concerned with how campaign
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finance regulations affect specific groups of donors, it is crucial to understand how these policies
historically developed to put context to my theory and results.
While I test my hypotheses using a large N quantitative approach, this chapter serves two
important purposes for my analysis. First, it explains how certain donors were targeted by
campaign finance regulations to provide some background for my hypotheses that specific groups
will be affected differently by campaign finance law. Second, this historical account will boost the
claim that many campaign finance regulations are designed to affect campaign contributions, even
if the regulations are sometimes intended to give one group an electoral advantage over the other
(La Raja 2008).
In the next section, I separate campaign finance reform efforts into three distinct time
periods. The first period began in the late 1800s and ended in the final days of the Progressive Era.
During this time, the rudimentary state campaign finance laws were oftentimes difficult to enforce
and were viewed skeptically by certain state supreme courts. Many of these regulations, however,
served as an important basis for modern state campaign finance law. The second period, which
saw the advent of long lasting and enforceable campaign finance laws, was primarily initiated by
the Watergate scandal. During this period, the states dramatically expanded campaign contribution
limits and public finance programs. Yet, many of these regulations still suffered from inadequacies
in their design (Alexander 1991). The latest period began in the mid-1990s and has been marked
by a dramatic increase in successful federal and state court challenges against campaign finance
regulations. Some state governments have also become newly hostile to state campaign finance
regulation, sometimes gutting their most important provisions, particularly public financing
programs (Kulesza, Miller, and Witko 2017). These developments have made testing the
effectiveness of campaign finance law more vital than before.
Of course, the court cases and regulatory challenges described below are not an exhaustive
list. Indeed, per the National Conference of State Legislatures, there was an average of 36 changes
per year in state campaign finance law over the past decade. Unsurprisingly, there have been very
few historical descriptions of state campaign finance law due to the complexity and the sheer
number of events that have shaped these statutes. The events discussed below, however, are those
that arguably had the most dramatic impact on state campaign finance regulation. It should also be
noted that this section discusses casework surrounding campaign finance expenditure limits, even
though my analysis in later chapters does not treat them as a variable of interest. In most cases,
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campaign finance expenditure cases were highly intertwined with challenges against contribution
limits. Thus, it would be impossible to exclude challenges to expenditure limits while writing a
complete history of campaign finance regulation reform.
3.2 History of Campaign Finance Regulations – Early Reform
The states have led American innovation in campaign finance law since the 1800s. The
first American law concerning campaign finance was passed by the Maryland legislature in 1811
to combat the widespread practice of vote buying with liquor and other forms of bribes (Gross,
Goidel, and Shields 1999). Other states, like Virginia (which dealt with their own problems that
arguably began with George Washington), enacted their own versions of the statute soon after
(Gross and Goidel 2003). Contributors were not fazed by these laws. Donors still easily found
ways around these early statues as the definition of “bribery” was quite vague (Gross and Goidel
2003).
For most of the 1800s, the federal and state governments were mostly uninterested in
regulating campaign finances. Indeed, only two laws were passed by the federal government in the
1800s dealing with campaign contributions. The first was the 1867 naval appropriations bill that
prohibited officials from soliciting contributions from navy dock workers. The second was the
Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, which was the first serious attempt to reduce
corruption in the federal government. The Act outlawed the ability of officials to gather donations
from government employees as an attempt to reduce the influence of the spoils system.
The American state governments jumpstarted a sustained period of campaign finance
reform at the end of the 1800s that lasted for five decades. This began with an effort to publicize
elections to reduce perceived corruption caused by two groups of donors; corporations and unions.
Corporations and unions first started to pour significant amounts of money into campaigns in the
1890s, sparking concern from government reformers (Winkler 2004). Before this, most campaign
money was raised through political patronage and parties funded by wealthy families (Winkler
2004). A wave of civil service reforms and the introduction of secret balloting in the late 1800s
severed the power of political bosses, giving an opening for corporations and unions to fill the void
(Winkler 2004).
Early state reformers looked to the British Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 as a model to
remove corruption from political campaigns, but these laws were almost entirely ineffective
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(Mutch 2014). New York was the first to pass a “publicity” requirement to its ballot reform
initiative in 1890 to reduce corporate influences (Belmont 1905). New York was quickly followed
by Michigan and Colorado in 1891 in implementing disclosure requirements (Argersinger 1992).
These initial laws only required candidates to disclose contributions, not campaign committees,
creating a glaring loophole for donors to shield their activities from public scrutiny (Malbin and
Brusoe 2012). Further, the New York and Colorado regulations were exceptionally difficult to
enforce and lacked severe punishments for violating the disclosure requirements, making these
regulations ineffective tools against corruption (Belmont 1927; Brickner and Mueller 2008).
Certain state governments quickly moved to fix the enforcement issues created by their statutes,
however. For example, Michigan soon followed up with amendments in 1892 to also include
candidate committees, but enforcement issues still existed for decades.
By the end of the 1800s, eighteen states had enacted disclosure requirements, but three had
repealed them soon after their implementation (Mutch 2014). After this initial setback, state
disclosure requirements quickly expanded across the county. Of these early state statutes, modern
disclosure requirement regulations are largely based on the California Purity of Elections Act of
1893, which also was modeled on English law for parliamentary elections (Thompson 1953). It
was among the first laws designed to bring real accountability to elections. In sharp contrast to the
New York disclosure law, the California law provided severe punishments for candidates who
failed to comply with its requirements. This law compelled candidates to disclose campaign
contributions to the Secretary of State within twenty-one days of the election. If candidates refused
to disclose their campaign contributions, it was considered a forfeiture of their elected office.
The California law was not long-lived. California state officials attempted to enforce the
act across both primary and general elections. The statute was challenged in the California
Supreme Court in 1896, claiming it did not apply to primary elections (an argument that would be
used against federal laws in future court cases). In response, the legislature passed the Purity of
Primary Elections Law in 1897. The law was designed with an obvious constitutional flaw. The
statute required individuals to take an oath that their vote in the primary would directly translate
to support in the upcoming general election. The statute was immediately challenged in Spier v.
Baker, and the California Supreme Court nullified the Primary law soon after in 1898 (Friedman
1956).
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In 1907, the California state legislature repealed the Purity of Elections Act of 1893 and
replaced it with a significantly weaker law. Although the new statute still required expenses to be
reported after an election, it no longer provided stiff punishments for noncompliant candidates.
The new statute lacked the original public office forfeiture requirement and made failure to report
campaign contributions a misdemeanor. For the next forty years, the law was further amended to
include primary elections and to bar any candidates from receiving a certificate of nomination until
they disclosed campaign expenses, but these efforts were largely fruitless. By the 1950s, only one
individual had been prosecuted for election code violations (Thompson 1953).
Like disclosure requirements, campaign contribution limits began in New York (Hayward
2008). Corporate campaign contribution bans were first formally considered at the 1894 New York
constitutional convention but were not immediately enacted. Primarily pushed by a single delegate
at the convention, the corporate contribution ban had been discussed among political leaders since
the mid-1880s. Initially, these campaign contribution bans did not enjoy significant support from
Democratic party leadership and were slow to take off. Four states enacted corporate campaign
contribution bans by 1897, but the effort completely stalled (Winkler 2004).
Campaign finance reform was relatively delayed at the federal level. Serious federal efforts
to regulate campaign finance began nearly twenty years after the first statutes were adopted in the
states, coinciding with the advent of the Progressive Era. Unlike the states, the federal government
began first experimenting with campaign contribution limits, not disclosure requirements. The
1904 presidential election cycle generated controversy when it was revealed that President
Theodore Roosevelt accepted campaign contributions from corporations. In the climax of the Wall
Street Scandal of 1905, George W. Perkins, the vice president of New York Life, admitted to the
company donating $48,000 to the Roosevelt Campaign before an investigative committee of the
New York Legislature (Winkler 2004). Facing significant criticism, President Theodore Roosevelt
called for prohibitions against union and corporate contributions in 1905. Congress responded by
passing the Tillman Act, which was signed by President Roosevelt in 1907. Like state campaign
finance regulations, the Tillman Act was nearly impossible to enforce. The Tillman Act, however,
was the first major step to regulate campaign contributions at the federal level.
The momentum of reform against contributions from unions and corporations continued at
the state level in 1905 in the aftermath of the Wall Street Scandal (Winkler 2004). By the late
1920s, all states except Rhode Island, Mississippi, and Illinois had some form of campaign
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contribution regulations (Malbin and Brusoe 2012). In 35 states, these regulations included
campaign contribution expenditure limits. Some state statutes went so far as to limit campaign
expenses on federal House of Representatives and presidential elector campaigns, which later were
challenged on constitutional grounds. Campaign contribution limit regulations also dramatically
increased during this time. By 1932, 34 states had campaign contribution limits (Gross and Goidel
2003). The regulations were still difficult to enforce due to practical shortcomings of state
governments to oversee elections.
Although disclosure and campaign contribution limits largely dominated the early period
of campaign finance reform, public financing was also on the agenda in a few states. Indeed, the
first public finance laws were enacted in the early 1900s, but their adoption was exceptionally
limited. Oregon was the first state to provide support to candidates through taxpayer funds,
arguably establishing the prototype public financing program. In 1908, the legislature passed a
statute that required candidates to purchase space at a fixed rate in pamphlets that were mailed to
all voters by the Secretary of State (Boeckel 1926). This space could be used for platforms,
photographs, and any other arguments they wished to use to sway voters. Colorado, Florida,
Montana, and Wyoming each passed similar legislation soon thereafter. Most of these statutes
were repealed, however, by 1921 (Boeckel 1926). Oregon was the only state to continue the
program until the mid-1900s (Gross and Goidel 2003).
The first state public finance program that provided direct monetary assistance to
candidates was passed in Colorado in 1909 (Jones 1994, Gross and Goidel 2003). The program
provided public funds to political parties without allowing them to collect further contributions
(Handlin 2014). The total amount of funds given to each party was equal to 25 cents per vote in
the previous gubernatorial election (Boeckel 1926). The law was almost immediately ruled
unconstitutional by the Colorado Supreme Court and was never fully implemented (Thompson
1953, Jones 1994). Specifically, the court was concerned about treating parties unequally and that
no provision was written to account for the formation of new political parties (Luce 2006). No
other state attempted to implement a public financing scheme for decades, perhaps due to concerns
that their programs would equally be challenged in state courts (Handlin 2014).
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3.3 Watergate Reform
Except for a few isolated cases, state efforts to regulate campaign finances were largely
nonexistent from the 1950s to the 1960s (Primo and Milyo 2006). Indeed, Colorado, Florida, and
Georgia removed their corporate contribution ban during the 1960s and 1970s (Hall 2015). The
numerous challenges to campaign finance regulations in state courts may have engendered
significant reluctance among the state legislatures from enacting any meaningful changes (Handlin
2014). This trajectory changed when Congress passed the first federal public finance program in
1966. Sponsored by Senator Russell Long, the program provided a $1 checkoff for individuals on
their tax forms. The program was quickly repealed a year later, never being used in an election
(FEC).
The failure of the initial federal public finance program did not end the reform effort,
however. Instead, moves by the Democratic Party to secure election victories following their defeat
by Richard Nixon was the impetus for major federal reform. The 1968 elections created
exceptional worry for the Democratic Party (La Raja 2008). Richard Nixon significantly outraised
all previous candidates for president (La Raja 2008), and the Democratic Party was in severe debt
(Cymer 1982). To level the playing field, Democratic Party leaders believed that the best strategy
would be to implement new campaign finance regulations. Specifically, Republicans could be
outmatched through a new federal public finance program that could limit private fundraising,
while allowing the unions to continue to support Democratic Party candidates externally (La Raja
2008). With this new funding mechanism, Democrats would be able to raise more funds than
Republicans, helping win future presidential elections. After extensive meetings by Congressional
Democratic Party leadership, a new plan was developed that called for a repeal of all previous
federal campaign finance regulations under a single statute that offered public financing to
presidential candidates. Caught off guard, the Republicans had little ability to mount a successful
legislative counter to the proposal (La Raja 2008).
The new consolidated federal campaign finance regulations were passed in two phases.
The first was through the Federal Elections Campaigns Act of 1971. The initial FECA provisions
attempted to enact more stringent campaign disclosure requirements by requiring all candidates to
report their expenses and campaign contributions. FECA also allowed corporations and unions to
establish separate campaign funds from their treasuries (political action committees). Voluntary
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campaign contributions could be solicited from these separate entities that could then be used to
advocate for specific candidates.
Although FECA represented the first effort to regulate campaign contributions at the
national level, severe weaknesses existed in the original Act. The original statute did not establish
an effective means to enforce the new requirements. Enforcement was divided between the Clerk
of the House, Secretary of the Senate, and Comptroller General of the United States. All potential
campaign finance violations had to be referred from these one of these three offices to the Justice
Department (DOJ), which was responsible for ultimately prosecuting offenders. This created
severe coordination problems with the disclosure reporting process. Indeed, according to Federal
Elections Commission records, while 7,000 cases were forwarded from congressional officials to
the DOJ after the 1972 elections, only 100 were referred from the Comptroller General. Very few
of these cases were pursued for prosecution.
New calls were made to further strengthen FECA three years later during the Watergate
investigations (La Raja 2008). Severe accusations of campaign finance abuse were widespread
following an investigation of Richard Nixon’s 1972 campaign contributions by the Watergate
Commission. Specifically, the Watergate Commission found that the Nixon campaign accepted
illegal campaign contributions from corporations. Congress responded by passing a series of
amendments to FECA in 1974 that placed limits on contributions from individuals, political
parties, and Political Action Committees; and it laid the groundwork for the current federal public
finance system (Bender 1988). In hopes of alleviating the difficulties that arose in prosecuting
offenders after the 1972 midterm elections, the amendments also established the Federal Elections
Commission to provide a single enforcement agency (Jones 1981). To reduce executive influence
over elections, the Federal Elections Commission was originally appointed by Congressional
leadership, not the president.
Like the legal struggles early campaign finance reformers encountered in the states, the
federal program was quickly put in a precarious legal situation. The expansion of state and federal
government campaign finance regulations triggered decades of court litigation, setting up the
precedent that eventually led to Citizens United. These legal challenges permanently entangled
state and federal reform efforts. The first and most impactful challenge to FECA was a lawsuit
brought forward by US Senators James L. Buckley and Eugene McCarthy and supported by
organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Conservative Union
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– Buckley (La Raja 2008). In Buckley, the petitioners argued that the provisions of the amended
FECA placed undue restrictions on First Amendment speech protections, including campaign
contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and expenditure limits.
The Buckley ruling was mixed for campaign finance reformers. Multiple provisions of the
1974 amendments were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in a per curium 7-2
decision. Most notably, the Court was troubled by the how sweeping and restrictive FECA’s
expenditure limits were, stating “the provision, for example, would make it a federal criminal
offense for a person or association to place a single one-quarter page advertisement 'relative to a
clearly identified candidate' in a major metropolitan newspaper” (Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
[1976] pg. 663). Further, the Court wrote that expenditure limits violate constitutional protections
that allow “candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression”
(Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 [1976] pg. 667). The Supreme Court also decided that the
appointment procedure for the Federal Elections Commission violated the separation of powers
for giving selection authority to congressional leadership rather than the president.
Even though expenditure limits were ruled unconstitutional, Buckley provided state
governments with a legal justification to maintain limits on direct contributions. The Court found
that campaign contribution limits “in themselves do not undermine to any material degree the
potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual
citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties.” (Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 29 [1976]). The government had to adhere to a “means closely drawn,” however, to
ensure that these campaign contribution limits did not unnecessarily abridge free speech rights. In
doing so, the Court set a $1,000 contribution level as being an appropriate limit for exercising First
Amendment rights. The new federal public finance program was also left relatively untouched by
the decision, giving constitutional support to programs that require candidates to surrender their
ability to raise funds privately in exchange for taxpayer-funded subsidies (Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 [1976]).
The Supreme Court was significantly more supportive of disclosure requirements, arguably
cementing them as the least legally challenged campaign finance regulation for decades.
Disclosure requirements, unlike public finance laws and contribution limits, do not stop speech
from happening. Under disclosure requirements alone, funds can still be transferred from the donor
to the campaign. By requiring candidates to report their campaign contributions, the Supreme
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Court ruled that they “deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing
large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity. This exposure may discourage those
who would use money for improper purposes either before or after the election” (Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 67 [1976]).
The wave of campaign finance reform was not isolated to the federal government. The
Watergate scandal also propelled state governments to enact similar reforms in public financing
after years of stagnation, starting with Minnesota, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Michigan, Hawaii,
and Wisconsin (Brickner and Mueller 2008). Indeed, with the federal government now operating
a public finance program, there was less of a concern among states that their programs would not
pass constitutional muster. Seventeen states enacted a public finance program by 1980 (Jones
1981; Noragon 1981).
Although these programs were started in response to federal finance reform, many had very
little in common with FECA beyond offering an income tax checkoff (Noragon 1981). Four states
extended their programs to fund state legislative races (Jones 1981). Fifteen of these state programs
only provided campaign subsidies to candidates or parties in the general election. Only
Massachusetts and Michigan provided funds for both the general and primary elections. Only eight
states emulated the federal checkoff by giving taxpayers a single general campaign fund option
(Noragon 1981). Five states (Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Oregon, and Utah) used a partisan fund
alone to collect campaign subsidies. The states also wildly differed on their enforcement policies.
Only seven states decided to give a single agency authority to enforce their statutes, however,
creating similar problems that plagued early disclosure and campaign contribution limits. Most
programs were designed at assisting statewide candidates, not legislative races (Noragon 1981).
Very few of these public finance programs were effective. Most programs were
unsuccessful at attracting tax checkoff money or candidates to sign up to the program. Only
Minnesota and Wisconsin provided enough assistance to legislative candidates to run a
competitive campaign. Some of these programs took on very odd forms with varying levels of
success. Among the most successful was Indiana. Indiana had a scheme where the sale of license
plates helped fund local party committees (Alexander 1991).
As campaign disclosure was declared constitutional by federal courts, disclosure
regulations were significantly strengthened by state governments. In contrast to the early
disclosure laws, state governments actively attempted to find ways to better enforce their statutes.

41
Arguably, the most important reform to disclosure requirements in the states during the 1970s was
a ban on large cash donations.11 Banning major cash donations gave the state governments an
exceptionally powerful tool in being able to track donations to candidates; finally giving officials
the means necessary to enforce disclosure requirements. Indeed, during the 1974 election, there
was very little evidence that significant amounts of money went undisclosed following the ban
(Broder 1976).
Many states and campaigns were not prepared to handle the new requirements.
Technological hurdles in receiving and maintaining campaign disclosure records created
exceptional difficulties for both state governments and campaigns. William Endicott of The
California Journal reported that the new levels of information from the disclosure reports were
somewhat overwhelming, leaving open the possibility that any noncompliance was simply missed
by state agencies (Broder 1976). On a similar note, state campaigns expressed that keeping track
of these donors was largely impossible, particularly from larger states like Texas.
The federal court challenges to campaign finance regulation did not end with Buckley.
Although Buckley was initially supportive of public finance law and campaign contribution limits,
the precedent set by the case surrounding expenditure requirements provided opponents with an
opening for future challenges on First Amendment grounds. Indeed, as state campaign finance
laws became more stringent, challenges in federal court against these regulations became more
commonplace. The first case to strongly test state campaign finance programs at the Supreme
Court was First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, (435 U.S. 765 [1978]). The Supreme Court
ruled against a Massachusetts commonwealth law that prohibited donations from corporations and
unions to ballot initiative campaigns. This was the first decision that asserted that corporations and
unions were protected under the First Amendment, dramatically broadening the application of
freedom of speech to campaign contributions to organizations and groups. More vitally, it marked
a turning point in the relationship between federal courts and state regulations. Campaign finance
law opponents could now use the federal court system to challenge state regulations.
In contrast to bans on contributions to ballot initiatives, direct campaign contribution limits
to candidate campaigns were placed on solid legal footing by the Supreme Court in California
Med. Assn. v. FEC, (453 U.S. 182 [1981]). The Court found that there was no guaranteed right to
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“speech by proxy” through campaign expenditures that are made on behalf of a donor by another
party. Specifically, the Court wrote “the rights of a contributor are similarly not impaired by limits
on the amount he may give to a multicandidate political committee” California Med. Assn. v. FEC,
(453 U.S. 182 453 [1981]). Thus, campaign contribution limits could not be equated to a restriction
on First Amendment rights.
The Buckley decision did not signify complete protection for all provisions of the federal
public finance regulations. Arguably, the first case that began to unravel public finance laws was
FEC v. NCPAC, (470 U.S. 480 [1985]). Wrapped into the public finance program was an FEC
requirement that required candidates who accepted public financing to adhere to a $1000 limit of
independent expenditures from PACs. This requirement was designed to not only keep PAC
independent expenditures away from campaigns but also to reduce the time candidates would
spend on soliciting donations. The Supreme Court found that organizing as a PAC should not
reduce an individual’s First Amendment rights. Thus, any campaign expenditure limits against
PACs are unconstitutional.
In many ways, the FEC opinion was not exceptionally surprising considering that the
Supreme Court was hostile to expenditure requirements in Buckley. As will be discussed in more
detail below, states continued to tie expenditure limits to their public finance programs and
campaign contribution limits. These limits, however, were set for the campaigns themselves, not
independent expenditures.
3.4 Modern Challenges to State Campaign Finance Law
The past few decades have not experienced the dramatic increases in campaign finance
regulations that occurred in the early 1900s and the 1970s. Since the early 1990s, state
governments have incrementally changed their campaign contribution limit requirements to
become more stringent (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016). Not much movement was seen,
however, with disclosure requirements. By the beginning of the 1990s, the American states had
relatively stringent disclosure requirements, arguably giving little room for states to expand their
regulations (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016; Witko 2005). From the late 1990s to the mid2010s, the state governments made new disclosure law changes that were primarily directed at
providing campaign contribution data online.
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The states witnessed a dramatic increase in experimentation with public financing
throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016). A sizable portion of
these new programs were not put forward by the state legislatures. Instead, many of the recent
public finance and clean election laws have been enacted through ballot initiatives, particularly
those that were the most comprehensive in scope including Massachusetts, Arizona, and Maine.12
The new citizen-led reform efforts were not without significant challenges. Even though
many of the programs were passed and supported by voters, certain state legislatures have actively
resisted the new push for public financing in elections. The best example of the state legislature
resisting citizen-led public finance reform efforts comes from Massachusetts. According to the
Massachusetts Office of Campaign and Political Finance, the Clean Elections law was passed
through a ballot initiative in 1996 with over 66% of the vote. The initiative aimed to greatly expand
the already existing Massachusetts public finance program for statewide candidates by subsidizing
state legislative campaigns.
Unfortunately for reformers, the initiative language was exceptionally flawed. Unlike other
state initiatives, the new statute did not compel the General Court (the state’s legislature) to fund
the program. Thus, the General Court refused to appropriate money to the program, leading to a
court challenge in Bates v. Director of the Office of Campaign and Political Finance, (763 N.E.
2d 6 [Mass 2002]). In a highly unorthodox decision, the Commonwealth Supreme Court required
lawmakers to hold a state auction to raise funds for the program. The auction was unsuccessful
and raised only $176,000, prompting the General Court to eliminate the legislative public finance
program. Public financing for statewide races remained, however, keeping the law that existed
before the initiative intact.
Not all state legislatures took similarly dramatic steps in opposing their public finance
programs. In many states, public finance programs are simply underfunded by their state
legislature. Indeed, legislative public finance programs have been regularly utilized only in
Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, and Minnesota over the past decade. The Nebraska program was
ruled unconstitutional by the state court. The Hawaii public financing program has been largely
unused due to the low subsidies it provides. Finally, in 2010, the Wisconsin state legislature pulled
all funds from the campaign finance program to pay for the state voter ID law.

Maine’s clean election law was passed by ballot initiative in 1996 and was recently strengthened through the same
process in a 2015 election.
12
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In the past three decades, federal court precedence on federal campaign finance regulations
soon caught up to the states, marking a noticeable shift in the discretion states had enjoyed in
setting campaign finance regulations. Even though the Buckley decision was decades old, its
impact on state campaign finance law has only been fully felt by the states recently. As late as
1990, the Supreme Court was open to upholding state regulations on independent expenditures by
corporations. The most noteworthy case to come before the Supreme Court testing state
independent expenditure requirements was Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, (494 U.S.
652 [1990]). The Michigan campaign finance regulations barred corporations and unions from
making independent campaign expenditures through their treasuries. The Supreme Court found
that restrictions on corporations from making donations from their treasuries could place a burden
on their speech. On the other hand, states had a compelling interest in removing potential
corruption from elections that might stem from independent expenditures made directly from
union and corporation treasures. Since the Michigan program also allowed unions and corporations
to make expenditures from separate accounts, the Court found that this burden was not significant
enough to violate First Amendment rights.
State governments have attempted to tie campaign expenditure limits to campaign
contribution limits in hopes of circumventing Buckley. One such notable instance of this
surrounded New Hampshire’s campaign contributions from the 1990s. In 1998 a New Hampshire
state representative filed a challenge to the state campaign contribution limits in federal court
claiming that they were a violation of the First Amendment in Kennedy, et al. v. Gardner, et al.
(CV-98-608-M [1998]) and inconsistent with the Buckley decision. The New Hampshire statute
was somewhat atypical of state contribution limits at the time. The individual campaign
contribution limits in New Hampshire were tied to a voluntary expenditure limit. Candidates who
agreed to the expenditure limits could raise more funds. The US district court struck down the New
Hampshire campaign contribution limits, but the case was never appealed. This limited the
decision’s impact to New Hampshire alone. New Hampshire enacted new campaign regulations
that included limits and have yet to be challenged in federal court
The first major challenge to state campaign contribution limits under the “closely drawn
standard” was Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, (528 U.S. 377 [2000]). Under the
“closely drawn standard,” states must show that their campaign contribution limits are not unduly
burdensome on First Amendment rights. In 1998, Missouri increased campaign contribution limits
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slightly to $1,075. The petitioner in the challenge was Zev David, a candidate for the 1998
Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor. Zev David argued that the campaign
contributions were too low to successfully mount a serious campaign, especially considering that
the $1000 contribution limit set under Buckley had not adequately taken into account inflationary
pressures.
The Supreme Court decision was a large victory for proponents of state campaign
contribution limits. The Supreme Court ruled that Buckley applied to the states, ensuring that
campaign contributions set by legislatures had a constitutional basis. Further, there was no
requirement that the states had to index their campaign contributions with inflation, nor did they
have to follow the exact limits set in Buckley. Thus, Nixon solidified the protection of campaign
contribution limits set down by Buckley. Ironically, even though the Missouri campaign finance
limits were upheld in the Supreme Court, they were removed by the state legislature eight years
later in 2008. Campaign contribution limits were reinstated by Missouri voters in 2016 through a
ballot initiative (Erikson 2017).
Buckley did not give states the ability to set campaign contribution limits at any level. In
2006, Vermont’s campaign contributions were struck down by the Supreme Court in Randall v.
Sorrell (548 U.S. 230 [2006])13. At the time, Vermont’s campaign contribution limits were the
most restrictive in the United States. The limits were set at $200 per State House candidate, $300
per state Senate candidate, and $400 for statewide candidates per two-year election cycle (Kulesza,
Miller, and Witko 2017). The plaintiffs believed that although Buckley agreed that states had a
“compelling interest” to remove corruption from state legislative elections, the Vermont campaign
contributions were too low to mount a credible campaign.
The Supreme Court ruled in Randall that the contribution limits were too low for
individuals to express their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Writing for the plurality,
Justice Breyer wrote that the exceptionally low campaign contributions could potentially “reduce
democratic accountability” by barring candidates from communicating their positions with voters.
Further, the limits also could create a disincentive for individuals to join a political party. Although
federal district courts had earlier declared campaign contribution limits unconstitutional, this was
the first time that the Supreme Court had done so. This case did not represent a significant danger
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for state campaign contribution limits, however, since the Vermont statute was far outside the
mean limit.
Supreme Court decisions through the 1990s and 2000s were still relatively supportive of
state campaign finance regulation. Arguably, no Supreme Court decision marked as dramatic a
change in the trajectory of the future of state campaign finance regulation than Citizens United.
The conservative group Citizens United wished to air and advertise a negative film about Hillary
Clinton titled Hillary: The Movie within 30 days of the 2008 Democratic primary. Showing the
movie was in direct violation of the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,
which banned any electioneering communications that were aired 30 days before a primary and 60
days before a general election.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court unraveled decades of precedent regarding
independent expenditures made directly from treasuries. Federal limits on independent
expenditures from unions and corporations were declared unconstitutional. The decision partially
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (494 U.S. 652 [1990]) that upheld the ban
on corporations from using treasury funds from political activity. The ruling also completely
overturned McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, (540 U.S. 93 [2003]) that allowed the
federal government to regulate “electioneering communications.”
The Supreme Court once again provided strong support for disclosure requirements in
Citizens United, continuing the trend of favorable decisions that originated with Burroughs.
Writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy stated that “disclosure is a less restrictive
alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech” (Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 558 U.S. 310 916 [2010]). The Court also noted that disclosure requirements could
provide exceptionally vital information to voters, serving as a tool that could be used to increase
democratic accountability.
Unsurprisingly, the Citizens United decision had direct implications for state independent
expenditure bans, most notably Montana’s. In 1912, Montana voters passed a ban on corporate
independent expenditures to limit the influence of mining companies over state politics (Wiltse
2012). The 1912 law was struck down a century later by the US Supreme Court in American
Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, (567 U.S. 516 [2012]). The short opinion, issued without
oral arguments, simply stated that the Citizens United decision applied to state campaign finance
statutes as well.
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The Citizens United decision did not overturn any state campaign contribution limits,
public finance programs, or disclosure requirements. The Citizens United decision set an important
precedent that was used in challenges against state disclosure, campaign contribution limits, and
public finance programs. Public financing was the first major target at the Supreme Court of the
new precedent set under Citizens United. The first direct challenge to state public finance laws at
the Supreme Court surrounded Arizona’s trigger provision. The law was passed by Arizona voters
in 1998 by a slim majority of 51.2% and represented the most comprehensive state public financing
program in the nation. The initiative established a two-stage mechanism to provide funds to
candidates. Candidates who accepted Arizona public financing are provided with an initial
subsidy. The Arizona public finance program further provided matching funds through the trigger
provision to candidates based on their competitors’ fundraising levels. The amount matched could
equal up to three times the initial subsidy. In 2011, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, (564 U.S. 721 [2011]) that the
Arizona trigger provision violated the First Amendment. Fundamentally, each dollar of support
given to a candidate would automatically equate to funds being donated to the opposing candidate.
A campaign contribution would indirectly signify support for both candidates. It was further
argued that providing matching campaign contributions would create disincentives for contributors
to donate to their preferred candidate.
The Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett case was not strongly
challenged by state legislators. In response to the ruling, the Arizona state legislature simply
removed two-thirds of their appropriations to the Clean Elections Program, leaving only the initial
grant in place. Candidates in Arizona can no longer receive public funds beyond the initial
disbursement. Maine quickly removed their matching funds provision early in the 2012 legislative
session. The impact of the Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett decision
was also felt in American states courts. In 2012, the Nebraska state Supreme Court struck down
the public finance program along with campaign contribution limits. The Supreme Court argued
that the two were inherently linked in the law, therefore severing unconstitutional provisions from
the rest of the statute was impossible. Since the statute was struck down, the Nebraska state
legislature has been largely disinterested in reinstating contribution limits.
The remaining states have decided to enforce programs without trigger provisions. Three
states maintain highly successful public finance programs for their legislative candidates. Since
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2008, the Connecticut public finance program has provided over $16,000,000 to State
House/Assembly candidates and has been the primary source of funds for most races (National
Institute on Money in State Politics). The Main Clean Election law still enjoys exceptional support
from the state legislature, even though the trigger provision had to be removed because of the
Arizona Free Enterprise Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett decision. The Minnesota public finance
system traditionally has an over 85% utilization rate by state legislative candidates. The Hawaii
program still provides funds to candidates, but it is only a partial program that is not well supported
by the state legislature. Indeed, serious efforts were made to provide full funding to legislative
candidates in 2013 and 2014. The bill was ended in conference committee after the two chambers
could not reach an agreement on a compromise in 2015.
Even in the aftermath of the Arizona Free Enterprise decision, states and local
governments continue to experiment with targeted financing programs, particularly with state
supreme court races. Following North Carolina implementing a public finance program in 2002
for judicial races, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and New Mexico have each attempted their own
systems (National Center for State Courts). Similar programs were also under consideration in
Kentucky, Ohio, Maryland, and Washington (Hazelton et al. 2015). Both Wisconsin and North
Carolina have since defunded their judicial public finance programs, but polling in 2013 from the
North Carolina Voters for Clean Elections shows staunch public support to implement new
subsidies in the future. Cities such as Los Angeles and New York have experimented with their
own forms of public financing to circumvent federal court decisions (Kulesza, Miller, Witko
2017).
Challenges to campaign contribution limits recently gained more traction in federal courts.
Both the Buckley and Citizens United decisions were instrumental in a case surrounding total
federal campaign contribution limits in 2014. The case surrounded Shaun McCutcheon, who was
a regular donor to the Republican Party. McCutcheon hoped to provide campaign contributions to
twelve candidates after having already provided sixteen with $33,088. McCutcheon was then
approached by Dan Backer (Fritzell 2014). In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (572
U.S. ___ [2014]), the United States Supreme Court struck down total limits on contributions to
candidates and political committees. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, stated “We
have made clear that Congress may not regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of
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money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative
influence of others.”
Combined, the McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (572 U.S. ___ [2014]) and
Citizens United cases put campaign contribution limits in an exceptionally precarious position. In
recent years, Montana’s (arguably the state with the most campaign finance law legal challenges)
campaign contribution limit has been regularly struck down in federal district court but were
recently reinstated by the Ninth Circuit. The Montana campaign contribution limit statute was in
part enacted through ballot initiative I-118 in 1994. The proposal passed with over 60% of the
vote. In Doug Lair v. Steve Bullock (12-35809 9th Cir. [2012]), a group of conservative donors
and the state Republican Party filed a lawsuit claiming that campaign contribution limits made it
virtually impossible for incumbents to be removed from office. United States District Judge
Charles Lovell ruled that the limits were unconstitutional, arguing that they prevented candidates
“from amassing the resources necessary for effective campaign advocacy.” The attorney general
of Montana quickly requested a stay from the Ninth Circuit which was granted one week later. In
the meantime, candidates could gather unlimited campaign contributions from donors.
Eventually, the case was sent back down to the district court after the Ninth Circuit refused
to rehear the case, effectively ensuring the demise of the campaign contribution limit statute. The
campaign contribution limits were struck down again by the same federal district judge in 2016
after the Ninth Circuit Court demanded that the case be reconsidered with a stricter constitutional
standard for campaign contribution limits. Judge Charles Lovell, however, stated in his decision
that the Montana state legislature could implement campaign contribution limits again in 2017 that
were not as restrictive, shaping the ruling in a way that largely tapped into the “closely drawn
standard.”
Disclosure has not been immune to challenges in federal courts in recent years either, even
though they have been upheld on multiple occasions by the United States Supreme Court. Indeed,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor once referred to disclosure as the “cornerstone' to effective
campaign finance reform” (Kang 2013, 1). As discussed, throughout the past two decades, little
change has been made to disclosure requirements, primarily because most states already had
relatively comprehensive regulations in place (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016). Recently,
disclosure requirements lost some of its favored status with courts. Since the mid-2000s, federal
court challenges against disclosure requirements have increased significantly, primarily
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spearheaded by the Institute for Justice and the Center for Competitive Justice. The focus of the
major challenges to campaign finance disclosure have traditionally centered around the definition
of “campaign committee.” Specifically, what group of individuals must disclose their funding and
contributions when conducting political activity.
Arguably, the two most hostile decisions against disclosure law were Minnesota Citizens
Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, (692 F.3d 864 8th Cir. [2012]), and Iowa Right to Life
Committee v. Tooker (717 F.3d 576 8th Cir. [2013]). Both cases were decided by the Eighth Circuit,
which found that Iowa and Minnesota disclosure laws on independent expenditures violated the
“exacting scrutiny” standard in Citizens United. The impact of these decisions, however, is
probably limited. Soon after Citizens United, the Supreme Court upheld federal disclosure
requirements without comment in Independence Institute v. FEC (No. 14–5249 [2016]). This case
was tied to Independence Institute v. Williams (No. 14-1463 [2016]), where the Tenth Circuit
upheld Colorado’s disclosure law on the same “exacting scrutiny” standard. These decisions may
signify that disclosure law is on solid ground with the federal courts (Kulesza and Fisher 2018).
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter made two arguments. First, I argued that modern campaign finance laws are
not intended to be ineffective. By design, early state campaign finance statutes were loopholeridden and unenforceable. The first meaningful state campaign finance reform was spearheaded in
California, only to be struck down by the state supreme court. State reform was put on hold until
Congress pushed for public financing at the federal level in the 1970s. States also banned cash
donations, putting new weight into disclosure regulations.
Second, I asserted that state campaign finance regulations were designed to regulate
specific types of donors, frequently for partisan political gain. Modern state efforts to rein in
campaign contributions began with a desire to limit the influence of unions and corporations in the
late 1800s. Campaign contribution limits demonstrate the most apparent bias towards certain
donors among campaign finance regulations. Campaign contribution limit regulations target
specific donors, including political parties, individuals, corporations, unions, families, and
candidate committees. Like early campaign finance regulations, only unions and corporations are
banned from providing direct donations in states. Political parties, individuals, and PACs are not
subjected to bans. As noted, public financing of campaigns gained momentum in the 1970s after
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the Democratic Party sought to reduce the influence of Republican donors at the federal level.
Modern state public financing programs quickly followed as a response to the Watergate scandal.
Disclosure law was initially designed to shine a light on corporate campaign contributions at the
end of the 1890s.
Current trends are not favorable to state campaign finance reform efforts. For the past two
decades, campaign finance laws have been undermined by courts, the state legislatures, and
governors. Courts have become increasingly skeptical of all campaign finance regulations,
including long-standing statutes that date back to the early 1900s. This includes disclosure
requirements that had been largely supported by nearly a century of court precedent. Following
the Citizens United decision, both direct state campaign contribution limits and public finance
programs have been ruled unconstitutional by federal and state courts. Further, public financing
has been exceptionally underfunded by legislatures, leaving them as mere skeletons in states that
had long established and successful programs. These shifts in campaign finance regulations,
however, are expected have a wide-ranging impact on state legislative races. In the next chapter, I
will put forward hypotheses that will seek to understand how effective these regulations have been
at achieving their intended goals at removing money in elections.

52

CHAPTER 4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

4.1 Overview of Descriptive Analysis
Before settling on a model specification for my hypothesis tests, it is helpful to understand
the distribution of campaign contributions among state legislators. Previous work has not
investigated campaign finance law on the scale of this study. Indeed, these data were only recently
made accessible by the National Institute on Money in State Politics for statistical analysis. This
led many researchers to use datasets that were exceptionally limited in the number of election
cycles and candidates. These new data provide an opportune moment to understand campaign
contributions to state legislators. The enormous size of the dataset, however, could present many
challenges that must be addressed before conducting a proper analysis. Thus, it is vital to
understand how these campaign donations are distributed to legislators to establish a strong degree
of confidence in my results.
I do not present or test any hypotheses in this chapter. Rather, the descriptive analyses
reported below are only informative about the nature of the data. This will assist me in building a
properly fitting model in the next chapter. Many of the trends demonstrated below will justify what
control variables should be included in the full model; how the control, primary independent, and
the dependent variables will be measured; and how the model should be specified to consider state
and individual factors. I also hope to demonstrate some distinct differences in campaign
contribution patterns between ideological and business interest groups. Further, the descriptive
analysis will help identify outliers that warrant further discussion and analyses.
As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 7, the categories that campaign contributions
are sorted into is dependent upon the strength of state disclosure laws. If state disclosure laws are
weak, then it is more likely that the National Institute on Money in State Politics categories does
not properly reflect the source of each contribution. For the sake of this chapter, I assume that each
category sufficiently captures the source of campaign contributions to make meaningful
comparisons among candidates.
This chapter is broken into four sections. First, I present a broad overview of contribution
patterns. Second, I describe where these campaign contributions originate. Third, I examine the
contributions provided to individual candidates running for the legislature. Here I detail how
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campaign contributions to state legislators either conform to or deviate from popular convention
or scholarly work on campaign contributions. Finally, I provide a brief overview of the findings in
this chapter.
4.2 Overall Tends in Campaign Contributions
Campaign contribution totals reported by the National Institute on Money in State Politics
are constant from year to year. For example, if the Institute reported in 2012 that Candidate A
raised $1,000 for the 2010 election, the total reported today is still the same. Category totals,
however, change slightly with time. The placement of each contribution into its respective category
is periodically updated by the National Institute of Money in State Politics to reflect each donor’s
current industry status with the federal and state government. These updates shift campaign
contribution totals for each category over time. The data presented here were provided by the
Institute in January 2015; thus, the category-specific campaign contribution totals may be different
than those currently posted. All campaign contribution data are reported in dollars adjusted for
inflation in 2010 prices. I begin the analysis by investigating total campaign contributions at the
state level. Although these totals are not included as a dependent variable in the analysis in
Chapters 6-8, this still helps understand which states are most targeted by interest groups and
donors. Donors will be affected differently by campaign finance regulations based on the states
they reside in. For example, the unions will be disproportionally affected by campaign finance
laws in states with a large union workforce. Similarly, the general business donations are likely to
be affected by bans on direct corporate contributions. Indeed, many of these laws were designed
to target specific industries to give one party an electoral advantage over the other (La Raja 2008).
State legislative campaigns have attracted significant attention from donors over the past
eighteen years. Donors provided a total of $8,301,628,928 to State House/Assembly and Senate
campaigns from 1999-2014, including funds provided by public subsidies, candidate selffinancing, and non-contributions that included interest on bank accounts. The total number of
individual campaign contributions was 15,949,140, leaving an average of $520.51 for each
donation made to state legislative campaigns.
Unlike federal campaigns, legislative races have not necessarily become more lucrative
over time. At first glance, I do not see a notable difference in total campaign contributions between
midterm and presidential election years. The total amount of campaign contributions made to state
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legislative races has followed a concave pattern since 1999. In 2010 constant dollars, the total
amount of campaign contributions during the 2000 election cycle was $819,122,304. The 2006
midterm election brought in the most for state legislative campaigns, however, with donors
providing $1,044,584,384 (Figure 4.1). Eventually, total campaign contributions fell to
$933,434,176 for general elections legislative candidates in 2014. The 2006 midterm was a
particularly strong for state legislative Democrats riding on the unpopularity of President George
W. Bush. While the total costs have increased, the number of donations provided to state legislators
has also risen. Interestingly, the 2010 election, which produced a similar swing to the Republicans,
did not attract as many campaign contributions. The total number of individual donors to state
legislative races followed the same pattern. Donors made approximately 1.51 million contributors
in 2000. This number peaked to nearly 2.1 million in 2010 and declined to 1.9 million in 2014.
4.3 Sources of Campaign Contributions
Conventional wisdom holds that businesses overwhelmingly pour funds into elections to
influence policy decisions. While most funds provided to legislative campaigns originated from
business groups, no individual economic industry was among the top three donor groups. The most
campaign contributions provided to candidates originated from funding sources that could not be
determined by the National Institute on Money in State Politics -- designated as the uncoded
category. These uncoded funds represent donations that are undeclared, originated from private
and unaffiliated individuals, or simply could not be traced to a precise source. This category
represented a relatively massive 18.04% of all campaign contributions. Unsurprisingly, political
parties were the second highest contributor to state legislative campaigns.
The defense industry provided the least campaign contributions to state legislative
candidates, accounting for a meager 0.00047% of all donations. This would be expected, however,
considering that most defense policymaking occurs at the federal level. Public finance programs
provided the second lowest amount of contributions to candidates, totaling only 1.3% of all funds
given to candidates. This is an exceptionally telling finding. This small amount underscores how
underfinanced and rare comprehensive state legislative public finance programs are in the
American states. The transportation industry provided the third lowest campaign contributions to
state legislators. As will be discussed in more detail later, however, the transportation industry is
particularly strong in the Midwest.
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Like the overall trend, campaign contributions for most categories peaked in the 2006
election. Agriculture, Construction, Finance and Insurance, General Business, Lawyers and
Lobbyists, Candidate Contributions, and Public Subsidy contributions peaked during the 2006 and
2008 elections, only to once again decline by 2014. Communications, Energy, and Labor campaign
contributions steadily increased from 2000 to 2014. Contributions from Transportation and
Government were largely stable over this time. Only campaign contributions from Political Parties
have consistently declined. There are a couple of reasons as to why Political Party donations may
have decreased. The most obvious explanation is the decline of political party strength. A second
explanation is that relaxing campaign contribution limits, and the wider use of independent
expenditures, make it no longer necessary for contributors to rely on political parties as a channel
to provide funds to candidates.
I show the highest contributing industry as a percent of all donors in Figures 4.2 and 4.3
by legislative chamber.14 Unsurprisingly, interest groups and donors do not have the same strength
across all states. Indeed, looking at the industries that provide the most campaign contributions to
legislative candidates, certain regional patterns emerge. The southern state legislatures enjoyed
exceptionally large support from the health industry. In the Midwest, the Mid-Atlantic, and on the
Pacific Coast, labor unions still provide very substantial resources to the House campaigns, even
though there has been a relatively steady decline in union membership as a percent of the overall
population. Still, the percentage of union membership is highest in these three regions. The energy
sector is especially strong in the plains states. This meets expectations with the recent increase in
gas, oil, and wind development in the plains states.
The Financial Sector tends to provide campaign contributions to State Senates more so than
the State Houses and Assemblies, particularly throughout the Midwest and the Atlantic Coast. In
the Midwest, the Financial Sector changes places with the Unions as the largest contributors to the
Senates. This support from the Financial Sector may be due to partisan control in these chambers,
however. In the Midwest, the Republicans have had more success in maintaining majorities in the
upper chamber, particularly in Michigan and Indiana. On the other hand, the State Houses in the
Midwest have been more likely to change hands, potentially leading the Unions to target these
seats to help Democrats win a majority.

14

These percentages exclude uncoded, public financing, and unitemized contributions.
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Of course, this dissertation is primarily concerned with differences in donations between
business and ideological groups. Some of the public subsidy data warrant additional attention to
inform my model specification in my next chapter. Only eight states provided public funding to
state legislative candidates from 1999 to 2014. Among these, only the Connecticut, Arizona,
Maine, Minnesota, and New Jersey programs provided funds that were close to the median total
raised by all candidates. The data suggest that the programs are strong enough, however, to perform
an analysis on public financing. The relatively healthy public finance programs in Arizona and
Maine were severely hindered by Arizona Free Enterprise. Indeed, the impact of the decision of
Arizona Free Enterprise is exceptionally clear when looking at public subsidies provided to
candidates in Arizona. At the height of the program in 2008, publicly financed candidates in
Arizona received a total of approximately $5.7 million. Once the trigger provision was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the public finance program became less relied upon by
candidates due to the drastic cut in the benefits provided by the subsidies. In 2014, the Arizona
public finance program only provided approximately $1.8 million. A very similar pattern exists in
Maine, which also used a trigger provision in their public finance law. The program peaked in
2006, providing state legislative candidates with approximately $5 million. The program was
relatively stable, however, in the 2008 and 2010 elections. Support to candidates plummeted to
$1.8 million once the trigger provision was removed by the legislature. The New Jersey pilot
program will create some operationalization challenges, which I will discuss in further detail in
the next chapter.
4.4 Overall State Variation in Campaign Contributions
My study is primarily concerned with the source of campaign contributions to individual
candidates, not aggregate statewide totals. Before looking at individual candidates, however, it is
helpful to see how statewide variables influence campaign contributions. A strong relationship
between statewide factors and campaign contributions signifies that I must cluster errors around
each state. First, I begin by investigating the three most apparent determinants of the statewide
campaign contribution totals; statewide party competition, professionalism (Hogan 2000), and
state population size. My models in this section are simple bivariate Ordinary Least Squares
regressions. All state level data are collapsed into a single datapoint that is not sensitive to time.
My unit of analysis for these models is the state legislative chamber. Each of my state-level results
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is separated by State Houses and Senates. I regress the three independent variables with log total
statewide campaign contributions (not including public subsidies) as the dependent variable.
Individual campaign contribution totals and averages will be analyzed in the next section.
My results indicate that campaign contributions gravitate to chambers with strong
professionalism scores and high state populations, providing further support that I must cluster the
errors around states in the next three chapters (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). The R-squared between the
total amount of campaign contributions (public financing excluded) provided to all candidates in
the chamber, and the professionalism score is .48 and .57 for Houses/Assemblies and Senates
respectively. Each of these relationships is significant. At both extremes of legislative
professionalism, candidates running for the North Dakota legislature raised a total of only
$4,989,872. This is compared to the exceptionally high total of $1,042,269,824 raised by
Californian candidates.
A few chambers were notable outliers in the professionalism bivariate regressions. First, I
will discuss the State Senates. The Texas State Senate had the largest residual of $1.44e+08. Thus,
the Texas State Senate drew in far more campaign contributions than the professionalism model
may suggest. The Illinois State Senate closely followed with a residual of $1.34e+08. In third is
Missouri with a much smaller residual of $7.65e+07. As will be expanded upon later, the Texas
State Senate has only thirty-one seats, with each Senator representing 806,000 citizens. These
Senate districts are larger than federal House of Representatives districts, inevitably pushing the
cost of each race higher than may be expected.
On the other end, the Wisconsin State Senate had a residual of -$7.57e+07. At face value,
this is a somewhat surprising finding. The Wisconsin State Senate is a swing chamber, with
majorities changing in 1998, 2002, 2006, and again in 2010. This initial finding indicates that party
competition may not be a strong predictor of campaign contributions. Arkansas and Michigan
followed Wisconsin with residuals of -$7.48e+07 and -$7.44e+07 respectively. Arkansas and
Michigan impose term limits on their candidates which may lead to lower total campaign
contributions. Candidates in term-limited states are not seen as good of an investment as their nonterm limited colleagues (Mooney 2009). Until Arkansas changed its term limits in 2014, the state
had the most restrictive legislative term limits in the nation along with Michigan. Representatives
were limited to three two-year terms and Senators to two four-year terms.
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State Houses/Assemblies followed the same pattern as the State Senates. The Texas House
of Representatives had the largest residual of $127,282.6. The New York Assembly raised the
lowest total relative to its professionalism level with a residual of -$93,466.24. This is logical,
considering that the New York State Assembly is firmly in control of the Democratic Party. New
York was followed by Michigan and Wisconsin with residuals of -$68,632.82 and -$56,202.19
respectively. The Wisconsin State Assembly was far less competitive than the Senate, flipping its
majority only twice since 1994 with an advantage towards Republicans. As noted, Michigan has
the most restrictive legislative term limits in the United States, potentially discouraging donors
from contributing.
The bivariate regressions support my inclination that competition is not a strong predictor
of campaign contributions. My regressions showed that statewide competition has no significant
effect on total campaign contributions. Indeed, the R squared for House and Senates was a meager
.01 and .02 respectively. This finding helps confirm that even competitive chambers may not
attract campaign contributions. I cannot yet say, however, why this might be the case. My models
in Chapters 6-8 may shed more light on this finding when I include the folded Ranney index into
a multivariate model and investigate donations at the individual level.
Interestingly, I also find that professionalism is not the most predictive statewide variable
of total campaign contributions. State population totals are more strongly correlated to statewide
total campaign contributions than legislative professionalism. The R squared between population,
and total campaign contributions were .74 and .79 for State Houses and Senates respectively. State
populations are also significantly related to professionalism scores with an R squared of .65.
Logically, larger populations states have more contributors, leading to higher statewide totals.
State populations should not be included in my Tobit models. The average state population from
1999-2014 is 4,328,014. Scaling issues will inevitably affect the fit of my models. The
professionalism score ranges from -1.8 to 8.54, making it a far more suitable variable for my
analyses.
Considering the strong relationship between state attributes and contribution totals shown
in this section, it is prudent to cluster the standard errors around each state. Of course, there is
variation in campaign contributions that requires far greater attention than was provided in this
section. None of these discussions have addressed the central state level variable of this
dissertation, campaign contribution laws. (The index is negatively and significantly correlated with
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total campaign contributions in the state if regressed with legislative professionalism.) Further,
state factors alone will not fully predict campaign contributions. Candidate-specific factors will
influence campaign contributions. The next section will discuss campaign contribution patterns at
the individual level.
4.5 Trends in Campaign Contribution Donations to Individual Candidates
The sheer number of legislative seats across the United States produced an exceptionally
robust dataset for understanding campaign contributions and law. Between 1999 and 2014, there
were 112,921 candidacies for the legislature in regular general elections across all fifty states. Of
these candidates, 89,746 ran for State House/Assembly, constituting approximately 79.5% of the
sample. This proportion is somewhat more than the overall number of House seats available
relative to Senate seats at 73.2%. By far, the state with the most candidates was New Hampshire
totaling 6,447. Most of the candidates in the dataset were able to stand in the primary or general
election. Only twenty-nine candidates passed away before the election. Seventy-two candidates
were disqualified, and another 1,393 candidates withdrew from the election (some merely to run,
however, in another district or chamber).
The average total amount of campaign contributions made to all state legislative campaigns
from 1999-2014 was a respectable $72,557.23. The median, however, was significantly lower at
$16,255, driven down by candidates who failed to raise funds. Omitting these candidates, the
median and average contribution levels rise to $24,649.01 and $84,935.59 respectively. A
surprising number of candidates failed to raise any contributions for their campaigns or went into
debt. Across all states, 16,086 campaigns raised $0, had to rely on loans, or provided more
campaign contributions than they brought in, resulting in a negative amount of total campaign
contributions. These candidates represent approximately 14.24% of the sample. A very large
portion of these candidates came from New Hampshire. Indeed, 4,366 of the 6,447 candidates
running for the state legislature in New Hampshire did not raise campaign contributions at all or
had to rely on loans for their campaigns. There does not appear to be any regional or
professionalization trends in where candidates failed to raise funds. Michigan followed New
Hampshire where 1,075 of the 4,129 candidates for the state legislature raised $0 or less for their
campaigns. On the opposite end, only twenty-one candidates failed to raise any campaign funds
out of a total of 1,431 in New Mexico.
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The distribution of the dataset presents some challenges for the full analysis. Even with the
considerable number of candidates with negative and zero contribution totals, it is likely that the
highly positive observations will be more influential over the results. To help overcome this, I
logged campaign contribution for my hypothesis tests to ensure that the results are not unduly
affected by outliers. Logging campaign contributions substantially improves the distribution of my
data for my hypothesis testing. The median logged value of total campaign contributions (not
including public subsidies) is 10.11. The mean is a relatively close 9.9 with a standard deviation
of 1.94. The threshold at the 99th percentile is 13.73. The 1st percentile is 4.61.
As can be seen in Figure 4.6, the average amount of campaign contributions provided to
individual candidates varies widely among the states. Unsurprisingly, these values largely follow
the statewide trends in legislative professionalism and population size, providing further evidence
that clustering around each state is warranted.
I will also account for chamber differences. As expected, State Senate campaigns received
far more funds on average than State House/Assembly campaigns. Most obviously, State Senates
are smaller than the House of Representatives/Assemblies, causing their seats to be worth
relatively more to donors than members of the House of Representatives/Assemblies. The mean
total donations to State Senate campaigns equaled $138,932.1. House races averaged less than half
that amount at $56,625.13. The largest difference between the average campaign contributions
between House and Senate candidates was in New Hampshire. The average candidate for the New
Hampshire House of Representatives raised only $527.08, whereas State Senate candidates raised
$43,037.34. New Hampshire holds the title as having a bicameral legislature with the greatest
difference in the number of seats between the upper and lower houses – 24 senators versus 400
representatives – providing much of the reason for this large discrepancy. The difference between
chambers is hardly surprising. The cost of running is also dependent upon the sheer size of the
constituencies a member represents. Chambers vary in size and number of constituents per seat.
States such as Minnesota and New York have relatively large Senates and Assemblies/Houses in
raw numbers. Both chambers, particularly the New York State Senate, attract higher levels of
campaign contributions.
Of course, there is far more that determines how much money is donated to state legislators
than state populations, district sizes, and chamber memberships. Individual attributes of candidates
also need to be investigated. Leadership is among those attributes that will likely attract campaign
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contributions (Monardi and Glantz 1998). Members elect leadership to manage the day-to-day
affairs of the chamber and serve as fundraisers for their caucus. They also serve as spokespeople
for the caucus.
Unsurprisingly, my data show that chamber leaders far outpace other members in raising
campaign funds. House/Assembly Speakers raised an average of $467,064.9, while Senate Leaders
raised an average of $537,133.9. This difference between the groups, however, is insignificant
with a t-score -0.81. Interestingly, three state Speakers and one Senate Leader raised zero dollars.
Perhaps most expectedly, the three Speakers that raised zero campaign contributions all came from
New Hampshire. The one State Senate Leader is from New York15.
Member seniority should play a role in the source of campaign contributions. Senior
members generally have more influence over a legislative chamber (Meyer 1980). These
individuals are familiar with the legislative process, have built personal relationships with their
colleagues, and are well known by other government actors and interest groups. Senior members
should be targeted by business interest groups. There is a slight difference in how many terms are
served by State House/Assembly and Senate members. On average, House members serve for 3.82
two-year terms.16 State Senators are elected to an average of 3.08 four-year terms.17 The median
number of terms served by these House/Assembly and Senate members are three and two terms
respectively. This points to the fact that State House/Assembly do not typically have the same
attachment to their positions as members of Congress. As of 2017, members of the US House of
Representatives serve for an average of 9.4 years. On the other hand, State Senators are out-serving
members of the United State Senate. Members of the US Senate serve for an average of 10.1 years.
The correlation between total campaign contributions and seniority is relatively low. The
correlation between total campaign contributions and the number of terms served is only .156 and
.131 for State Senates and Houses/Assemblies respectively. I will still need to account for seniority

15

Pedro Espada of New York is the sole Senate leader who did not raise funds going into his term in leadership. It
bears noting that Espada did not rise to the Senate leadership in a typical way. In 2009, Pedro Espada was one of
two Democratic members of the Senate who voted to remove the Democratic Senate President Malcolm Smith,
temporarily placing the Republicans in the majority. The Democrats installed Pedro Espada as Majority Leader after
he agreed to return to their caucus. The Republicans soon thereafter won an outright majority in 2010, while Pedro
Espada was eventually indicted on six counts of embezzlement and theft and was sent to federal prison on December
14th of that year.
16
House members in five states, including Mississippi, Alabama, Mississippi, Maryland, and North Dakota, serve
for four-year terms.
17
Senate members in twelve states, including Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, serve two-year terms.
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in my models. This correlation does not consider how ideological and business groups provide
money over time. As discussed in Chapter 2, a central tenant of my theory suggests that ideological
and business interest groups differ in their contribution patterns to incumbent legislators. If there
is no compelling relationship between seniority and contributions, there is a serious flaw in my
underlying assumptions on donor behavior.
To ensure consistency with my theoretical predictions, I report the trends in ideological
and business interest group donations over members’ tenure in Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. Consistent
with findings at the federal level, ideological and business interest groups tended to provide
campaign contributions to candidates differently over the course of a legislator’s tenure. Campaign
contributions from business interest groups tended to be more stable over time. Once a member
was elected to the legislature, business interest groups tended to consistently provide donations,
seemingly to maintain a long-term relationship as discussed by Welch (1980) and Snyder (1992).18
This becomes difference more apparent, however, when unions are removed from the ideological
group category. This finding will be given more attention in Chapters 6-8, as unions tend to be
treated differently under campaign finance regulations.
4.5.1 Winners and Losers
The conventional wisdom among the American public is that winners raise significantly
more campaign contributions than their challengers. This conventional wisdom tended to be
accurate when I compared contributions between winners and losers in state legislative elections.
Indeed, general election winners raised significantly more campaign funds than losers.
Considering the major differences in their campaign contributions, it would be wise to control for
winners and losers while testing my hypothesis. From 1999 to 2014, 61,978 individual campaigns
lost their election for the state legislature, while 50,943 were successful.19 On average, all losing
candidates, including those who lost in the primary and nominating conventions, raised
$38,293.49. Winners raised significantly more at $116,370.7. This difference is significant in an
unequal variance t-test with a t-score of -60.23. Nationally, the median total campaign
18

Interestingly, when term limits are introduced, campaign contributions from these business interest groups fall in
the member’s last term in office, demonstrating that business interest groups balance the diminishing prospects of
future returns on their donations with the seniority the member holds in the chamber. Ideological groups in termlimited states fell as members approached their last term, but at a much faster rate than in non-term limited states. I
will follow up with this in future studies.
19
This number does not distinguish incumbents running across multiple elections.
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contributions to winning state legislative campaigns were $44,953.68 as opposed to $6,160.23 for
losers.
The difference between winning and losing candidates was stark for both State
House/Assemblies and Senates. Winning candidates raised approximately three times more than
their opponents, regardless of the chamber for which they were running. The 48,960 losing State
House/Assembly campaigns raised an average of $29,576.28, whereas the 40,786 winners raised
an average of $89,094.88. This difference is significant in an unequal variance t-test with a t-score
of -54.25. Similarly, these numbers were highly skewed by outliers. The median total campaign
contributions to winners and losers for State Houses/Assemblies were $38,064.96 and $5,355.645
respectively. The 10,157 successful State Senate campaigns raised an average of $225,898.5
versus the average of $71,078.47 raised by the 13,018 unsuccessful candidates. An unequal
variance t-test also showed that these differences were significant with a t-score of -33.83. The
median successful campaign for State Senate raised $96,348.5.
Some of the differences between winning and losing candidates, however, can simply be
explained away by candidates being eliminated in the primary or nominating convention. Thus, I
will control for candidates who never advanced to the general election. Candidates who lose their
primary or convention will cease to raise funds before the general election is held. Naturally, this
will immediately result in a decrease in their potential to raise campaign funds. The effect is not
as wide as might otherwise be predicted, however. Running for the state legislature only to lose
the primary can still be relatively expensive. Losing State House/Assembly candidates who did
not survive their primary raised on average $23,229.39. The median donation was $5,063.59,
indicating that positive outliers skew the mean. On a similar note, State Senate candidates who lost
their party’s nomination raised an average of $53,170.18 with a median of $9,560.43. The
comparison among general election winners and losers, however, still produces major differences
in the mean total campaign contributions. General election losers for State House/Assembly raised
an average of $33,616.6 and a median of $5,572.7. The median losing general election Senate
candidate raised $13,823.94 and an average of $82,144.85.
My data reveals that both ideological and business interest groups provide more campaign
contributions to winners. The difference was quite stark for both groups. As expected, the
difference in campaign contributions is much larger for business interest groups. Business interest
groups provide winners with an average of $47,032.52 and a median of $14,954.25. Business
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groups provide losers with a median of only $115 and an average of $7,600.84. Ideological groups
gave winners an average of $31,007.72 and a median of $5,270.4. Losers attracted an average of
$17,293.75 and a median of $11,15.926 from ideological donors. The difference in the medians of
winners and losers from their respective averages is because ideological groups primarily provide
donations to challengers running for their first term.
4.5.2 Competition in the States
A central tenant of campaign finance law stringency is its ability to level the playing field
for legislative races. Conventional wisdom holds that campaign finance law can equalize the
number of funds available to all candidates, allowing for more competitive elections. Previous
analyses in this chapter showed that statewide measures of competition did not predict total
donations to candidates. Before moving onto the analysis, getting a snapshot of competition at the
individual level provides us a highly fascinating picture of state legislative campaigns.
Interestingly, the average number of challengers running for each State House/Assembly seat has
somewhat declined since 1999 (Figure 4.10). The average number of State Senate candidates, on
the other hand, has been relatively stable (Figure 4.11). Neither trend can be explained by the
amount of money raised by either chamber. As noted, 2006 attracted the highest amount of
contributions for state legislative races.
House and Senate seats attracted similar numbers of candidates. Each State
House/Assembly district averaged 2.4 candidates, while Senate races had slightly fewer
challengers with an average of 2.311 candidates per district. The median number of candidates per
house and Senate districts was two. A sizable portion of districts did not have a challenger. An
astonishing 12,352 races from 1999-2014 were unchallenged out of the 46,757 legislative elections
held (26%). New Jersey had only four unchallenged state legislative elections. Georgia had an
astonishing 942 uncompetitive races. Unchallenged candidates raised respectable amounts of
campaign contributions, however, indicating that donors saw immense opportunity in building
relationships with these members. Unchallenged State Senate candidates raised an average of
$154,223.9 and $63,066.91 for State Houses/Assemblies. Consistent with expectations, very few
of these contributions were provided by ideological groups. Ideological groups do not need to
provide uncontested candidates with funds since they are not trying to build a long-term
relationship. Rather, most of these campaign contributions originated from business interest
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groups. The average total donations to competitive seats were $137,199.1 and $55,817.97 for State
Senates and Houses/Assemblies respectively.
Somewhat surprisingly, professionalized legislatures did not have more challengers
running for each seat. Arguably, legislative professionalism should attract candidates. As noted,
professionalized legislatures provide members with high salaries, staff sizes, and give members a
more substantial media presence. The relationship between legislative professionalism and the
number of candidates is not straightforward. Professionalism does not significantly predict the
average number of challengers in each district. Almost all state legislatures, regardless of
professionalism level, had an average of four or fewer challengers per district. Indeed, at both
extremes are highly unprofessional legislatures. The North Dakota Senate race only had an average
of 2.05 candidates. The Virginia House of Delegates had the lowest average number of candidates
per district of 2.20. The New Hampshire House of Representatives had the most candidates per
district. It should be noted, however, that the New Hampshire House of Reps utilizes multimember
districts. Some New Hampshire House districts elect eleven state representatives, dramatically
pushing up the number of candidates in each seat.
There was a significant difference in fundraising between winners and challengers within
each district, warranting controls in the full analysis. The median standard deviation for the total
campaign contributions within each race was $27,692.7. Unsurprisingly, the chamber with the
lowest standard deviation among candidates was the New Hampshire House of Representatives at
a mere $779.41. On the opposite end was the California State Senate, with $766,455.2. The
California State Assembly was also the lower chamber with the highest standard deviation at
$433,023.8. The North Dakota Senate had the lowest differences in total campaign donations
among the members at $4,514.01.
There was no notable movement in the average standard deviation in campaign
contributions since 1999, suggesting that the fundraising gap among candidates is not changing.
The difference between funded and underfunded candidates has been exceptionally consistent.
This finding may have a few implications. First, it may suggest that competition for these seats is
not increasing. Second, donors are not improving at identifying winning candidates. If interest
groups want to maximize their influence for as little money as possible, they are likely to target
candidates with the greatest likelihood of winning. This should create a higher spread between the
campaign contributions donated to winning and losing candidates.
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Member tenure tends to be weakly and negatively associated with the number of
competitors in a district at the .05 level. The correlation, however, is only .11. This would suggest
that long-serving members are successful at keeping challengers away but to a limited degree.
Political parties painstakingly try to make sure they have candidates on the ballot. Although not
always successful, these candidates give a choice to their voters in electoral strongholds that belong
to the opposing party. These candidates often serve to boost each political party’s statewide vote
totals.
Although state party competition does not predict campaign contributions, majority party
membership is a strong attractor of donations. Candidates running under the majority party raised
$89,137.02 whereas those in the minority party raised only $56,705.65. This is a clear indication
that donors are targeting campaigns that are likely going to deliver benefits.
4.5.3 Party Differences
This study covers a time that witnessed major shifts in party control over the legislatures.
Through multiple wave elections, both the Republican and Democratic Parties enjoyed near-record
success in winning state legislative races. From 2006 to 2008, the Democratic Party gained over
300 state legislative seats, riding the same wave that provided them with a majority in Congress
and the US Presidency. The Democratic Party went from holding seventeen state legislatures
outright up to twenty-seven at the beginning of the 2009 sessions. They did not hold onto these
seats for very long, however. From the 2009 to the 2014 elections, the Republican Party gained
816 seats, providing Republicans with their largest state legislative election swing since 19201922 (Hartgen and Shonerd 2016). The Republican Party made exceptionally large gains in the
Western and Midwestern states. Most noteworthy, there was a shift away from the Democratic
Party in the South, breaking the complete legislative control they enjoyed since the end of
Reconstruction.
Democrats and Republicans had about an equal number of candidates running for the state
legislature. From 1999 to 2014, a total of 52,399 Democrats and 52,206 Republicans ran for State
House and Senate sears. Independents and third parties made up the remaining 7,631 candidates.
Democrats outraised Republicans, being provided a total of $4,160,164,864 compared to
$4,069,283,328 for Republicans. This $91 million advantage in fundraising did not translate to
more victories for the Democratic Party. Indeed, the difference between the numbers of
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Democratic and Republican Party general election winners is exceptionally small. Republicans
won slightly more state legislative campaigns relative to the Democratic Party. Republicans won
a total of 25,355 races compared to 25,227 for Democrats. Nor did it mean that individual
Democratic candidates raised significantly more funds than Republicans. The difference between
the mean total amount of campaign contributions these candidates raised was insignificant under
a t-test with p>= 0.66. Republican winners raised an average of $116,502.8 compared to $ 117,013
for Democrats. Overall, the Democratic Party fielded more losing candidates than the Republicans.
Republican candidates experienced 26,851 losses between general, primary, and convention
elections. Democrats were slightly higher with 27,172 losing candidates. For both
House/Assembly and Senate races, Losing Democratic candidates raised significantly more
campaign contributions than Republicans. Overall unsuccessful Democrats raised $44,138.69
compared to $41,538.69 for Republicans. This difference was significant at the .05 level in an
unequal variance t-test with a t-score of -2.35, suggesting that a party membership control will be
necessary for the subsequent analyses.
Some fascinating differences emerge in contributions provided by political parties between
the state legislative candidates. Republicans were given an average of $77,946.66 for each election
with the median total campaign contributions equaling $20,682.4. Democrats slightly outraised
Republicans by averaging $79,393.97 in campaign contributions with a median of $21,225.99. A
significant portion of campaign contributions could not be traced back to a particular industry,
potentially signaling weakness in disclosure laws. Uncoded campaign contributions accounted for
an astounding 18.5% of the total donations made to Republicans and 17.46% made to Democratic
candidates. Further testing in Chapter 7 will be necessary to see if these funds were due to any
weakness in campaign finance law.
An initial survey of the data suggests that business groups prefer Republicans and
ideological groups prefer Democrats. Business interest groups provided Democrats with an
average of $22,460.82 and Republicans $32,053.82. The median of business interest donations to
Democrats and Republicans was $2,200 and $4,191.25 respectively.
There does not seem to be a severe bias in donating, however, when looking at each
industry as a percentage of all donations. As demonstrated by Table 4.1, Democrats and
Republicans generally received campaign contributions from the same industries. Very few
industries demonstrated exceptionally high partisan preferences in their campaign contributions.
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Thus, I will not need to worry about losing observations when I isolate my analyses to
contributions from specific donor groups. Among all industries, Labor was the most partisan in
their contribution levels. Unsurprisingly, Labor Unions were exceptionally supportive to
Democratic candidates relative to their Republican peers. Labor unions provided Democratic
candidates with $522,239,311.1 from 1999 to 2014. Labor Unions provided support to
Republicans, however, but at a relatively meager $96,361,792.13. For Democrats, this total
constitutes 12.5% of all their donations, compared to only 2.36% for Republicans. Approximately
$16 million of labor union campaign contributions were provided to New York State Senate
candidates alone, which is an interesting and telling finding. Unions provide contributions to New
York Assembly Republicans, but they only rank fourth in total statewide donations. Breaking away
from other trends, the strong campaign support from unions to New York Senate Republicans
signifies that under certain conditions (like when a party has almost guaranteed control over the
chamber), even ideologically backed groups are willing to put partisanship aside.
The financial services industry was the second most partisan industry. The financial and
insurance sectors were particularly supportive of Republican candidates, providing them with
roughly 10.5% of all campaign contributions. Still, the partisan divide in their campaign
contributions is not nearly as high as Labor Unions. The financial sector was still somewhat
supportive of Democrats, providing 7.37% of campaign contributions. This indicates that most
industries are simply interested in building influence, regardless of political party membership of
the member.
On the opposite end, single-issue groups, as defined by the Federal Elections Commission
(not to be confused with the overall ideological group category that I constructed), provided very
little campaign financing for candidates. Ideological and single-issue campaign contributions to
Democrats and Republicans were exceptionally low, only constituting 1.9% and 2% of all
donations respectively. This is not too surprising, however, considering that ideological groups
must rely on donations from the public to operate. They do not have a stable funding stream to
operate, greatly reducing their ability to provide a significant amount of financial support to their
candidates.
Cross campaign support tended to be exceptionally important for both Republican and
Democratic candidates seeking their first term in office. Candidate contributions constituted 10.3%
of the total for Republicans and 8.4% for Democrats. For the first term in office, this number rises
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to 17.3% for Republicans and 13.9% for Democrats and then drops soon after. This suggests that
candidates from both parties rely on their colleagues for support to secure office while they make
relationships with business interest donors.
There was a significant difference between the amount of campaign contributions raised
between successful Democratic and Republican House/Assembly candidates. Republicans and
Democrats won approximately the same number of State House/Assembly races at 20,460 and
20,475 respectively. Victorious Republican House/Assembly candidates were outraised, however,
with a mean of $85,894.02 versus Democrat’s $91,661.35. This was significant at p>0.0038. This
significant difference could be an effect of Democrats being the strong incumbent majority party
in states that have particularly expensive elections such as New York, Illinois, and California,
whereas Republicans have held supermajorities in states with relatively inexpensive elections such
as Idaho, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Utah.
On the other hand, there was no significant difference in average total campaign
contributions between winning Republican and Democratic Senate candidates. Successful
Republican Senate candidates raised an average of $231,642.3 versus $220,117.7 for Democrats.
Republican State Senate candidates are more competitive in expensive states than their
House/Assembly colleagues. Republicans won more State Senate races than Democratic
challengers, particularly in states that tended to be more competitive for the upper chamber.
Republicans secured 5,279 State Senate victories compared to 4,967 for Democrats. Indeed, in
many states such as Michigan, Kentucky, New York, Colorado, and Maine, Republicans have
traditionally had more success winning the State Senate over the State House/Assemblies during
the time of this study.
Unsurprisingly, campaign contributions to third party and independent candidates were not
nearly as high. The mean campaign contributions to third-party candidates was a mere $6,542.76.
Somewhat surprisingly, the median total campaign contributions collected by Third Parties
candidates was $0. The uncoded category was even more significant for these candidates,
constituting 27.97% of all campaign contributions. The construction industry was the most
supportive industry to Third Party candidates, providing 23.98% of their total contributions.
Political party donations to Third Party candidates were also exceptionally low relative to support
given by the Democratic and Republican Parties. This is not a surprising finding, however,
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considering that Third Parties lack infrastructure and strong backing from contributors to provide
their candidates with campaign funds.
4.6 Conclusion
The findings here will play a helpful role in setting up my models the in next chapter. The
data shows that national, state and individual factors play an important role in determining
campaign contributions to state legislative campaigns. This includes variables such as legislative
professionalism. Thus, the model must include a relatively full set of controls to appropriately
capture trends in campaign finance contributions. Most importantly, the data here further
demonstrates that a fixed effects model is necessary to ensure accurate results.
A few fascinating trends emerged at the individual level. Unsurprisingly, campaign
contributions to state legislators are highly dispersed, requiring the dependent variable to be
transformed in the full model to account for outliers. Against conventional wisdom, however,
direct donations to state legislative campaigns are not increasing. Rather, they peaked in 2006 and
have been declining ever since. Perhaps most fascinatingly, Republicans and Democrats tend to
receive donations from the same contributor industries. Only campaign contributions from labor
unions show any substantive partisan preference. This suggests that business donors have little
interest in the party of the candidate. Rather, they simply care about who will give them influence
in the policy process.
Conditions across the districts were surprisingly static. State legislative seats are not
attracting more candidates as time goes on. Rather, the number of candidates per House/Assembly
district is declining, while competition in State Senate seats is holding steady. Further, the
difference between the best and worst fundraisers within each district is not changing either.
Unfortunately, this study cannot offer any explanation as to why these trends may exist.
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Table 4.1: Party Differences in Campaign Contributions
Industry

GOP

Dem

(GOP)-

Absolute

(Dem)

Val.

Defense

0.06%

0.04%

0.02%

0.02%

Ideology

1.96%

1.80%

0.16%

0.16%

Communications

2.20%

1.97%

0.23%

0.23%

Party 13.01% 13.34%

-0.33%

0.33%

Public Subsidy

1.11%

1.46%

-0.35%

0.35%

Non-Contributions

0.93%

1.41%

-0.48%

0.48%

Unitemized

3.33%

3.99%

-0.65%

0.65%

Transportation

2.01%

1.31%

0.70%

0.70%

Government

2.55%

3.33%

-0.77%

0.77%

Uncoded 18.53% 17.46%

1.07%

1.07%

Agriculture

2.37%

1.17%

1.20%

1.20%

Health

7.25%

5.73%

1.52%

1.52%

Energy

4.44%

2.76%

1.68%

1.68%

Candidate Contributions 10.30%

8.48%

1.83%

1.83%

Construction

4.43%

2.51%

1.92%

1.92%

General Business

7.86%

5.43%

2.43%

2.43%

Lawyers and Lobbyists

4.77%

7.88%

-3.10%

3.10%

Financial Services 10.53%

7.39%

3.14%

3.14%

2.37% 12.56% -10.19%

10.19%

Labor

0

2.0e+08 4.0e+08 6.0e+08 8.0e+08 1.0e+09

Sum of Contributions
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Figure 4.1 Total Campaign Contributions Per Election year for All States

73

Figure 4.2

Figure 4.2 Largest Contributors for State Houses/Assemblies

Figure 4.3 Largest Contributors for State Senates

8

74

6

CA

2

4

NY

MI
MA

-2

0

AK
OH
AZ WI
FL
NJ
HICO MD
WA
MO
CT OK
MN
OR
DE
NC
NVIA IN
MS SC
VA
RI
VT
LA
KYTN
IDWV
ME KS
AR AL
GA
MT
ND
SD
UT
NM
WY
NH

0

PA
IL

TX

2.00e+08
4.00e+08
6.00e+08
Contribution Total to State House/Assembly

8.00e+08

Figure 4.4 House Chambers Professionalism and Total Contributions

75

6

8

CA

4

NY
PA

2

MI
MA

-2

0

OH
WI
AK
AZ
WA
FL
MD
HI CO
DE
MN
OK
IAORLA
NE NV
VA
RICT
SC
WV
VT
ID MS
KS
ME
KY TN
AR IN
GA
NH
MTUT
AL
NM
WY
NDSD

0

1.00e+08

IL
NJ
MO

TX

NC

2.00e+08

3.00e+08

Contribution Total to State Senate

Figure 4.5 Senate Chamber Professionalism and Total Contributions

0

100000

200000

300000

400000

76

AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MDME MI MNMOMS MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WAWI WVWY

State
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Figure 4.7 Average Total Business Group Donations by Tenure
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Figure 4.8 Average Total Ideological Group Donations by Tenure
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Figure 4.9 Average Total Ideological Group Donations by Tenure Without Unions
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CHAPTER 5. DATA AND METHODS

5.1 Introduction to Methodology
Many might find it surprising that political scientists have not investigated the questions
presented in this research, especially considering the amount of attention placed on campaign
finance laws over the past five decades. Unsurprisingly, methodological hurdles are the primary
reason why the questions presented in this dissertation have not been put to rest. Many conceptual
and practical barriers stand in the way of researchers who study state campaign finance law.
Operationalizing state campaign finance regulation is complicated. State governments are not
equal in their record keeping prowess; state legislative records are sometimes incomplete or
difficult to access. Campaign finance regulations are also tailored to the political needs of each
state, making it difficult to compare these statutes easily. As noted in the previous chapter, very
few scholarly works tested the effectiveness of campaign finance law on contributions (Gooch and
Rackaway 2014). The unavailability of campaign contribution data plagued earlier research
(Hogan 2000). The analyses in the extant research included brief time spans, finite state samples,
and tested very few campaign finance laws.
Fortunately, recent advances in campaign finance research have ameliorated many of the
methodological weaknesses present in previous studies. The development of the Witko Index
(2005) has opened the door to making meaningful comparisons among state government campaign
finance laws. The National Conference of State Legislatures and the Campaign Finance Law
Institute have made tremendous strides in making campaign finance regulations readily accessible
to the public. The National Institute on Money in State Politics has collected all data on campaign
contributions to state legislators back to 1999, remedying the most significant issue faced by
campaign finance scholars. These improvements allow researchers to conduct analyses that are
broad enough to generate credible estimates.
The hypotheses in this dissertation present a broad array of questions surrounding the
effectiveness of campaign finance law regulations. No single approach will adequately tackle each
hypothesis. Instead, the models must be systematically adjusted to ensure that the estimates
provide a sound picture of the effectiveness of state campaign finance law. This chapter will
provide a broad foundation of how I will adapt the models for each test of my analysis.
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This chapter is broken down into four sections. First, I will provide a basic overview of my
methodology. Second, I will discuss the data collection process. Third, I present the variables that
will be used in the analysis. Finally, I will briefly conclude on how my method improves upon
previous studies.
5.2 Method
I rely on Tobit analyses to test my hypotheses. Tobit analyses are particularly useful when
the dependent variable cannot take on a negative value. While using a Tobit model will drop all
negative values, they represent a tiny percentage of all donations across all industries (less than
.001%). Thus, these negative totals do not constitute a relationship between donors and the state
legislator and are not relevant to this study. They also do not provide additional information about
the ability for campaign finance laws to reduce donors’ ability to fund candidates since they are
not ultimately contributions.
Contributions to candidates likely are not independently distributed. To correct for this,
scholars typically use multilevel modeling or cluster the standard errors around the state. For this
study, I chose to cluster the standard errors around each state. Failing to do so would result in
overstated significance levels for state-level predictors (Bonneau 2007; Primo, Jacobsmeier, and
Milyo 2007). Furthermore, statewide predictors that vary little, like certain state campaign finance
regulations, would merely act as a state identifier and not a measure of regulatory stringency. Of
course, this would be especially troubling for this study considering that my primary predictor is
a state level variable, campaign finance law regulations.
5.3 Data
As noted in the previous chapter, the sample includes candidates for State House/Assembly
and Senate from 1999-2014 across the fifty states – a total of 112,921 observations representing
65,928 unique candidates. The primary unit of analysis is the individual candidate for State
House/Assembly and Senate. Although the primary independent variable is state campaign finance
law stringency, it is most logical to analyze campaign contributions at the individual level for a
few key reasons. First, state-level campaign contributions are not exceptionally informative for
understanding how campaign finance regulations affect donations in legislative elections. The total
amount of campaign contributions raised in each state is dependent on factors such as the state
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economy, raw number of seats in the state legislature, population size, and legislative
professionalism. Statewide totals are not directly dependent upon the relationship between donors
and state legislators, which this dissertation is most concerned about. Secondly, as previous
Supreme Court cases suggest (see Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC and Randall v.
Sorrell), state campaign finance laws are designed to inhibit campaign contributions for individual
elections. Campaign contributions are made between the donor and the candidate, not to the bulk
of members serving within the legislature. Indeed, donors strategically provide donations to
members who will deliver the most legislative benefits for the lowest cost (e.g., legislative
leadership [Apollonio and La Raja 2006] and members of the majority party).
The dataset for my analyses includes only general election candidates. The National
Institute on Money in State Politics only recently started to collect campaign contribution data on
special elections, typically just including election cycles beginning in 2010. Their inclusion would
not provide a representative sample of the data that are currently available. With this, special
elections typically suffer from exceptionally low turnouts, utilize procedures that are different from
the general election, and provide shortened periods for candidates to raise funds. It would be
unwise to compare the fundraising patterns in special elections to general elections due to the
former’s idiosyncrasies.
5.3.1 Dependent Variables
There are three ways to ascertain whether campaign finance laws affect contributions. First
is the law’s ability to limit the total size of direct donations – i.e., reduce how much money a donor
can provide to a candidate in total. Second, does the campaign finance law cut a candidate’s
proportion of overall total donations from certain groups? Finally, doe the laws force donors to
provide relatively similar levels of donations to all candidates? In other words, do campaign
finance laws ensure that donors cannot provide a single candidate with an inordinate amount of
contributions relative to his or her challengers?
One primary dependent variable cannot adequately be used to measure these effects. On a
similar note, understanding how well campaign finance laws equalize donations among candidates
must be tested at the district, not the individual level. Thus, this research uses four dependent
variables to test my hypotheses – three for the individual models and one for the district model.
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5.3.2 Individual Level Model Dependent Variables
The first group of dependent variables is log total campaign contributions provided to state
legislative candidates. Contribution totals are data divided into election cycles.20 That is, each data
point represents the amount of money each candidate raised from his or her previous election to
the next. All campaign contribution data for the dependent variables were provided by the Institute
on Money in State Politics (followthemoney.org). Donations to candidates were separated by the
Institute on Money in State Politics into 19 broad sectors as designated by the United States Census
North American Industry Classification System. These industry classifications are: Agriculture,
Candidate Contributions, Communication and Electronics, Construction, Defense, Energy and
Natural Resources, Finance and Real Estate, General Business, Government, Health, Labor,
Lobbyists and Lawyers, Party, Public Subsidy, Transportation, Ideology and Single-issue,
Unitemized Contributions, Non-contributions (bank interest, etc.), and Uncoded. These data have
been used widely in previous research on campaign contributions to state legislatures (Hall 2014),
indicating their strong validity and reliability. I excluded funds from public financing programs in
the hypothesis testing chapters since this research is most interested in campaign contributions
from private donors.
Industries were placed into Ideological and Business Interest categories. The Candidate
Contribution, Labor Unions, Party, and Single-Issue Groups categories were combined to create
the Ideological donor group. These groups are not purely seeking economic benefits from the
legislature. Instead, these groups advocate for policies that affect societal and social norms. These
groups also aim to keep individuals with a certain viewpoint in a majority, rather than to seek
direct regulatory change, through their campaign contributions (Welch 1982). Arguably, Labor
Unions stand out from this group for having a clear economic mission. Labor Unions are not
primarily concerned with advocacy (Asher et al. 2001). Rather, they negotiate contracts with
employers (Asher et al. 2001). As will be expanded in later chapters, unions will need to be
analyzed separately to adjust for various regulations in certain circumstances. Some statutes are
designed to affect only unions. Thus, I will ascertain if unions respond to regulations differently
than other ideological groups.

20

For example, if a candidate runs in the 2014 election cycle for a two-year term, all contributions made in the
previous two years for that cycle is totaled and counted for the 2014 data entry.
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Totals from Agriculture, Communication and Electronics, Construction, Defense, Energy
and Natural Resources, Finance and Real Estate, General Business, Government, Transportation,
and Health categories were aggregated to form the Business Interest group. As noted, these groups
are primarily concerned with shaping state statues that provide economic benefits to their firms.
Campaign contribution totals were adjusted for inflation and indexed to 2010 prices. The
predicted effects of campaign finance law on raw contribution totals is straightforward. If
campaign finance laws reduce contributions to state legislators, the index will be significantly and
negatively correlated with the totals.
The campaign contribution data are not exclusive to direct donations. Contributions made
from Political Action Committees (PACs) are also included in the industry totals. Because PAC
donations are included, the models will be exceptionally useful in exploring whether donors can
easily sidestep campaign finance regulations, particularly bans on direct contributions.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the distribution of campaign contributions is highly
skewed. States such as California, Texas, New York, and Pennsylvania have candidates that raise
contribution totals that are far above the median (Figure 5.1). This skewness creates exceptional
problems for the model fit. Tobit models require that the dependent variable is normally distributed
(Gordon 2005). To overcome this issue, most scholars log campaign contributions and spending
to deal with the right-skewed distribution (for example, see Barber 2016, and Barber, Butler, and
Preece 2016, Bonneau 2007, Campante 2011, Claessens et al. 2001, Gerber 1998, Milyo 2011,
Powell 2012, Sarbaugh-Thompson and Thompson 2017). Of course, this drops all observations
with a negative or zero total. Scholars can also take the square root (Gordon 2005) or transform
the variable with log(value+1) (Abler 1991). As can be seen in Figures 5.2-5.4, of these three
options, only the log transformation reaches normality. I also checked the results presented in the
following chapters with link tests and boxcox tests, which confirm that the log transformation is
the most appropriate.
Losing the candidates with zero campaign contributions is not troubling for this study. For
one, most candidates who raise zero dollars are not serious contenders for office. Campaign
finance law would not affect these candidates regardless of the statute's stringency level, causing
the estimates to be far lower than they otherwise should be. Secondly, this research is interested in
how contributor behavior is affected by campaign finance law. Candidates who unsuccessfully
raise funds do not provide further insight into this relationship.
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Logging campaign contributions make the interpretation of the β coefficient exceptionally
difficult in models where my primary independent variable is dichotomous. Traditionally, a change
in the β coefficient is interpreted as a percentage change in the dependent variable (Hardy 1993).
This interpretation is accurate when the dependent variable is continuous. As shown by Halvorsen
and Palquist (1980), Giles (2011), and Hardy (1993), this is not the case when the variable is
dichotomous. Thus, for this analysis, I will need to recalculate the numbers represented in the β
coefficients to report the percentage changes adequately and in some cases limit my analysis to a
pure comparison of reported effect sizes.
Also, the dummy coefficients are likely to be negative. In some cases, they may be lower
than -1. At face value, this makes little logical sense since a value cannot decrease by more than
100%. That said, it is essential to consider that the dichotomous nature of my independent variables
represents an “on, off” condition for each policy. The negative values can be interpreted to
understand how much higher contributions are when the policy does not exist. If campaign
contribution laws negatively impact log total donations, I will discuss these effects regarding states
that do not have the relevant statute that I am testing.
The second group of dependent variables is a simple percentage breakdown of the total
campaign contributions by industry. Percentages were calculated for all categories of campaign
contributions, including the business and ideological groups. There should be a shift in the source
of donations if campaign finance regulation affects specific groups more than others. For example,
if ideological interest groups are unaffected by campaign finance regulation but business interest
groups are, candidates should see a sizable portion of their campaign contributions originating
from ideological interest groups.
The third dependent variable is the logged average donation size provided by each group.
This variable was calculated in two stages. First, I divided the inflation-adjusted total contributions
with the number of individual records for each respective candidacy. The total record number
represents all individual donations made to a candidate for that election, as recorded by state
election agencies. Each record represents a single donation made during a respective election
cycle. Like total donations, each average donation value was logged to fix issues with right
skewness.
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5.3.3 District Model Dependent Variables
The district models explore the ability for campaign finance regulations to equalize
donations among candidates running for the same seat. In other words, if campaign finance laws
cause candidates to raise similar levels of campaign contributions in the same legislative race. As
noted, only investigating direct donations to state legislators provides a limited picture of the
effectiveness of campaign contribution regulations. Campaign finance regulations serve a dual
purpose. They seek to complicate the relationship between donors and legislators and bring further
accountability to elections. Thus, policymakers must conduct a tough balancing act when
designing campaign finance laws to comply with Supreme Court precedent. Campaign finance
laws must simultaneously allow candidates to raise enough funds to mount a serious challenge
while ensuring that no single candidate gains an insurmountable advantage in the election. If a
well-connected candidate can fundraise without limitation, it is possible that suppression of
competition within the district will follow. As donation levels among candidates equalize, the
chances that similar messaging levels will occur. This equalization minimizes the chances of any
candidate having an insurmountable advantage in voter outreach.
To account for the equalization of variables, the district dependent variable is the logged
standard deviation of campaign contributions in each legislative district. This dependent variable
was generated using data from the Institute on Money in State Politics. The Institute includes
district identifiers in its data, allowing these models to be generated with relative ease. Candidates
were grouped into their respective legislative district and year. Then, I calculated the standard
deviation of the total campaign contributions in each legislative district per election. Finally, all
duplicated observations by district per election cycle were removed from the dataset. This left one
observation per legislative district. In total 46,757 districts were included in the analysis. The
standard deviation of campaign contributions will verge on zero as each candidate in the district
raises the same amount of total donations. In other words, the standard deviation will be 0 when
the totals are the same. Thus, when campaign contribution laws are effective at equalizing
donations, they will be negatively associated with the standard deviation of donations in each
legislative race. To account for high outliers, I similarly logged the standard deviation variable.
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5.3.4 Primary Independent Variables
Campaign finance law stringency is the primary independent variable. Campaign finance
law stringency was measured using the updated Witko index from Kulesza, Witko, and
Waltenburg (2016). The index is divided into disclosure requirements, campaign contribution
limits, and public finance laws. The additive measure codes “1” if a state maintains a specific
regulation during that election cycle. If the legislature passed the measure but was not yet enforced,
the policy was coded as "0." Further, the policy was coded as “0” if the policy was still officially
law but was struck down or suspended by state or federal courts. If the program was underfunded
or not widely used, however, the measure is still coded to reflect that the statute is in place. This
was done to ensure that there was legal consistency, as certain states with programs that could be
considered "underfunded," such as Hawaii, still pay out campaign funds in rare circumstances.
I made four adjustments to the updated Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg (2016) measure
to better fit this analysis. None of the changes affected the contribution limit sub-index. Most
obviously, not every regulation in the public financing sub-index is relevant for this study. Public
financing is not available for every election in each state. Instead, certain state public finance
programs are designed to provide funds only to political parties, legislative campaigns, or
statewide candidates. Of course, public financing programs for statewide elections and political
parties do not directly affect campaign contributions to legislative candidates. Thus, the index was
recalculated to no longer include public financing for statewide campaigns and political parties.
The disclosure requirement regulations and campaign contribution limits, however, are universally
applied to state legislative candidates. There was no need to remove regulations from the index
permanently.
States enforce different campaign contribution limits on individuals, families, candidates,
unions, and corporations. This variation can be somewhat problematic for the full campaign
contribution limit sub-index dependent upon what hypothesis is being tested. For example,
business interest groups will be directly affected by bans and limits on corporate contributions. As
demonstrated in Table 5.1, the Witko Index (2005) codes these regulations separately. The
campaign contribution limit sub-index will be adjusted based on the groups being tested. These
adjustments will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Most important for my analysis, the
Witko Index (2005) does not code for PAC contribution or party limits. As will be discussed in
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the next chapter, the individual limit variable will be used as a substitute. This is done since most
states tie their individual limits to parties and PACs (NCSL 2018).
Secondly, three minor coding changes were made to the updated Kulesza, Witko, and
Waltenburg (2016) index. First, Arkansas was coded in both Witko (2005) and Kulesza, Witko,
and Waltenburg (2016) as having a legislative public finance program. This program was not
included in the measure for this analysis for a few reasons. Arkansas law provided a rudimentary
tax checkoff that can be applied to state legislative candidates, and thus could be counted as a
public financing program in a very strict sense. This study, however, is primarily concerned with
programs that provide direct donations to state legislative campaigns. Indeed, the program is not
currently counted by the National Conference of State Legislatures as a direct legislative financing
program. Accordingly, this program was removed from the index for the analysis to reflect only
programs that provide direct assistance to candidates.
Third, the Witko (2005) index was expanded to include odd number election cycles. The
Witko (2005) index was only calculated for even-year elections. Thus, Virginia, New Jersey,
Mississippi, and Louisiana were recoded for their odd-year election cycles. Except for New Jersey,
these states did not change their campaign finance regulations in the odd-numbered years. In 2005
and 2007 the New Jersey legislature operated a pilot public financing program. In 2005, the public
financing program only covered two swing legislative districts. The 2007 program was extended
to include six districts. Neither program provided funds for the primary election. Further, the funds
were only set aside for candidates in the two major parties (Brickner and Mueller 2008). Although
the 2007 program only covered six districts, it provided over $3.9 million to candidates. The 2005
program offered a little over $600 thousand. Thus, the 2007 program was included in the measure
whereas the 2005 program was excluded.
Finally, the index (Witko 2005) was updated to include the 2013 and 2014 elections. Like
the Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg (2016) study, information for the updated Witko (2005) index
was collected from state records on legislative changes to campaign finance regulations, National
Conference of State Legislators databases, and conversations with state election officials.
This measure is a particularly sound choice for testing my hypotheses. The Witko (2005)
index is widely used among researchers, signaling that the measure is a reliable way to capture
campaign finance regulation. Indeed, the index (Witko 2005) generated an exceptionally high
number of research projects on campaign contributions since it was initially introduced,

90
demonstrating its acceptance by scholars as a reliable way to measure campaign finance law
stringency. Furthermore, the Witko (2005) Index is readily adaptable to my research questions
relative to other campaign finance law measures. On the one hand, the measure provides an
unusually holistic view of campaign finance regulation by combining all forms of campaign
finance regulation into a single index. On the other hand, this measure uniquely separates
disclosure requirements, campaign contribution limits, and public financing into three distinct subindexes, which allows this study to compare the relative effectiveness of all significant forms of
state campaign finance law. The measure is also consistent in its application to state statutes.
Most importantly, the measure includes campaign finance regulations that are consistently
used across states, providing a basis to compare regulations on the same playing field. With this,
the Witko Index (2005) is especially useful for testing the effectiveness of individual campaign
finance regulations. This is most relevant regarding campaign contribution limits. Campaign
contribution limits are crafted to reflect the cost of campaigning in that state. The comparability
of the Witko Index (2005) should provide an expansive view of the effects of campaign finance
regulation on donor behavior that would not be achieved by using other measures.
The Witko Index (2005) weighs each campaign finance regulation equally. There are a few
advantages to this approach. Campaign finance regulations are not equally effective at influencing
donations. Naturally, some will be more effective than others. Unless there is a theoretical reason
to weigh each sub-index or regulation, however, there is little logical reason to do so before
conducting this analysis. Weighting individual campaign finance regulations may provide
estimates that are quite misleading and may bias the results in a direction that may either overpower
or undermine the actual effect of the campaign finance regulation. Second, previous research has
yet to demonstrate that any of these campaign finance programs or specific regulations are more
meaningful than the other. Thus, weighting campaign finance regulations unequally without
having a sound theoretical reason or backing from previous work would be illogical.
PACs serve as an important conduit for donors to provide money to candidates. The index
does not include PAC limits as a separate regulation. This is not concerning, however, considering
that the individual limit can easily be used as a proxy for PAC donations. Per the National
Conference of State Legislatures, all but one state, South Dakota, enforce individual limits and
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limits on political action committees together.21 Indeed, sixteen states enforce individual campaign
contributions under the same limit as political action committees. More importantly, all states that
allow unlimited campaign contributions are consistent between political action committee and
individual limits. Thus, the individual limit dummy variable accurately reflects whether a state
enforces limits on PACs.
5.3.5 Control Variables
Any model that predicts campaign contributions to state legislators requires a wide array
of control variables. Personal, state, national, and district factors influence how campaign
contributions are provided to state legislative races. To account for these effects, I include controls
for statewide party competition, presidential election cycles, odd-numbered year elections, term
limits, member tenure, party ID, chamber, previous experience in the other legislative chamber,
running as a challenger, district competition, speakers of the house, Senate leaders, elimination in
the primary election, and running for the majority party in the individual level models.
5.3.5.1 Election Year Controls
National election trends will likely influence campaign contributions. Scholars have
demonstrated that presidential campaigns have significant spillover effects in state legislative
politics. For instance, legislative polarization tends to increase when presidential elections are
particularly close in a state (Hinchliffe and Lee 2015). The vast financial resources and media time
spent on the presidential election greatly surpasses those for midterm elections. Midterms, when
the clear majority of state legislative and gubernatorial races are conducted, are typically plagued
with depressed voter turnout. Legislative elections are often tied to the national races by campaigns
and pundits alike, giving them more attention than they might otherwise enjoy. Thus, campaign
contributions during presidential years are likely to be higher than usual.
Four states hold legislative elections in odd-numbered years; New Jersey, Virginia,
Mississippi, and Louisiana. These states score in the relative middle of legislative professionalism,
suggesting that any deviation in campaign contributions should be isolated to their election year. I

21

A separate model was conducted that recoded South Dakota to account for the difference between PAC and
individual limits. The effect size and t value were identical to the unaltered model.
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expect that these election cycles are likely to attract fewer campaign contributions considering that
no federal offices are on the ballot.
5.3.5.2 State Level Controls
Statewide party competition can be a reliable driver of investments in legislative
candidates. When party competition is high, the result of the election is uncertain. This gives
donors reasons to believe that their preferred candidates can win the election. As statewide
competition increases, donors will be more likely to provide campaign contributions to assist their
preferred candidates. I used an updated Ranney measure to capture statewide partisan competition.
The original measure only gauged the level of Democratic Party dominance in the state
government as a function of the percentage of votes received by the Democratic gubernatorial
candidate, the percentage of Democratic seats in the state legislature, and percentage of past years
the state government was under trifecta control. Thus, the Ranney measure is primarily best suited
for models seeking to understand the role of shared governance between Democrats and
Republicans (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012). The measure quantifies statewide party competition when
folded.
Legislative term limits are a separate tool used by states to deter donations from building
strong relationships with legislators. Introduced in the early 1990s, term limits were intended to
complicate the relationship between donors, interest groups, and state legislators. Proponents of
term limits argued that interest groups and donors were unlikely to provide significant campaign
contributions to term-limited members. Since building long-term relationships with donors are
exceptionally difficult under term limits, candidates were no longer as lucrative of an investment.
Thus, it is expected that term limits will reduce campaign contributions to state legislators
(Apollonio and LaRaja 2006). It may be that term limits affect donations from business interest
groups more than ideological groups. This will have to be tested more thoroughly in future studies.
I include a control for chambers with multimember districts. Ten states elect members in
multimember districts. Previous research suggests that multimember districts create increased
competition for campaign contributions, forcing candidates to look outside the state for donations
(Curry, Hernson, and Taylor 2013). Multimember districts may reduce the total amount of
campaign contributions provided to candidates.
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I also use the Bowen and Greene Index (2014) for state legislative professionalism.
Professionalized legislatures give more lucrative salaries, provide bigger staffs, and are in session
for more days of the year. Seats in these state legislatures are likely to be more sought after by
candidates. I expect that professionalized legislatures will attract more money to campaigns.
Unlike the Squire Index (2007), the Bowen and Green Index (2014) accounts for annual variation
in professionalism. States periodically change their salaries, legislative calendars, and perks, which
the Squire (2007) Index is not as sensitive to.
5.3.5.3 Individual Level Predictors
All information for the party ID, chamber, and challenger status controls were provided
by the Institute on Monday in State Politics. Each is coded as a dummy variable with Democratic
party membership, challenger status, and Senate elections valued at "1." Since both political parties
benefited from wave elections during this period, it is unlikely that either political party will have
a clear advantage. Thus, I do not predict if Democratic party membership affects campaign
contributions. Challengers, having never served, are likely to raise less campaign contributions
from business interest groups than incumbents and those running for open seats. State Senate
elections, which have longer terms and larger districts, will raise relatively more funds than State
Assembly/House members. Those who have previous experience in the other legislative chamber
have additional experience in fundraising, and thus should raise more than their challenger peers
running for their first term.
It is also vital to include if a candidate is present on the general election ballot. Of course,
not all candidates make it to the general election. Many candidates are eliminated in the primary
election or nominating convention. A smaller portion will voluntarily drop out of the election, will
be disqualified, or will pass away before appearing on the general election ballot. In all cases, these
candidates will not attract campaign contributions once they are removed from the election,
shortening the time they must collect funds from donors. Thus, they will raise less campaign
contributions than candidates who move onto the general election.
Any predictive model for campaign contributions cannot ignore competition within each
legislative district. District competition is likely to be among the strongest predictors of campaign
contributions to legislative candidates, but also among the most difficult to capture. Variables such
as name recognition, advertisement costs, local political trends, and campaign ground games affect
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the competitiveness of a state legislative campaign. Incorporating these factors into a single model
is nearly impossible. Data that would make operationalization of each of these variables is simply
unavailable.
I use a proxy variable due to the difficulties in operationalizing district competition. The
competition variable represents the number of competitors in each state legislative district.
Previous work has shown that legislative districts with a history of high party competition attract
more candidates (Hamm and Hogan 2008). This will inevitably affect the number of donations
provided in the district. Candidates in a crowded field will require significant resources to stand
out from their competitors and get their message out to voters. Indeed, districts that are considered
winnable will likely attract more campaign contributions to fund more viable candidates. Of
course, candidates who do not have competitors will not need to raise campaign contributions to
win their election. Donors are likely to provide their preferred candidate with relatively more
resources to ensure they can attract voters. Thus, I expect campaign contributions will be positively
correlated with the number of competitors in each district.
A simple party membership control variable is insufficient to account for the partisan
effects of fundraising. Models that explain campaign contribution should also account for the
majority party status of the political party. Donors are likely to provide more funds to members of
the majority party rather than those in the minority party (Barber 2016). Candidates running for
the controlling political party are likely to have a fundraising advantage for a few reasons,
regardless of the type of contributor. First, the party has already demonstrated that it can win a
majority in the state legislature, placing it in a position to deliver legislative benefits to donors.
Secondly, the majority party has already had time to build relationships with donors in previous
sessions by enacting policies. Finally, the majority party enjoys the ability to control the resources
under the control of the chamber. For example, members of the majority party in certain states are
rewarded with more staff and larger office budgets.
Legislative leaders are a vital intermediary between state legislators and donors, helping
solve collective action problems that arise from the legislative process (Mooney 2013). Scholars
have long known that campaign contributions gravitate to chamber leadership. Further, leadership
is tasked with setting the chamber agenda. To measure leadership effects, the Speaker of the
House/Assembly and Senate President are coded as dummy variables. Historical information on
chamber leadership was provided by state legislative public records. All House/Assemblies have
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a Speaker position, making coding a relatively straightforward task for these members. Senates,
however, vary significantly in their leadership positions. Certain states, such as Minnesota and
Michigan, give the Senate Majority Leader the most authority in the chamber. Others, such as
Indiana, Kentucky, New York, and Ohio vest their presidents and president pro tempores with the
most authority. Thus, whoever had the most administrative and political influence in the state
Senate was coded as the leader. The Texas State Senate lacks the party leadership structure found
in other state Senates. Instead, the Lt. Governor is given significant organizational power over the
chamber. For this reason, no member of the Texas State Senate is coded as serving in a leadership
position.
5.4 Testing the Witko Index
My primary independent variable is the updated Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg Index
(2016). The original Witko Index (2005) earned significant respect among campaign finance
scholars and underwent additional scrutiny following its introduction (Kulesza, Witko,
Waltenburg 2016). It is still helpful to conduct a few checks to ensure that the measure works well
with my data. As noted, a central tenet of the Witko Index (2005) is its ability to separate campaign
finance regulation into three distinct sub-indexes. I must be confident that the sub-indexes are not
highly correlated with each other so I can isolate the effects of specific campaign finance
regulations. In each of the next three chapters, I will conduct a basic analysis on each respective
sub-index before I test my hypothesis. Typically, an index that measures campaign finance law
stringency would strive for a high degree of correlation among its components since it is trying to
capture a single concept. Low correlations among the sub-indexes, however, would provide
confidence that the effects of specific campaign finance regulations on donations can be isolated.
The degree of change in campaign finance law change across the states, particularly those
caused by state and federal court decisions, could present challenges measuring regulations as
well. It is known from history that certain campaign finance regulations were strengthened or
weakened during different time periods. Matching this history with changes in the campaign
finance law measurement will build a case for the strength of the Witko Index (2005) as my
primary independent variable. This can be performed by running basic summary statics on the
Witko Index (2005). It makes little sense, however, to conduct these tests in this chapter. These
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tests will be conducted in each of the three hypotheses testing chapters for each corresponding subindex.
5.5 Conclusion
Previous work on campaign finance regulation was plagued with significant and
unavoidable methodological hurdles. Data on campaign contributions were limited, and state
campaign finance law records were difficult to collect and operationalize. Fortunately, these issues
were overcome through the work of the National Institute on Money in State Politics and the
creation of the Witko Index (2005). These two developments allow this study to test campaign
finance regulations on donations across all fifty states.
The design of this dissertation tackles the hypotheses from a variety of angles that is
unmatched in other scholarly work. To date, no study has tracked campaign finance law this
broadly. Each major form of campaign finance law will be thoroughly tested to see how it affects
campaign contributions for candidates and individual races. By the end of this dissertation, I will
be able to discern how nineteen separate types of campaign finance regulation affect donor
behavior from a variety of interest groups. These analyses also utilize a dataset that is far larger
than anything used in previous research by including all candidates for State House/Assembly and
Senate across all fifty states from 1999-2014.
The models presented in the next three chapters, however, may turn up surprises that should
be further investigated. Thus, any results that are not consistent with the hypotheses will be
followed up with further testing in Chapters 6-8. In the next chapter, I begin testing my hypotheses
with contribution limits.
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Table 5.1 Witko Index of Campaign Finance Law Stringency
Disclosure:

Spending limits/public financing: Contribution limits:

1) Reporting of aggregate
expenditures,

1) A total expenditure limit,

2) Reporting of aggregate
contributions,

2) A check-off on tax return forms 2) Prohibition of direct
to contribute to public funding
contributions from
accounts,
corporations,

3) Itemization of some
categories of expenditures,

3) An independent revenue source 3) Prohibition of direct
for public financing,
contributions from labor
unions,

4) Itemization of some
categories of contributions,

4) Public financing of statewide 4) Limits on the amount of
office elections (e.g. governor, lt. contributions from
governor, etc.),
corporations (direct or PACs),

1) Contribution limits on
individuals,

5) Itemization of expenditures 5) Public financing of state
over $50,
legislative elections,

5) Limits on the amount of
contributions from labor
unions (direct or PACs),

6) Itemization of contributions 6) Public financing of political
over $50,
parties, and

6) Limits on the amount of
candidate self-financing, and

7) A final report required
within one month after an
election, and

7) Limits on the amount of a
candidate’s family’s
contributions.

8) Reports required on at least
a quarterly basis.

7) Equal distribution of public
funds between candidates and/or
parties.
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Figure 5.1 Distribution of Inflation Adjusted Total Campaign Contributions to Candidates

Figure 5.2 Distribution of Logged Total Campaign Contributions to Candidates
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Figure 5.3 Distribution of the Sqr. Root of Inflation Adjusted Campaign Contributions to
Candidates

Figure 5.4 Distribution of the Log of Inflation Adjusted Campaign Contributions to Candidates +
$1
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CHAPTER 6: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS

6.1 Overview of Hypothesis One.
This chapter tests Hypothesis One: Campaign contribution limits will affect business
contributions more than ideological interest group donations. On the surface, campaign
contribution limits are exceptionally straightforward regulations. Campaign contribution limits
merely restrict donors from donating over the amount set by the statute. In practice, however, the
politics and enforcement of campaign contribution limits are far more complicated. Contribution
limits are championed by reformers to remove the influence of money from campaigns. Logically,
limiting donations should reduce donors’ capacity to fund campaigns, especially those that outright
ban direct donations from certain donors (Witko 2005), which should eliminate the influence of
these groups during campaigns. On the other hand, campaign contributions can be crafted to have
no impact on candidates’ fundraising abilities. If set too high, or designed with loopholes,
contribution limits can be less impactful, particularly when they allow unregulated independent
spending (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Nelson 2000). Some argue that
campaign contribution limits hinder democratic processes and free speech (Smith 2001; Sullivan
1997, 1998). These critics of campaign finance laws, including prominent lawyers like James
Bopp22, blame contribution limits for giving a fundraising advantage to incumbents or for being
outright unconstitutional.
Consistent with previous research, my theory rejects both arguments that campaign
contribution limits and bans are either ineffective or designed to hurt challengers. Instead, this
dissertation assumes that campaign contribution limits keep donations low and reduce money from
politics. That is, I argue that campaign contribution limits are not superficial or nefarious
regulations. It is a mistake, however, to assume that all campaign contribution limits are designed
with the same underlying approach. History suggests that powerful group politics affect the design
and scope of campaign contribution limits. Both legislators and the public have historically
targeted campaign finance regulations to impact the donations of a specific group of contributors.

22

James Bopp is a former member of the RNC from Indiana. He successfully argued the McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission, 572 U.S. ___ (2014), Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. ___ (2014), Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and the American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v.
Bullock, 567, U.S. 516 (2012) decisions.
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Often, this activity purposefully gives political advantages to certain political parties (Hall 2016).
Thus, states do not typically enforce the same campaign contribution limits on all groups of donors,
leaving specific donations completely unregulated.
The focus cannot be on the design of campaign contribution limits alone. Donors also differ
in how they contribute money to campaigns. As stated, donors have diverse strategies and
intentions for providing campaign contributions. The division primarily rests on ideologically
driven or access-oriented donors (Barber 2016). Business groups donate to build long-term
relationships; ideological groups, primarily to get likeminded individuals elected. Thus, to be fully
effective, laws should be sensitive to contribution strategies of each type of donor.
I argue that there is more nuance to the effectiveness of campaign contribution limits. My
hypothesis predicts that the effectiveness of campaign contribution limits is dependent upon the
group they are intended to impact. I contend that campaign contribution limits are not adequately
designed to account for the different donation patterns used by interest groups to gain influence.
As described in previous chapters, ideological groups provide most of their campaign contributions
when a candidate is first seeking election to get like-minded candidates elected (Snyder 1992).
Since ideological groups primarily donate to new candidates, they are most likely to run against
campaign contribution limits early in the member's tenure. Once the member is elected, ideological
group contributions diminish, thus making campaign contribution limits largely ineffective.
Corporate campaign contributions are consistently provided to candidates to build long-term
relationships with members. Business interest groups also have significantly more resources than
most ideological based groups. Thus, business interest groups are more likely to run against
campaign contribution limits throughout the entirety of the members’ service.
This chapter is broken down into five sections. First, I will provide a basic overview of
the campaign contribution limit sub-index. Second, I present the expected relationship between
the dependent and independent variables for hypothesis one. Then, I will confirm the campaign
contribution limit stringency sub-index is predictive of donations to state legislative candidates.
Fourth I will begin to test the individual sub-index regulations by examining direct contribution
bans on donations. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the findings.
I find limited support for my hypothesis that contribution limits are more impactful on
business groups. My results, however, still paint a very compelling picture of the effectiveness of
campaign contribution limits. I discovered little support for the theory that campaign contribution

102
limits are set at purposefully highly levels to allow candidates to raise an inordinate amount of
campaign contributions. Instead, my findings show that campaign contribution limits are a very
useful tool for disrupting the flow of money between candidates and all types of donors. Overall,
both log total ideological and business interest group donations are negatively and significantly
impacted by campaign contribution limits and bans. I found very slight differences, however, in
the effectiveness of campaign contribution limits on business interest and ideological group
donations. As will be expanded upon below, ideological groups tended to be slightly more affected
by campaign contribution limits than business groups, even for incumbents. Business interest
group contribution limits are less effective for incumbents than new candidates. I will explain why
this might be the case in the discussion section.
6.2 Methods and Trends in Campaign Contribution Limits.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, my models rely on Tobit analyses. Tobit is useful when the
dependent variable cannot take on a negative value. Campaign contributions fit this criterion,
making Tobit especially suitable for my analyses. As a reminder, estimates from a Tobit model
are like ordinarily least squares, but the linear effect “is on the uncensored latent variable, not the
observed outcome” (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group 2017). I clustered each model around
the states as to not overstate the effect size of state-level independent variables.
My hypotheses are interested in understanding the effects of campaign contributions from
two distinct angles. First, I ask if campaign contribution limits affect donations to individual
candidates. Second, I test if campaign contribution limits place candidates on an equal fundraising
playing field in each district. Thus, I divide my analyses into individual and district models.
My primary dependent variables for the individual candidate models are log total campaign
contributions, the number of contribution records in each election cycle, and the percentage of
donations originating from each respective group. Limits directly target the ability of candidates
to raise an inordinate amount of funds from candidates, so it is logical to focus on logged total
donations. That said, it is also helpful to see how many contributors donate under contribution
limits to coincide with any changes in log total donations. When appropriate, I will also use average
donation size as a rough measure of individual contributor activity. The primary dependent
variables for the district models are the logged standard deviation of campaign contributions from
ideological and business groups donated to candidates in the same legislative election. The
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standard deviation of campaign contributions measures the equality of donations among
candidates running in an election. A value of zero represents no variation in the amount of
contributions.
My primary independent variable for this chapter is an adapted version of the Witko (2005)
campaign contribution limit sub-index. The Witko Index (2005) codes for seven types of campaign
contribution limits; union bans, corporate bans, corporate limits (direct and PACs), union limits
(direct and PACs), candidate self-finance, individual limits, and family limits. Admittedly, my
primary analyses below will only focus on campaign contribution limits on corporations, unions,
PACs, and candidates. Due to the nature of the data from the National Institute on Money in State
Politics, there is no reliable way to distinguish family and candidate contributions within the
unitemized and uncoded categories. Thus, I cannot directly test the effectiveness of family or
candidate campaign contributions. Further, unions will receive additional attention since they are
subjected to dedicated campaign contribution limits even though they are a part of the ideological
group.
There is a slight complication testing PAC and party donations on campaign contribution
limits using the Witko Index (2005). The Witko Index (2005) does not code for party limits. The
corporation and union limit variables include PAC limits. Thankfully, all but one state, South
Dakota, sets their individual limits to their PAC limits. Thus, the individual limit dependent
variable acts as an adequate proxy for PAC limits in my models. Because almost all donors use
PACs to fund candidates, I can use this variable to test both corporate and ideological PAC group
donations directly. Examining political party contributions is a bit more complicated. Five states
impose limits on parties but not on political action committees. There may be a need for some
slight adjustments to the individual limit measure for political parties later in this chapter.
The states developed a diverse range of campaign contribution limit regulations.
Contribution limits are the second most utilized form of campaign finance law behind disclosure
requirements. An average of forty-five states enforced some form of campaign contribution limits
from 1999-2014. As discussed in Chapter 3, the past three decades have witnessed relatively low
levels of campaign finance law reform. Legislatures regularly updated contribution ceilings, but
very few states repealed or enacted new limits and bans on groups. The Witko Index does not
consider the monetary level of campaign contribution limits, so these changes had no impact on
my measure. State campaign contribution limit stringency did not undergo much change from
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1999-2014 (Kulesza, Witko and Waltenbug 2016). This is reflected in the numerical score of the
contribution limit sub-index. Using an unaltered version of the Witko Index (2005), the average
stringency in campaign contribution limits was 3.7 in 2000 versus 3.88 in 201423.
Usually, this lack of variation in a primary independent variable would cause concerns for
any statistical model. I am not worried, however, about insufficient change in campaign
contribution limit regulations for my analyses. During the timeframe covered by my dataset there
was isolated, and sometimes drastic, change to campaign contribution limits in certain states. For
example, the Missouri Legislature completely gutted its campaign contribution limits in 2008. The
Nebraska Supreme Court struck down all of Nebraska’s campaign contribution limits in 2012 as
unconstitutional. Vermont’s campaign contribution limits were successfully challenged at the US
Supreme Court. Montana’s contribution limits were struck down by federal district courts on
multiple occasions. Eventually, the contribution limits were upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court in
2017. Illinois, bucking the trend, enacted new campaign contribution limits in 2009, which took
effect before the 2012 elections. These changes, along with other slight amendments in campaign
contribution limit laws in other states, provide sufficiently high variation in my primary
independent variable.
Since campaign contribution limits are designed to affect specific groups, each dependent
variable must be matched with its respective primary independent variable. Admittedly, it will be
easier to ascertain the effects of campaign contribution limits on donations from businesses interest
groups for two reasons. First, state statutes hold all corporations to the same campaign contribution
limits. Statutes vary on the limits they place on ideological groups, including unions, political
parties, and candidate committees. Further, unions are the only ideological group that are subjected
to direct campaign contribution bans. Consequently, I will need to run multiple models to
understand how ideological groups are affected by their respective campaign contribution limits.
I only need a single primary independent variable to understand the effects of contribution limits
on business group donations. Thus, I can test corporate campaign contributions with the same
standard across all states.
Second, unlike most ideological groups, I can directly compare effects between corporate
contribution limits and bans. States do not enforce bans on ideological groups other than unions.

23

This level of change was insignificant in a t-test.
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The lone exception to this is New York, which bans political parties from donating to candidates
during primary elections. On the other hand, states regulate ideological groups under separate
contribution regulations. The Witko Index (2005) accounts for family, candidate, and individual
limits. Thus, each type of campaign contribution in the ideological group must be tested with a
separate model.
Understandably, there may also be a concern that the index is not responsive to variation
in campaign contribution limits across states. The lack of sensitivity of my measure to campaign
contribution has important theoretical implications for my findings. There is no doubt that the level
of campaign contribution limits matters. Previous work demonstrated that low campaign
contribution limits have a positive effect on electoral competition in legislative districts. This effect
is not especially important to my research question in this dissertation. This analysis does not test
if lower levels of campaign contribution limits are more effective for reducing the flow of money
to candidates. Instead, I am analyzing the effectiveness of state campaign contribution limits as
they were enforced from 1999-2014. This way, I can better determine if campaign contribution
limits are designed with any group bias in mind. Legislatures are bound by Buckley and Randall
to set limits that are sensitive to the costs of campaigning in the state while not infringing on First
Amendment rights. Campaign contribution limits are set with a legal lower limit by federal and
state courts, but not an upper limit. Thus, if policymakers design ineffective campaign contribution
limits, the monetary level is inconsequential. My models will produce insignificant results for my
campaign contribution limit variable. If campaign contribution limits are effective, my
dichotomous variable will still be significant, even if the measure does not account for variation
in campaign contribution limit levels.
Thus, for the sake of this analysis, it would be unwise to use a primary independent variable
that captures state by state variation in campaign contribution limits. I can only make meaningful
comparisons with a consistent and readily applicable measurement of campaign contribution
limits. Statutes may be filled with loopholes that allow donors to easily get around campaign
contribution limits, which I expect will be revealed in my analyses below if they exist. These
loopholes cannot be easily quantified. Thus, the campaign contribution limit dummy variable is an
adequate way to capture both the current levels of campaign contribution limits and any potential
weaknesses in state statute.
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Basic descriptive analyses of the campaign contribution limit sub-index demonstrated
some noteworthy trends that provide insight into my theory. Business interest group donations are
more strictly regulated than ideological groups. An average of 21 states allowed political parties
to donate an unlimited amount of campaign contributions to candidates from 1999-2014. In
contrast, an average of only seven states allowed unlimited direct campaign contributions from
corporations until 2012 when Illinois began to restrict them as well. Twenty-two states banned
corporations from making direct donations. Another 22 imposed limits. Only Iowa and Mississippi
imposed campaign contributions on corporations and not unions. An average of 11 states imposed
no campaign contribution limits on individuals, allowing private citizens to provide candidates
with an unlimited amount of resources.
Since each campaign contribution limit dummy will be matched with its respective
independent variable, high correlations between my dependent variables are not problematic. Still,
as reported in Table 6.1, correlations reveal four interesting patterns that demonstrate which groups
states target with campaign contribution limits. Unsurprisingly, the highest correlation is between
the union and corporate contribution limits at .9205. States tend to impose limits on both unions
and corporations at the same time. This high correlation most likely reflects the political reality
that it is difficult for legislators to limit contributions on only corporations or unions alone without
some fallout.
Second, more stringent direct campaign contribution bans on unions are also closely
intertwined with corporation bans. The correlation between each ban type is relatively high at .717.
Following the same logic, banning only corporate or union donations could lead to severe partisan
bias in elections. Thus, it is logical that most state legislatures would try to impose regulations on
both equally. Indeed, limits on unions and corporation bans are correlated at only .078. This finding
indicates that states would instead ban donations from both groups outright rather than placing
more lenient regulations on the other. That said, there is a slight bias in regulating corporations
over unions. Including states that changed their campaign contribution limit regulations, an
average of 23 states enforced a direct corporate contribution ban during this period. In contrast, an
average of only 17 states did the same for unions. This pattern may suggest that there is relatively
more political pressure on states to limit campaign contributions from corporations over unions.
This study does not definitively test this hypothesis, however, and will have to be followed up with
further studies. There were low positive correlations between corporate and union bans with their
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respective limits. This is not due to a weakness of the measure. Instead, these correlations merely
reflect overlap in state statutes between PAC and direct limits.
Third, I find relatively high correlations between individual and other forms of limits.
Individual limits serve as a baseline regulation for all donors. Many states link all contribution
limits to individual limits. But while the correlations are high, individual limits are not as strongly
correlated with other limits as those between unions and corporations. Individual limits serve as
an anchor for union and corporate limits as well. Individual limits are correlated with corporate
and union limits at .653 and .626 respectively. In 2014, 18 states set corporate limits to those placed
on individuals. Only Tennessee tied its corporate campaign contribution limits to PAC limits.
Twenty-one states tied together union and individual limits. Twelve states, however, placed no
regulations on individual contributions at all. Individual limits are also correlated with family
limits at .664 and candidate limits at .205. I expected that individual and family limits would be
more highly correlated with each other. Family and individual limits are intrinsically targeting
campaign contribution from private wealth.
Fourth, family and candidate limits were uncorrelated with corporate or union bans.
Corporate bans were only correlated with family and candidate limits at -.072 and -.101
respectively. Each of these four regulations targets a very different group of donors, so it is not
surprising that they are not highly correlated with each other. While this is a very weak and
insignificant relationship, the negative correlation is a bit perplexing. On its face, it seems that
some states avoid regulating too many groups of donors at once. This claim is outside of the scope
of this analysis, however, and will need to be investigated in future work.
These trends in campaign contribution regulations show a slight bias towards regulating
corporations over ideological groups. This tendency demonstrates some evidence that states are
more concerned about undue influence from corporations over ideological groups and individuals.
It is unlikely that legislators will enact limits against ideological groups if they hold similar
positions with each other. Of course, this is far from providing solid evidence for my hypothesis.
This will be explored more in the next chapter.
Now, I turn to the Tobit analyses to see if ideological groups are less impacted by their
respective campaign contribution limits than business interest groups. My models should provide
straightforward, consistent results to conform to my hypothesis. Corporate contributions should
always be negatively and significantly associated with their respective limits. Conversely,
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ideological group donations, including those from political parties, unions, single-issue groups,
and campaign committees, should be insignificantly related to contribution limits.
6.3 Direct Contribution Bans
A logical first step is to test campaign contribution bans on unions and corporations.24
Among my dependent variables, the ban analyses should provide the starkest and most apparent
evidence of group differences in the effectiveness of campaign contribution limits. At first glance,
this argument may seem counterintuitive. On the surface, direct campaign contribution bans are
among the most precise mechanisms used by state policymakers to remove money in legislative
campaigns. Direct bans on campaign contributions block all donations originating from the
treasuries of corporations and unions. With perfect enforcement, a statistical model should not
reveal much about the effectiveness of campaign contribution bans. Logically, an actual ban should
eliminate all donations from the source it is being enforced upon. Thus, if my measure accurately
captured state statues, the model should show that candidates raise zero dollars under contribution
bans. This should be true for whatever group they are enforced upon, be it unions or corporations.
Campaign contribution bans cannot be described as a full prohibition of donations from
unions and corporations. Campaign contribution bans are designed with an obvious loophole.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, state statutes allow corporations and
unions to bypass these regulations by establishing separate Political Action Committees.
Corporations and unions may first donate to their respective PACs, which then provide
contributions to campaigns. Thus, if campaign contributions are made by corporations and unions
under these bans unhindered, it suggests that state law was designed with a gap that allows
candidates to receive funds from their supporters through separate PACs. Thus, it would be
unreasonable making a prediction that bans completely remove donations to candidates.
To be consistent with my hypothesis, corporate bans should be more effective at reducing
campaign contributions than bans on unions. The logic behind this prediction is relatively
straightforward, yet somewhat different than why I predict ideological groups will be less affected
by simple limits. I expect that unions are better designed to circumvent campaign contribution
bans. Admittedly, unions’ primary mission is to negotiate contracts between workers and
24

As noted, unions are the only ideological group subjected to bans. Thus, they are tested separately from other
ideological groups initially.
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corporations, not to lobby the state government and affect legislative campaigns (Asher 2001). It
would be a mistake, however, to characterize unions as lesser political entities than corporations.
The primary mission of unions is far more politically inclined than that of corporations.
The corporate contribution ban model estimates are reported in Table 6.2. The results are
exceptionally supportive of the effectiveness of direct corporate donation bans. Direct corporate
contribution bans significantly limit total donations from business interest groups. Candidates
running under direct corporate bans are predicted to suffer a 73% reduction in their campaign
contributions from business interest groups. That said, my results indicate that corporate
contribution bans do not reduce candidates’ total share of donations from business groups. The
percentage makeup of contributions from business interest groups is insignificantly related to
corporate bans. Thus, while the total amount of business interest group contributions declines,
there is no significant shift in the makeup of business interest group donations provided to
candidates. Most likely, this is because states with corporate bans also employ bans on direct
donations from unions. Since unions are the largest ideological group contributor, if their donations
also decrease, then there is not likely to be a significant shift away from ideological groups.
I now turn to test my hypothesis on union bans. Once again, my model uses the full set of
independent variable controls. My primary independent variable is the union ban dummy. Union
bans should be insignificant or positively associated with both log total union contributions and
the percentage makeup of union donations to conform to my hypothesis.
The results from my union ban models are reported in Table 6.2. Union donations are
negatively, but just insignificantly associated with bans. The result is exceptionally close to
significance at the p .05 level with a t-score of -1.95. While this non-significant finding conforms
to my hypothesis, the t-score is too close to -1.96 to write off union bans as fully ineffective.
Taking the result as close to significant, the coefficient suggests that union bans reduce donations
by approximately 55%. The results from the percentage dependent variable models were more
conclusive than the log total models. Bans were insignificantly related to the percentage of overall
donations originating from unions. This result neither confirms nor denies my hypothesis,
considering that bans were also insignificantly associated with business interest donations. These
results suggest that union bans are sufficient to reduce the total amount of contributions revived
by candidates, but it does not lead them to rely more on other sources of donations.
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Overall, the ban models were not informative about the relative effectiveness of
contribution regulations on business interest and ideological groups. In sum, bans did not affect
the overall share of contributions from either unions or business interest groups. For both unions
and business groups, bans reduced the log total of candidate contributions. Of course, this is only
if the union model is considered a significant finding. The coefficients in the log total contribution
models suggest that union donations were less affected by bans than from business interest groups.
Still, these results do not provide definitive support for my hypothesis. The log total union
contribution model was far too close to significance to write off union bans. The effect sizes, while
stronger for business interest groups, are not a reliable indicator either. Unions provide far fewer
donations overall than corporations, potentially leading to the differences in the β coefficients
between each model. Instead, I will need to look at the contribution limit variables to find more
evidence for my hypothesis.
6.4 Corporate and Union Campaign Contribution Limits
To provide a quick contrast to my ban models, I begin with testing corporate and union
contribution limits. As previously discussed, union contributions are less regulated than the
contributions of corporations. Five fewer states imposed limits on unions than corporations. Still,
because the level of most union and corporate contribution limits was set to individual limits, the
range of campaign contribution limits across states is identical for corporations and unions. Across
the timespan of this analysis, Vermont’s campaign contribution limits of $200 were the lowest.
These limits were struck down by the Supreme Court in Randall. After this decision, Maine
enforced the lowest limits on corporations and unions at $375.
The corporate and union contribution limit independent variables have a major advantage
over the ban models. Unlike the ban models, the campaign contribution limit measure includes
restrictions on both direct and PAC donations. Thus, my results will show the effectiveness of
campaign contribution limits on all donations from corporations and unions, regardless of whether
they were directly or indirectly provided to candidates.
The results from the full campaign contribution limit models are reported in Table 6.3. As
predicted, campaign contribution limits were significantly and negatively related to log total
donations from business interest groups. Corporate campaign contribution limits reduce business
interest donations by approximately 200%. Corporate campaign contribution limits, however, do
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not shift overall donations away from business interest groups. My estimates suggest that corporate
campaign contribution limits have no significant effect on the percentage of total donations. Oddly,
the average size of donations for business interest groups was positively and significantly affected
by corporate contribution limits. I do not have a direct explanation of why this is the case that is
consistent with previous political science literature. Most likely, this is correlation and not
causation. States with large individual donations may be those most likely to enforce contribution
limits. This finding will need much more testing in subsequent work to understand this effect.
I now turn to test union campaign contributions to their respective limits. To be consistent
with my hypothesis, log union campaign contributions should be insignificantly or positive and
significantly associated with union limits. The results from the union limit models are reported in
Table 6.4. Unexpectedly, union limits were negatively and significantly associated with log total
donations. Total union donations also suffer an expected reduction of 200%. The impacts of union
contribution limits go beyond reducing log total donations. As reported in Table 4, the percentage
makeup of contributions from unions declines by 3.8% under contribution limits. Further, average
labor donation sizes reduce under union contribution limits. These three results suggest that
ideological groups, not business interest groups, are more affected by campaign contribution
limits. Unions may not be representative of all ideological groups, however, warranting further
analyses later in this study.
I am not yet done testing the effectiveness of corporate and union campaign contribution
limits. The fundamental difference between business and ideological groups is how they treat
incumbents. Business groups donate to maintain influence over incumbents while ideological
groups assume legislators will not significantly change their positions once elected. I must also
account for the effects of campaign contribution between incumbents and nonincumbents. It is
prudent to see if corporate campaign contribution limits affect business donations to incumbents
differently than nonincumbents. Incumbency should have no bearing on the effectiveness of
campaign contribution limits under ideal circumstances. Thus, to conform to my hypothesis,
business interest contributions to incumbents should be negatively associated with corporate
contribution limits. Union donations to incumbents should be unrelated to campaign contribution
limits.
The estimates from the incumbent models are reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Although
signed correctly, my results indicate that corporate contribution limits have no significant effect
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on business interest contributions. Thus, corporate campaign contribution limits do not hinder
business’ ability to donate to incumbents. The result was exceptionally close to significance,
however, with a t-score of 1.95. The estimate suggests a 215% reduction. Union donations to
incumbents were significantly and negatively impacted by their campaign contribution limits.
Union contributions to incumbents are cut by 223%. Even taking the corporate limit incumbent
model as significant, contributions to unions are more impacted.
Not only do the results in this section refute my hypotheses, but they also reverse entirely
my predictions. Unlike the ban models, these estimates suggest that ideological groups are more
impacted by campaign contribution limits. The next step is to test business and union groups with
PAC limits to see if there is consistency in my results. The PAC limit models should provide more
clarity to the trend that business interest group contributions are less affected by contribution
limits.
6.5 PAC Limits on Unions and Corporations
I account for the effects of PAC limits in the corporate and union limit models. The primary
independent variables in the previous sections included limits placed on unions and corporations
from both their treasuries or PACs. It is impossible, however, to ignore any potential isolated
impacts of PAC limits on business interest and unions contributions in this analysis. PACs are a
vital part of the donor/candidate relationship. All donor groups can establish a PAC to fund
candidates, bypassing other forms of campaign contribution limits and election regulations.
Because PACs give more flexibility, donors provide a sizeable portion of campaign contributions
through PACs, not directly by the donors themselves. Indeed, PACs are among the most important
sources of income for incumbents (Berber 2016). As noted, all but one state sets their PAC limits
to those placed on individuals. Thus, the Witko Index (2005) individual limit dummy works well
as a proxy for PAC limits as my primary independent variable.
I report the results for the PAC limit models in Table 6.5. Similarly, union campaign
contributions are more impacted by PAC limits than business group donations. As expected,
business interest group donations are negatively and significantly associated with PAC limits.
Candidates subjected to PAC limits are expected to experience a 72% reduction in business interest
group donations. Union contributions, however, suffer an expected 82% decline in total campaign
contributions under PAC limits. These findings suggest that union donations, which are classified
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as an ideological group, are more impacted by campaign contribution limits, partially refuting my
hypothesis.
But once again, it is wise to test PAC limits on business interest and union contributions to
incumbents to see if the results are consistent with the corporate and union campaign contribution
limit models. The results of these models are reported in Table 6.5. Again, the PAC limit model
for business interest group donations was negative yet insignificant for business interest donations.
Union campaign contributions to incumbents were significantly and negatively impacted by PAC
limits.
With the estimates from the PAC limit models, I am now certain that contribution limits
on business interest group donations are not effective on incumbents. Thus far, unions are the only
ideological group that I have tested. The next sections will expand my analysis into single-issue
groups and political parties to see if there are any significant differences in their respective
campaign contribution limits on donations.
6.6 Single-issue Groups
Single-issue groups are the archetypal ideological donors. These groups advocate for a very
narrow policy focus, encompassing areas such as LGBTQ+ rights, abortion, or government reform.
The objective of getting likeminded individuals elected to the legislature should not be muddled
with any other goal. The results should perfectly conform to the hypotheses; single-issue groups
should not be affected by campaign contribution limits. My tests on single-issue groups should
provide vital clarity to whether ideologically leaning donors are at any time less affected by
campaign contribution limits.
My dependent variable is logged total campaign contributions from single-issue groups.
States do not place specialized campaign contributions on single-issue groups. Instead, single
individual groups are subjected to PAC limits. Once again, I will use the individual limit
independent variable as a proxy of PAC limits.
The single-issue models are reported in Table 6.6. Log total single-issue group donations
are negatively and significantly associated with PAC contribution limits. The estimates suggest
that single-issue group donations drop by 223% under PAC limits. Thus far, this is the largest drop
of any group tested within this chapter. This is the most damaging to hypothesis one, as single-
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issue groups should conform to my predictions on ideological donors more than any other. I will
discuss this result in further detail later in this chapter.
6.7 Party Limits
Political parties constitute the final donor group I test with an individual level model.
Political party limits should be among the least effective regulations in this analysis. There should
be little incentive for either political party to place stringent campaign contribution limits on their
candidates. Political parties are among the most important lifelines for new candidates
Understandably; most nonincumbents are unfamiliar with donors. New candidates have not yet
built long-term relationships with business groups. The lack of familiarity puts first-time runners
at a major fundraising disadvantage. Political party donations are a necessary means for most new
candidates to survive their elections.
Political parties also allow donors to bypass other campaign contribution limits. Donors
can contribute resources to political parties knowing that donations will fund candidates with
similar viewpoints. In a way, this allows donors to provide beyond the maximum contributions
allowed for their donor group. Thus, to be consistent with my hypothesis, political parties should
be insignificantly or positively related to their respective campaign contribution limits. Indeed,
this is the last ideological group I test. If the results do not come back as either insignificant or
positive and significant, my hypothesis will be thoroughly refuted. Once again, the Witko Index
(2005) does not code for party limits. Thus, I made slight adjustments to the individual limit
variable to account for California, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, and South Dakota by
recoding their entry to zero. These states enforce no limits on their political parties for either the
general or primary elections.
I report the results from the political party models in Table 6.7. Unfortunately, my results
do not conform to my hypothesis, disproving hypothesis one for contributions to individual
campaigns. Political party limits are negatively and significantly associated with log donations.
Total party campaign contributions fall by 85% in the presence of limits. There may be differences
in the district model, but that is highly unlikely. It is still vital, however, to ensure the previous
results are consistent at the district level as well, so nothing is missed.
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6.8 District Models
I now move on to test the effects of campaign contribution limits on placing candidates on
an equal footing of fundraising. Arguably, one of the central goals of campaign contribution limits
is to ensure that one candidate cannot substantially outraise all others. While bringing down the
raw totals of contributions is a hindrance for campaigns, placing candidates on an equal fundraising
footing helps ensure that no candidate has an advertising advantage going into the election.
To recap, legislative districts are the unit of analysis for these models. The dependent
variable is the standard deviation of campaign contributions provided to candidates running in the
same district in each election. Since these models analyze races at the district level, individual
controls are incompatible with these models, including party ID, member of the majority party,
seniority, challenger status, speakership, Senate leadership, elimination in the primary
election/convention, and service in the other chamber. Thus, these individual level controls were
removed from the models.
The district models provide very mixed evidence. All tested campaign contribution limits
resulted in a reduction in the standard deviation of campaign contribution limits. Thus, campaign
contributions were equalized by the limits. The results from the district models are reported in
Table 6.8. Once again, my estimates show that ideological groups are more affected by their
respective campaign contributions than business interest groups. Corporate campaign contribution
limits had a negative and significant effect on the standard deviation of business interest donations.
As expected, corporate campaign contribution limits reduced the standard deviation of business
interest donations by .999. This suggests that the difference in fundraising between candidates is
160% higher in states without contribution limits. Again, union donations were more negatively
impacted by their respective contribution limits, reducing the standard deviation by 1.19 and an
associated 220% difference. Political party limits reduced the standard deviation of party donations
by .738, representing a 208% difference. Thus, I cannot say that ideological group donations are
less affected by their contribution limits with the results reported in this section.
6.9 Discussion
This chapter tested hypotheses one: Campaign contribution limits will affect business
contributions more than ideological interest group donations. Unfortunately, this hypothesis
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was refuted. I found little evidence that ideological group donations are less affected by campaign
contributions. Instead, my model estimates suggest that ideological groups, not business interest
groups, were relatively more affected by campaign contribution limits.
Consistent with my hypothesis, both corporate limits and bans overall were significantly
and negatively predictive of campaign contributions from business interest groups. The results
from my ideological group models, however, did not conform to my hypothesis. Unions were the
only ideological group in the individual models to be insignificantly associated with their
respective campaign contribution ban. The t-score was 1.96, indicating that unions may still suffer
from adverse effects of campaign contribution limits. That said, it is important to note that bans
do not eliminate all donations originating from corporations and unions. As my results suggest,
both union and corporations subjected to contribution ban still find a way to funnel money to
campaigns. Interestingly, states with a high percentage of union memberships, including, Alaska
(3rd), Connecticut (4th), Rhode Island (8th), Michigan (10th), Ohio (13th), Pennsylvania (16th),
Montana (17th), and West Virginia (18th) enforce direct union contribution bans (Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2017). As seen in the previous chapter, many of these states also have a significant
amount of resources donated to candidates by unions.
My models showed notable differences in the size of the decline in donations caused by
contribution limits for ideological and business interest groups. The percentage reductions in
donations for ideological groups were consistently higher than business interest groups. It is
somewhat difficult to conclude the effectiveness of campaign contribution limits based on my
reported effect sizes alone. In part, this is because ideological groups provide far fewer resources
to candidates than corporations. On average, business interest donors provide candidates with
$25,389.98 versus $17,963.74 for ideological groups.
Turning to my tests on incumbents, it appears that corporate campaign contribution limits
are not as effective for incumbents. This strongly suggests that corporate campaign contributions
were designed so that business interest groups could provide candidates with contributions
unhindered to incumbents. Campaign contribution limits negatively impacted ideological group
donations to incumbents, even though they typically provide less funds after the first term.
Nevertheless, the coefficient differences were not sufficient evidence to disprove my hypothesis;
the incumbent models showed that ideological group donations were more impacted than business
interest groups.
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There is no easy explanation of why my results suggest that ideological groups are
relatively more affected by campaign contribution limits than business interest groups.
Corporations have significantly more resources than ideological groups, allowing them to provide
more donations to candidates. By all accounts, they should use these resources to maximize their
contributions, thus run into campaign contribution limits on a more regular basis. Of course, my
results suggest that this is not the case. I propose two explanations here why ideological groups
are relatively more impacted by campaign contributions than ideological groups. While not
consistent with my hypothesis, each reason paints a very compelling picture of the relationship
between donors and candidates.
The first reason lies with how donors interact differently in the face of campaign
contribution limits. This explanation comfortably fits into my theory and narrative of campaign
contributions and legislators. As discussed, ideological groups primarily donate to candidates
running for their first term or at risk of losing their elections. There is no need for ideological
groups to consistently provide money to campaigns since candidates are unlikely to undergo
significant shifts in their attitudes. Targeting new candidates and at-risk members may cause
ideological groups to run against contribution limits more often than business interest groups.
Ideological groups may pull together all available resources to provide massive amounts of support
to new and endangered candidates. Since ideological groups are maximizing their donations, the
contributions will more likely hit the campaign contribution limit.
Business interest groups only need to give enough funds to maintain a long-term
relationship with incumbents to extract economic benefits. Corporations do not seem to be very
interested in who holds the majority. Instead, they attempt to influence the legislative process
regardless of who is serving. As shown in the previous chapter, most corporations do not
discriminate by party except for the financial services sector. Both parties know that their
legislators receive funds if they are in power, so long as corporations are free to give under
campaign finance regulations.
This explanation, while simple and consistent with my theoretical framework, does not
adequately explain the relationship between donors and legislators. Instead, it is better to look
outside of my theory and focus on the personal reelection motivations of legislators and how they
may benefit from limiting donations from one group versus another. The second and more likely
explanation comes down to incumbency protection. Most legislators want to get reelected
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(Mayhew 1974). It is only natural that legislators would design campaign contribution limits in a
way that maximizes their reelection chances. Access-oriented groups, including businesses, prefer
incumbency and moderation above the ideological leanings of the members (Barber 2016,
Fouirnaies and Hall 2014; Grimmer and Powell 2013; Hall and Wayman 1990; Milyo, Primo, and
Groseclose 2000). As shown in the previous chapter, they do not discriminate by political party.
They donate to candidates who are already in office. It is a wise strategy for incumbent legislators
to design campaign finance regulations that have a negligible impact on their primary sources of
income.
Interestingly, my analyses on the Witko Index (2005) showed that most states take a one
size fits all approach to campaign contribution limits. Most states enforce the same level of limits
on individuals, PACs, unions, and corporations. Ideological groups seek candidates that are in
lockstep with their attitudes. With this, the donation strategy of ideological groups strongly favors
challengers. Indeed, the number of candidates receiving donations from single-issue groups
dramatically declines among incumbents. Only 19,453 incumbents received donations from
single-issue groups. This is opposed to 17,085 challengers, which are running for their first term
in office.
State campaign contribution limits do not adjust to these different strategies. Ideological
groups are further disadvantaged by current campaign contribution limit design for having fewer
resources to donate and being fewer in number than corporations. There are fewer political parties,
union organizations, and single-issue groups than businesses. In 2016, the Encyclopedia of
Associations listed 24,000 national nonprofit organizations. If using a more informal definition,
there are 200,000 interest groups between the state, local, and federal levels (Nownes 2013). There
are only fifty state and six territory political parties. The number of political parties is small in
comparison to the number of for-profit entities in the US. In 2015, the US Census Bureau listed
over 30 million business entities. Thus, it is nearly inevitable that donations from ideological
groups will be more impacted by limits if legislators are choosing to regulate these groups in the
same way as corporations, simply because there are not enough nonprofit groups to donate. Indeed,
my data show that ideological groups made a total of 2,096,183 donations from 1999-2014 as
opposed to 4,845,921 business groups.
Still, there is an important caveat in my results. Business group donations to incumbents
were insignificantly associated with campaign contribution limits with t-scores of 1.95. This was
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true for both corporate and PAC limits. Still, campaign contribution limits enforced during 19992014 had a stronger negative effect on ideological groups rather than business interest groups. In
total, it is safe to say that business group donations are not relatively more impacted by their
campaign contribution limits.
Even with the incumbency protection explanation, it is somewhat surprising that political
parties were affected by their respective campaign contribution limits. Intuitively, legislators have
very little incentive to limit political party donations. Unlike unions or corporations, legislators
cannot target political party donations without inevitably limiting their chances of receiving funds.
Both Democrats and Republicans benefit from well-funded political parties. Political parties are
vital for new candidates who have not built relationships with donors. Political parties also serve
as an essential conduit between donors and candidates. Donors can bypass strict campaign
contribution limits on individuals, union, PACs, and corporations through political parties. Donors
know that donations to political parties will be given to their preferred candidates. Indeed,
legislators can set direct campaign contribution limits on all other groups to combat perceptions
of corruption, knowing that these donors can simply provide funds to the political party.
Legislators also have obligations to fundraise for their respective political parties to help keep their
majorities.
The question becomes under what condition would legislators benefit under political party
contribution limits? One possible explanation might be the unpopularity of both major political
parties. Legislators could shield themselves from being too connected to political parties by
enforcing limits. The Democratic and Republican Party’s approval ratings suffer historic lows.
According to CNN polling in 2017, 37% of the American public had a favorable view of the
Democratic Party (Struyk 2017). Only 30% of the American public were favorable towards the
Republican Party. In recent years, running against the “establishment” in both the Democratic and
Republican Party is used to win support. This phenomenon was reflected in part by the rise of
movements such as the Tea Party from 2009-2010 (Karpowitz et al. 2011). Strong social
movements form when the public is dissatisfied with the government or parties (Lipset 1972).
The unpopularity explanation, however, is insufficient and does not conform to previous
research or United States political history. Political party contribution limits have existed long
before the recent simultaneous unpopularity of the Democratic and Republican Parties. It is
unlikely that voters perceive donations from political parties as an inherently corrupt activity.
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Indeed, it should come as no surprise to voters that political parties provide campaign contributions
to their candidates. If there is pressure from the public to enact political party campaign
contribution limits, legislators should merely set them so high that it does not negatively impact
their ability to receive support.
Under the right circumstances, it is conceivable that legislators set political party limits to
protect their majorities rather than to capitulate to public pressure. As noted, political party
donations are needed the most by new candidates, not by incumbents. Legislators already have
connections with business interest donors to fund their campaigns. A relatively effortless way to
harm opponents is to cut them from their primary source of income. In the case of newly minted
candidates, the primary source of contributions is political parties. This is a powerful way to ensure
that challengers are cut off from their major source of income. This strategy is particularly useful
for heavily entrenched majority parties where their members do not require large contributions to
campaigns.
6.10 Conclusion
This chapter tested Hypothesis One: Campaign contribution limits will affect business
contributions more than ideological interest group donations. Campaign contribution limits
were a far stronger predictor of donations than I expected. Across the board, campaign contribution
limits had a significant and negative effect on campaign contributions from both ideological and
business interest groups. Contrary to my predictions, campaign contribution limits were more
impactful against ideological group donations over business interest group donations. Indeed,
campaign contribution limits were insignificantly related to corporate campaign contributions to
incumbents.
I reason that campaign contribution limits are less impactful for corporate limits because
they are designed by incumbents to protect incumbents. Corporations consistently provide
donations to legislators, not challengers. They seek to build long-term relationships with
incumbents. It would be illogical for contribution limits to hurt their ability to raise funds and keep
their seats. Ideological groups mainly provide funds to challengers. It would be beneficial for
legislators to enact campaign contribution limits that hurt challenger’s abilities to raise money.
The next chapter will test the effects of disclosure requirements on campaign contributions
from business and ideological groups. Disclosure laws may be more impactful against business
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group donations than ideological groups, even though the opposite was true for contribution limits.
Disclosure laws do not place direct regulations on the flow of money to candidates. Instead, they
merely shine a light on donations, making them available to public eyes. There may be concern
among legislators about receiving publicly divulged donations from business groups over
ideological groups. Indeed, basic analyses on the campaign contribution limit index alone
suggested that there is more impetus for states to regulate donations from corporations. I will test
this theory in the next chapter.

Table 6.1 State Level Correlations of Campaign Contribution Limit Regulations
Limit Regulation

Corporate
Bans

Union
Bans

Family
Limits

Candidate
Limits

Corporate
Limits

Union
Limits

Corporate Bans

1.0000

Union Bans

0.7170
0.0000

1.0000

Family Limits

-0.0724
0.1558

-0.1530
0.0026

1.0000

Candidate Limits

-0.1014
0.0465

-0.1311
0.0100

0.2932
0.0000

1.0000

Corporate Limits

0.1141
0.0250

0.0656
0.1982

0.5534
0.0000

0.1623
0.0014

1.0000

Union Limits

0.0782
0.1253

0.0159
0.7559

0.6012
0.0000

0.1763
0.0005

0.9205
0.0000

1.0000

Individual Limits

0.1281
0.0118

0.1306
0.0102

0.6642
0.0000

0.2052
0.0000

0.6529
0.0000

0.6262
0.0000

Individual
Limits

1.0000
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Table 6.2 Corporate and Union Bans on Total and Percentage of Donations
Model

Corporate Ban

Log Total Business
Donations

Log Total Union
Donations

-0.549*
(0.265)

Union Ban

Percent of Business
Donations

Percent of Union
Donations

-0.0309
(0.0337)
-.449
(0.230)

-0.00858
(0.0195)

Term Limits

-0.202
(0.286)

-0.240
(0.216)

0.0476
(0.0373)

-0.0138
(0.0227)

Folded Ranney

-0.445
(1.101)

-0.439
(0.677)

-0.139
(0.139)

-0.131
(0.0725)

Professionalism

0.236***
(0.0686)

0.367***
(0.0467)

-0.00740
(0.00887)

0.0189***
(0.00453)

-0.512

-0.0152

-0.0235

0.00614

(0.366)

(0.278)

(0.0584)

(0.0334)

Presidential Year

0.0481
(0.0468)

-0.0314
(0.0589)

0.0114
(0.00630)

0.00649
(0.00469)

Off Year Election

0.972***
(0.228)

0.485
(0.352)

0.0434
(0.0387)

-0.0154
(0.0377)

Competition

-0.0299
(0.0356)

0.0208
(0.0198)

-0.0192**
(0.00705)

-0.00347
(0.00216)

Chamber

0.480***
(0.0976)

0.401***
(0.0838)

0.00300
(0.0118)

-0.00839
(0.00779)

Democratic Party

-0.514***
(0.0459)

1.065***
(0.0957)

-0.115***
(0.0112)

0.206***
(0.0215)

Cumulative Terms
Served

0.0958***

0.0220*

0.0273***

0.00562***

(0.0111)

(0.0105)

(0.00382)

(0.00116)

Multimember
Districts
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Table 6.2 Continued
Other Chamber
Experience

0.747***

0.276**

0.113***

0.0360***

(0.114)

(0.0867)

(0.0137)

(0.00859)

1.480***

0.783***

0.0981***

-0.000987

(0.143)

(0.138)

(0.0199)

(0.0118)

Senate Leader

0.847***
(0.160)

0.623***
(0.120)

0.0547**
(0.0188)

0.00151
(0.0100)

Never Made
General Election

-1.024***

-0.659***

-0.142***

-0.116***

(0.110)

(0.0957)

(0.0242)

(0.0128)

Challenger

-1.364***
(0.0850)

-0.488***
(0.0721)

-0.239***
(0.0265)

-0.0678***
(0.00970)

Majority Party
Membership

0.368***

0.0184

0.0592***

0.00793

(0.0393)

(0.0785)

(0.0118)

(0.0101)

9.581***
(0.893)

7.506***
(0.604)

0.403***
(0.107)

-0.0107
(0.0558)

1.694***
(0.0633)

1.488***
(0.0533)

0.463***
(0.110)

0.202***
(0.0262)

79218
0.0921

48436
0.0805
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

96585
.111

96585
.4957

Speaker of the
House

Constant
Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared
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Table 6.3 Corporate Campaign Contribution Limits on Business Donations
Model

Log Total
Business
Donations

Log Average
Business
Donations

Percent Business
Donations

Log Total Business
Donations
Incumbent Model

Corporate Limits

-0.709*
(0.321)

0.462**
(0.174)

-0.0337
(0.0333)

-0.777
(0.397)

Term Limits

-0.178
(0.270)

-0.563**
(0.178)

0.0488
(0.0356)

-0.0697
(0.325)

Folded Ranney

-0.0254
(0.959)

1.429*
(0.667)

-0.117
(0.144)

-0.655
(1.261)

Professionalism

0.264***
(0.0651)

0.0610
(0.0474)

-0.00611
(0.00887)

0.335***
(0.0936)

Multimember Districts

-0.270
(0.386)

-0.317
(0.231)

-0.0111
(0.0608)

-0.623
(0.576)

Presidential Year

0.0274
(0.0560)

-0.00805
(0.0235)

0.0103
(0.00659)

-0.0184
(0.0695)

Off Year Election

0.840*
(0.367)

0.200
(0.264)

0.0379
(0.0307)

0.823
(0.484)

Competition

-0.0346
(0.0350)

0.0557*
(0.0278)

-0.0194**
(0.00712)

0.0160
(0.0559)

Chamber

0.536***
(0.0926)

-0.0111
(0.0554)

0.00579
(0.0124)

0.752***
(0.127)

Democratic Party

-0.513***
(0.0474)

0.262***
(0.0467)

-0.115***
(0.0113)

-0.514***
(0.0699)

Cumulative Terms Served

0.0940***
(0.0114)

-0.0756***
(0.0118)

0.0271***
(0.00384)

0.00895
(0.0105)

Other Chamber Experience

0.759***

-0.407***

0.114***

0.115

(0.111)

(0.0619)

(0.0133)

(0.113)
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Table 6.3 Continued
Speaker of the House

1.487***

-0.143

0.0985***

1.593***

(0.142)

(0.0974)

(0.0197)

(0.137)

Senate Leader

0.861***
(0.163)

-0.198**
(0.0735)

0.0555**
(0.0191)

0.800***
(0.164)

Never Made General
Election

-1.012***

0.916***

-0.142***

-0.230

(0.107)

(0.0714)

(0.0237)

(0.118)

Challenger

-1.385***
(0.0849)

1.020***
(0.0825)

-0.240***
(0.0270)

0
(.)

Majority Party Membership

0.365***
(0.0405)

-0.174***
(0.0397)

0.0590***
(0.0120)

0.193***
(0.0538)

Constant

9.535***
(0.847)

1.830***
(0.550)

0.398***
(0.112)

10.77***
(1.094)

1.698***
(0.0488)

1.633***
(0.0361)

0.463***
(0.110)

1.468***
(0.0755)

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

79218
0.0909

78500
96585
0.0535
0.1107
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

36699
0.0711
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Table 6.4 Union Campaign Contribution Limits on Union Donations
Model

Log Total Union
Donations

Log Average
Union
Donations

Percent
Union
Donations

Log Total Union
Donations
Incumbent Model

Union Limits

-0.720**
(0.234)

-0.387*
(0.173)

-0.0384*
(0.0195)

-0.792**
(0.271)

Term Limits

-0.259
(0.193)

-0.103
(0.139)

-0.0132
(0.0211)

-0.213
(0.221)

Folded Ranney

0.244
(0.603)

-0.212
(0.356)

-0.0957
(0.0759)

0.370
(0.677)

Professionalism

0.401***
(0.0389)

0.137***
(0.0345)

0.0206***
(0.00470)

0.479***
(0.0495)

Multimember Districts

0.201
(0.316)

0.000534
(0.137)

0.0142
(0.0349)

0.134
(0.391)

Presidential Year

-0.0385
(0.0491)

-0.0488
(0.0480)

0.00621
(0.00420)

-0.114*
(0.0581)

Off Year Election

0.445
(0.448)

0.368
(0.307)

-0.0250
(0.0394)

0.564
(0.510)

Competition

0.0191
(0.0225)

0.0264*
(0.0119)

-0.00346
(0.00221)

0.0692
(0.0369)

Chamber

0.450***
(0.0897)

0.219***
(0.0441)

-0.00653
(0.00808)

0.572***
(0.114)

Democratic Party

1.107***
(0.0964)

0.119*
(0.0507)

0.207***
(0.0215)

1.164***
(0.113)

Cumulative Terms
Served

0.0212*

-0.00463

0.00563***

0.00384

(0.0101)

(0.00435)

(0.00115)

(0.00951)

0.268**

-0.0317

0.0356***

0.0668

(0.0872)

(0.0400)

(0.00857)

(0.0946)

Other Chamber
Experience
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Table 6.4 Continued
Speaker of the House

0.793***
(0.136)

0.471***
(0.0705)

-0.00117
(0.0116)

0.874***
(0.129)

Senate Leader

0.638***
(0.118)

0.289***
(0.0695)

0.00257
(0.0100)

0.645***
(0.113)

Never Made General
Election

-0.627***

0.0758

-0.116***

-0.125

(0.0963)

(0.0477)

(0.0126)

(0.0810)

-0.513***

-0.0249

-0.0682***

(0)

(0.0695)

(0.0302)

(0.00961)

.

0.0607

-0.00662

0.00844

0.0313

(0.0753)

(0.0502)

(0.0102)

(0.0838)

7.276***
(0.510)

6.443***
(0.330)

-0.0144
(0.0570)

7.239***
(0.581)

1.479***
(0.0534)

0.796***
(0.0475)

0.201***
(0.0262)

1.410***
(0.0630)

48436
0.0837

48436
0.0531

96585
0.5015

27469
0.1065

Challenger

Majority Party
Membership

Constant

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 6.5 PAC Limits on Union and Business Donations
Model

Log Total Business
Donations
-0.546*
(0.270)

Log Total
Union
Donations
-0.593**
(0.200)

Log Total
Business
Donations
-0.649
(0.332)

Log Total
Union
Donations
-0.625**
(0.231)

PAC Limits

Term Limits

-0.191
(0.282)

-0.240
(0.200)

-0.0951
(0.349)

-0.196
(0.233)

Folded Ranney

-0.189
(0.992)

0.0348
(0.617)

-0.714
(1.276)

0.244
(0.705)

Professionalism

0.251***
(0.0656)

0.382***
(0.0391)

0.318***
(0.0931)

0.456***
(0.0472)

Multimember Districts

-0.325
(0.387)

0.194
(0.320)

-0.686
(0.575)

0.119
(0.398)

Presidential Year

0.0517
(0.0500)

-0.0276
(0.0512)

0.0129
(0.0624)

-0.102
(0.0610)

Off Year Election

0.972**
(0.340)

0.537
(0.422)

0.959*
(0.456)

0.670
(0.476)

Competition

-0.0331
(0.0356)

0.0193
(0.0231)

0.0178
(0.0568)

0.0685
(0.0376)

Chamber

0.515***
(0.101)

0.438***
(0.0915)

0.728***
(0.138)

0.560***
(0.121)

Democratic Party

-0.506***
(0.0465)

1.112***
(0.0968)

-0.498***
(0.0687)

1.178***
(0.116)

Cumulative Terms Served

0.0911***
(0.0119)

0.0177
(0.0103)

0.00442
(0.0109)

-0.000921
(0.00963)

Other Chamber Experience

0.763***
(0.117)

0.294***
(0.0829)

0.128
(0.121)

0.0974
(0.0882)

Speaker of the House

1.505***
(0.140)

0.801***
(0.137)

1.615***
(0.135)

0.885***
(0.130)
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Table 6.5 Continued
Senate Leader

0.871***
(0.162)

0.644***
(0.116)

0.810***
(0.162)

0.644***
(0.110)

Never Made General
Election

-1.005***

-0.621***

-0.244*

-0.130

(0.107)

(0.0961)

(0.113)

(0.0849)

Challenger

-1.393***
(0.0848)

-0.531***
(0.0721)

0
(.)

0
(.)

Majority Party Membership

0.371***

0.0841

0.209***

0.0543

(0.0395)

(0.0727)

(0.0517)

(0.0818)

9.476***
(0.855)

7.281***
(0.537)

10.64***
(1.095)

7.146***
(0.619)

1.699***
(0.0484)

1.480***
(0.0537)

1.466***
(0.0724)

1.414***
(0.0638)

36699
0.0717

27469
0.1049

Constant

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

79218
48436
0.0906
0.0832
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 6.6 PAC Limits on Single Issue Group Donations
Model

Log Total Single Issue
Donations

PAC Limits

-0.841***
(0.190)

Term Limits

-0.192
(0.183)

Folded Ranney

0.868
(0.650)

Professionalism

0.186***
(0.0454)

Multimember
Districts

-0.244
(0.258)

Presidential Year

-0.0513
(0.0493)

Off Year Election

0.439*
(0.214)

Competition

0.0220
(0.0251)

Chamber

0.412***
(0.0897)

Democratic Party

-0.0963
(0.0622)

Cumulative
Terms Served

-0.0492***
(0.00810)

Other Chamber
Experience

0.0710
(0.0906)
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Table 6.6 Continued
Speaker of the
House

1.047***
(0.154)

Senate Leader

0.682***
(0.144)

Never Made
General Election

-0.149
(0.0928)

Challenger

-0.0985
(0.0697)

Majority Party
Membership

0.128**
(0.0416)

Constant

6.701***
(0.602)

Sigma
Cons
1.436***
(0.0525)
N
36539
Pseudo R Squared
0.0420
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 6.7 Party Limits on Party Donations
Model

Log Total Party
Donations

Party Limits

-0.628***
(0.171)

Term Limits

-0.233
(0.223)

Folded Ranney

0.421
(0.759)

Professionalism

0.177**
(0.0574)

Multimember Districts

-0.497
(0.302)

Presidential Year

0.0694*
(0.0281)

Off Year Election

1.270***
(0.319)

Competition

0.0266
(0.0346)

Chamber

0.547***
(0.0922)

Democratic Party

-0.125
(0.0746)

Cumulative Terms
Served

-0.0906***
(0.0146)

Other Chamber
Experience

0.00883
(0.0992)
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Table 6.7 Continued
Speaker of the House

Senate Leader

Never Made General
Election

-0.00524
(0.169)
0.103
(0.157)
-1.247***
(0.145)

Challenger

-0.0986*
(0.0431)

Majority Party
Membership

0.283***
(0.0656)

Constant

7.755***
(0.622)

Sigma
Cons

1.898***
(0.0811)

N
47685
Pseudo R Squared
0.0298
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 6.8 Contribution Limits on the Standard Deviation of Donations
Model

Corporate Limits

Standard
Deviation of
Business
Donations

Standard
Deviation
of Union
Donations

Standard
Deviation
of Party
Donations

-0.999*
(0.403)

Union Limits

-0.719**
(0.253)

Party Limits

-0.738***
(0.207)

Presidential Year

0.0286
(0.0704)

-0.0683
(0.0528)

0.0750*
(0.0343)

Off Year

0.928
(0.482)

0.420
(0.530)

1.200***
(0.314)

Multimember Districts

-0.441
(0.592)

0.0935
(0.391)

-0.524
(0.352)

Chamber

0.857***
(0.0996)

0.487***
(0.0905)

0.557***
(0.105)

Folded Ranney

-1.099
(1.331)

1.137
(0.711)

0.180
(0.926)

Competition

-0.0602
(0.0551)

-0.0424
(0.0343)

0.00259
(0.0333)

Professionalism

0.397***
(0.0980)

0.445***
(0.0499)

0.182**
(0.0654)

Term Limits

-0.129
(0.415)

-0.303
(0.224)

-0.223
(0.281)

Constant

10.70***
(1.103)

7.323***
(0.553)

7.572***
(0.703)
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Table 6.8 Continued
Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

1.603***

1.524***

1.907***

(0.0950)

(0.0668)

(0.0832)

33226
28601
0.0681
0.0672
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

26305
0.0274
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CHAPTER 7. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

7.1 Overview of Hypothesis Two.
This chapter tests Hypothesis Two: Disclosure requirements will affect business
contributions more than ideological interest group donations. Disclosure law is unique among
campaign finance laws. As noted by the United States Supreme Court in the Citizens United and
Buckley decisions, disclosure requirements do not directly bar groups and individuals from
donating. Instead, disclosure laws bring increased accountability by shining a light on
contributions. They are nothing more than a mechanism used to provide more information to the
public about the relationship between donors and their candidates.
Because disclosure requirements do not directly curb contributions, there are substantial
theoretical and practical implications that I must exclusively account for in this chapter. Under
disclosure requirements, negative publicity is all that discourages contributors from donating.
Thus, my theory of how disclosure law affects campaign contributions rests on publicity. Donors
want their candidates to get elected. They will not purposefully conduct themselves in a way that
will purposefully sabotage the campaigns of their preferred candidates. My hypothesis assumes
that it is politically riskier for business interest groups to divulge their donations. Indeed, polling
by Pew Research and Gallup suggests that the public is exceptionally concerned that corporations
have too much influence over the American political process. On the other hand, ideological
donors are driven by political activity, not economic benefit. Donations demonstrate that
ideological groups are players in the political system. Under most instances, ideological groups
will not feel that contributing is a negative activity. Further, campaign donations from ideological
groups can serve as an essential cue to voters (Sloof 1998). Campaign contributions from groups
with the same beliefs as the candidate should come as no surprise to any voter. Thus, additional
knowledge supplied by disclosure requirements on ideological group support should not hinder
the flow of money to candidates.
This chapter is broken down into six sections. First, I will discuss my methodology and
provide a broad overview of the disclosure index and its relation to other campaign finance
regulations. Second, I will test the entire disclosure sub-index on total, business, and ideological
group campaign contributions. Third, I will investigate the effects of individual disclosure
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requirements on business and ideological group donations. Next, I will test if disclosure
requirements equalize the amount of contributions given to candidates running in the same
election. Finally, I will provide a discussion of my results and conclude.
Like the previous chapter, the results below indicate mixed support for my hypothesis.
Business interest donations are oftentimes more impacted by disclosure requirements than
ideological groups. This finding comes with a critical caveat. I find that each disclosure regulation
impacts different facets of contributing, underscoring the necessity for states to enact
comprehensive regulations to starve off donations. No single disclosure regulation universally
reduces all measures of campaign contributions. Disclosure requirements do not consistently affect
business regulation donations, nor are they always ineffective for ideological groups. The trends
from the analyses below clearly show, however, that business interest donations are more affected
by disclosure requirements.
7.2 Methods and Validity Checks
The parameters for my disclosure law tests are nearly identical to the campaign
contribution limit models. Each model relies on Tobit analysis due to the censored nature of the
data. That is, my contribution data very rarely take on a negative value, barring a limited number
of candidates who rely on loans to fund their campaigns. There are only seventeen observations
that fall into this category. The dependent variables for this chapter are log total campaign
contributions, the percentage of a candidate’s donations originating from ideological or business
group contributors, average donation size, and the standard deviation of contributions provided to
candidates running for the same seat in the legislature. Once again, it is important to note that Tobit
estimates the effect of x on y*, the latent variable, not on an observed outcome.
My primary independent variable is the Witko disclosure law sub-index. The Witko Index
takes a holistic approach to measuring disclosure requirements; thus, it is particularly appropriate
as my primary independent variable. Arguably, it is more challenging for state lawmakers to design
effective disclosure requirements than public financing laws or contribution limits. Building
influence with state legislatures with contributions is a function of both the timing and the size of
each donation. Thus, for disclosure laws to be successful, they must provide complete information
on both attributes. Fortunately, the Witko Index (2005) accounts for regulations that are designed
to impact the timing and size of each donation. The sub-index includes four types of disclosure
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regulations: timing of reporting requirements, aggregate reporting, itemization of some categories,
and itemization of any amount over $50.
An additional strength of the Witko Index (2005) is the inclusion of both contributions and
expenditure disclosure requirements. Yet, it is not prudent for me to analyze expenditure
requirements in this dissertation. It is highly unlikely that donors make decisions based on the
expenditures of campaigns. Thus, the expenditure disclosure requirement variables will not be
formally tested on my hypothesis. Instead, my analysis of the expenditure disclosure variables will
be limited to basic correlations with the contribution disclosure variables.
By design, each disclosure law will likely have a piecemeal effect on campaign
contributions. For example, some disclosure requirements may affect the average size of donations
while not affecting contribution totals. Each section below will discuss my predictions for
individual regulations. The complexity of disclosure laws creates issues determining how these
regulations affect business interest and ideological group donations. Specifically, considering the
breadth of the Witko Index and the plethora of available contribution data, it may be difficult to
focus on meaningful results that paint a compelling theoretical picture of campaign contributions.
To avoid merely running one insignificant model after another, I will be clear how specific
disclosure laws will affect campaign contributions. To provide additional clarity, I report the
expected relationships between each disclosure requirement and campaign contributions in Table
7.1.
The disclosure law sub-index is also more likely to suffer from issues surrounding
insufficient variation. Lawmakers favor disclosure law relative to contribution limits and public
financing law. As noted in Chapter 3, disclosure requirements are the most common campaign
finance regulation in the American states. As of 2014, all fifty states had disclosure requirements.
Disclosure requirements were well entrenched in state campaign finance law by the early 1990s
(Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016). There has been very little change in state campaign
disclosure law since 1999. States that amended their disclosure requirements only did so by one
level on the campaign finance law disclosure sub-index.
To address this concern, I ran a series of descriptive analyses on the sub-index. I report
state level correlations in Table 7.2. Interestingly, state-level correlations indicate that disclosure
requirements are not necessarily stronger in states with strict contribution limit statutes or
comprehensive public financing programs. Disclosure requirement stringency levels are correlated
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with public financing and contribution limits at .0426 and .1866 respectively. The correlation
between disclosure and contribution limits is significant at the .01 level, but it is still relatively
low. In many ways, the relatively low correlations between disclosure law, campaign contribution
limits, and public financing are not too surprising. State policymakers are much more open to
enacting disclosure requirements than public financing and campaign contribution limits since
they do not keep money from being donated to their campaigns. States with relatively lax
contribution limits and public financing enact disclosure laws, including Oregon, Virginia, and
Utah. Like public financing requirements and contribution limits, disclosure requirements are the
weakest in the south and most robust in the northeast.
There is strong independence among the disclosure regulations, barring a few notable
exceptions (Table 7.3). Unsurprisingly, the highest correlations are between expenditure and
contribution requirement. Aggregate contribution and expenditure requirements had the highest
correlation at .872, which is significant at the .01 level. All other correlations were below .5 with
the itemization of expenditures and contributions above $50 at .496, which was also significant at
the .01 level. This is followed by general itemization requirements at .429. With most of these
correlations, I can be confident that I am isolating the effects of each statute with each model.
Depending on the results, it may be challenging to discern if aggregate expenditure or contribution
reporting requirements are more effective at reducing donations unless one result is nonsignificant. I will further discuss the high correlation between the general itemization regulations
when I test my hypothesis.
Before testing my hypothesis, it is helpful to check the basic effectiveness of disclosure
requirement statutes. The primary goal of disclosure requirements is to remove money from
unknown sources. Any disclosure requirement that fails meeting this fundamental objective is
effectively useless and does not affect campaign contributions. Indeed, this study is meaningless
without evidence that disclosure laws remove money from unknown sources. Any indication that
dark contributions are unrelated or positively related to disclosure requirements suggests that
donors bypass the statutes entirely. A contrary finding during my hypothesis testing would boost
this claim by demonstrating that disclosure laws shift contributions from disclosed to undisclosed
reporting categories.
The simplest way to check the fundamental effectiveness of disclosure law statutes is by
testing the sub-index against unitemized campaign contribution totals. Unitemized campaign
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contributions are defined by the National Institute on Money in State Politics as “an amount given
that is less than a state's threshold for listing the contributor's name on a receipts and expenditures
report.” As the disclosure requirement index increases, the overall level of unitemized
contributions should decrease due to the additional stipulations of the state statute.
The dependent variables for the validity tests are log total unitemized contributions, log
average unitemized contribution size, and percentage of overall donations from unitemized
sources. The primary independent variable is the disclosure law sub-index. Here, and with all
individual-level models, I use the full set of national, state, and individual level control variables
described in chapter four. Like all other models in this study, each dependent variable is measured
over the course of one campaign for each candidate up to the primary/convention or general
election. Thus, the average donation size captures all contributions made from the time the
candidate announced
I report the estimates for the unitemized campaign contribution models in Table 7.4. As
expected, candidates subjected to stringent disclosure requirements have more difficulty hiding
the sources of their campaign contributions. The results suggest that log total unitemized campaign
contributions are expected to be negatively and significantly associated with higher levels of
disclosure requirements. Candidates who raise money under stricter disclosure requirements are
likely to receive less overall unitemized donations, lower average unitemized donations, and a
smaller percentage of their overall donations from unitemized sources. Thus, I can conclude that
disclosure laws are not wholly infective regulations. Donors are not bypassing the disclosure
requirements in a way that results in higher levels of unitemized donations. Now that I provided
evidence that disclosure laws are not merely a veneer of fake regulations, and that sufficient
variation exists in my primary independent variable, I can turn to test campaign contributions from
identified sources.
7.3 Overall Disclosure Sub-index
To get a broad picture of the impact of disclosure law on donations, I first test the overall
sub-index on ideological and business group campaign contributions to individual state legislative
candidates. Disclosure is the only type of finance law that covers all fifty states. The overall subindex includes regulations that govern the timing and size of each disclosure report. Many of the
individual regulations will have an isolated impact on contributors’ behavior. Thus, it is unwise to
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use dependent variables that will likely only be affected by a specific type of disclosure regulation.
The only dependent variables I test against the overall disclosure index are the total log
contributions provided to candidates and the log average size of their donations. Business
contributions should be negatively and significantly associated with disclosure requirements to
conform to my hypothesis. Ideological group donations should be insignificantly associated with
the campaign disclosure sub-index.
The results from the log total campaign contribution models are reported in Table 7.5.
These initial models provide very little confidence in the ability of disclosure requirements to
reduce total donations. Disclosure requirements have no significant effect on log total campaign
contributions. Neither ideological or business interest groups shy away from donating under
disclosure requirements. Log total and business interest group donations are unaffected by
disclosure law stringency and thus do not conform to the hypothesis. professional
This result is not necessarily a fatal blow for campaign finance disclosure laws. The log
total donation simply represents the amount of money provided by all donors. This variable is not
sensitive to the number of donors that are contributing. To account for the number of donors, I
must replace the log total donation variable with average donation size. The average donation size
speaks much more to the interpersonal relationship between donors and state legislative candidates
than total donations. Candidates who receive a relatively substantial number of campaign
contributions from many donors are unlikely to be as influenced by an individual donor. Although
this study does not test this conclusion,25 it can be assumed that as the number of donors rises, the
individual voice of any specific donor may be diluted. On the other hand, a candidate who received
large contributions from a limited number of donors is likely to suggest that the legislator will be
beholden to their backers when making policy decisions. The average size of business interest
group campaign contributions should decrease with higher levels of disclosure requirements.
Results from the log average campaign contribution size models are also reported in Table
5. Each additional level of disclosure was associated with an expected 17% decrease in the average
donation size. Unexpectedly, the average donation size for both business interest and ideological
groups decline as well. Every additional level of disclosure stringency was associated with a 10%
decrease in the predicted value of the average business interest group donation size at the .05 level.

25

This will be the topic of future studies.
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Each additional disclosure regulation corresponded with a 12% decrease in the predicted value of
the average ideological donation size at the .01 level.
This finding is the opposite of my hypothesis. At face value, the average contribution
model suggests that disclosure requirements put significant pressure on both business and
ideological interest groups to at least give the appearance that they are not unduly influencing state
legislators through large campaign contributions without diminishing their overall levels of
support. Ideological groups, however, tend to be more affected by disclosure law. These findings
provide some support of the effectiveness of disclosure requirements but fail to lend support to my
theory. I now begin testing individual regulations in the sub-index.
7.4 Quarterly Reporting
Timing requirements are the most challenging disclosure statutes to code. Most disclosure
laws enforce separate requirements on candidates for election and non-election years. The most
stringent timing requirements (enforced by Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Ohio, and Washington)
require candidates to disclose their contributions monthly during election years (NCSL 2017). In
off years, however, states such as Alabama do not require candidates to disclose contributions in
non-election years. Others use haphazard reporting schedules that have no recognizable pattern or
consistency.
Used by ten states, regular quarterly reporting exists somewhere in between these extremes.
The requirement is not as onerous as monthly reporting. Quarterly reporting is also regular enough
to see discernable patterns in contributions across time. Only twelve states required candidates to
report on a quarterly basis within the timeline of this study. Considering that so few states use
quarterly reporting, my results should provide a reliable estimate of how these donations differ
with states without quarterly reporting.
Quarterly reporting is also the most difficult regulation to test my hypothesis. This is in
part because quarterly reporting requirements will likely only influence average donation sizes if
they are effective at all. Quarterly reporting exists to reveal the consistency of contributors, not
necessarily how much they provide in total during an election cycle. For this reason, average
donation sizes are much more relevant than the total donations. As noted, quarterly reporting may
simply reduce the average size of donations because candidates are filing contribution records
more often. The mere existence of quarterly reporting may bring down the average donation size
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without having any real effect on how contributors donate to candidates. Thus, any result may
merely be due to how the measure is coded.
To cover all potential concerns, this model tests both average contribution sizes and the
number of records filed by the campaign in each election cycle. If quarterly reporting is a
significant predictor of both average donation size and number of records, then any negative and
significant result between average donation size and disclosure law will simply be a product of
stricter timing of reports. If the number of records is insignificantly associated with quarterly
reporting requirements, then I can safely assume that disclosure laws have a real effect on average
donation size.
The results from these models are shown in Table 7.6. The log total number of contribution
records is significantly associated with quarterly requirements. Candidates subjected to a quarterly
reporting requirement are expected to submit 60% more reports per election cycle.26 Interestingly,
the average donation size and log total donations are insignificantly related to quarterly reporting.
These two findings do not definitively explain the inconsistency of the previous results. Instead, it
is likely that the conflicting results were merely a result of non-effective and effective disclosure
regulations being incorporated into the index. As touched upon, certain portions of the disclosure
sub-index will affect campaign contributions in diverse ways. My initial findings suggest,
however, that quarterly reporting requirements make candidates file more reports, but have no
effect on donors’ behavior.
I now test the differences between ideological and business group donations. Quarterly
reporting requirements should be exceptionally revealing of business interest groups’ strategy to
influence state legislators. Quarterly reporting requires candidates to disclose their contributors on
a regular basis. Business groups must be careful not to time their donations in such a way to make
it obvious that they are directly influencing legislative policy. Ideological group donations are
primarily provided at one point in a legislator’s career. Quarterly reporting should not affect
ideological group donations since there is no consistent pattern of their donations across time.
I report the results from the quarterly reporting models in Table 7.6. My results suggest
that quarterly reporting is not a very useful tool for dissuading either ideological or business

26

Using the simple total number of reports submitted as the dependent variable (unlogged), the number of reports is
positively and significantly associated with quarterly reporting at the .01 level. The coefficient signifies that under
quarterly reporting, campaigns submit 71.7 more reports. Business interest group
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contributors from donating. Logically, quarterly reporting is significantly and positively associated
with the log number of reports filed by both ideological and business contributors. These findings
are consistent with the model above. That said, it does not appear that this increase in donation
record count has any effect on the average size of donations. That is, the effect is not sufficiently
high to reduce the average size of each donation. Quarterly reporting is not significantly associated
with average donation sizes for either ideological or business interest groups. This lack of
significance suggests that quarterly reporting forces candidates to turn in more reports but has no
real impact on contributions. Since neither group was relatively more affected by quarterly
reporting requirements, these results neither lend support nor refute my hypothesis.
7.5 Aggregate Reporting
Aggregate reporting requirements constitute the second group of disclosure laws and are
the most basic requirement currently enforced by states. An aggregate reporting requirement
simply provides numerical totals of contributions. This explains why ninety percent of states
enforce aggregate reporting requirements. Since aggregate reporting requires nothing but the
disclosure of mere totals, it impossible to ascertain the size and timing of each donation without a
corresponding itemization requirement.
Because aggregate reporting regulations do not require comprehensive details about
donations to campaigns, they provide little information to the public. It is a mistake, however, to
assume that aggregate reporting requirements are useless because of their simplicity. At the very
least, aggregate reporting allows individuals to view contribution totals. This additional
information gives the public sufficient information to make comparisons between candidates and
donors. This information may be just enough to dissuade business interest donors from
contributing.
Because of the limited amount of information provided under aggregative reporting, only
total campaign contributions and the percentage of donations will be used as dependent variables.
Since these requirements do not have itemization requirements on their own, they will not
influence average donation sizes nor the number of contribution records. Thus, I will only focus
on log total campaign contributions and the percentage of overall donations from ideological and
business interest groups.
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The results from the aggregate contribution reporting models are reported in Table 7.7.
The models show that while aggregate contribution reporting does not affect total donations, it
shifts the source of donations away from business interest groups. Log total donations from
business and ideological groups are both insignificantly related to aggregate contribution
reporting. Aggregate contribution reporting, however, has a significant and negative effect on the
percentage of business group donations. Aggregate contribution reporting leads to a predicted
8.9% reduction in the ratio of business group donations. There is no significant effect from
aggregate contribution requirements on campaign donations from ideological groups, lending
support to my hypothesis.
7.6 General Itemization of Contribution Categories
Itemization requirements are the regulations that states use to disclose the size of donations.
By doing so, they are far more revealing of the relationship between donors and candidates than
aggregate reporting. The Witko Index (2005) includes two types of itemization regulations. The
first is a broad itemization requirement where donors must be categorized based on Federal
Elections Commission classifications. Admittedly, the general itemization requirement variable is
a very vague category. The dichotomous measure designates if a state statute requires some form
of itemization in specific categories. Further, unlike the $50 requirement tested in the next section,
there is no strict monetary trigger associated with the variable. This variable codes all itemization
requirements regardless of their level. Forty-two states enforce general itemization requirements
of contributions.
Understandably, there may be some methodological questions about the general
itemization requirement models. This independent variable captures a wide array of disclosure
laws, potentially weakening the validity of the results. Rather than a weakness, however, the lack
of a specific monetary level and itemization category is quite useful for this analysis. Like the
contribution limits, states shape disclosure laws based on their political climates. States with lower
election costs usually have lower disclosure triggers (see Independence Institute v. Williams 2016).
This variable can help understand whether legislators shape itemization requirements that are
sensitive to the cost of campaigning in their state.
The results of the itemization reporting requirements are reported in Table 7.8.
Unexpectedly, I find that the general itemization of contributions has a significant and negative
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impact on log total donations from both ideological and regulatory groups. The difference of the
coefficients, however, is relatively stark. Under general itemization requirements, log total
business group donations are expected to be negatively associated with general itemization
regulations by 299% at the p .01 level. For ideological groups, the reduction is a relatively meager
85% at the .05 significance level.
These results conform to my hypothesis even though both business interest and ideological
groups were affected by general itemization requirements. Business groups are more responsive
to the general itemization requirement. This is the first disclosure regulation to have a discernable
impact on the total amount of funds donated to individual candidates. Considering what the general
itemization requirements do, it is not surprising that there would be a negative effect on total
donations. Since contributions are itemized, the public has sufficient information to see the source
of each donation, placing downward pressure on business and ideological group donations.
7.7 Itemization Over $50
The $50 itemization requirements are the strictest form of disclosure included in the Witko
Index (2005). At first glance, the $50 amount may seem like an arbitrary amount to code for. While
no value perfectly represents state regulations, the $50 value is a reasonable level to separate states
that place strict disclosure requirements on campaigns versus those that are more lenient. In almost
all cases, it should be impossible to influence policy with a $50 donation. Indeed, this was as much
said by Justice Scalia during oral arguments in Randall. Thus, the $50 contribution itemization
requirement should make it quite burdensome to influence state legislators through donations
secretly.
Because of their elevated level of stringency, the $50 itemization requirements should be
the most impactful on campaign contributions of the regulations in the Witko Index. Theoretically,
the $50 itemization requirement should affect average, total, and the percentage of donations from
business groups. While not explicitly requiring campaigns to disclose the timing of donations, the
$50 itemization requirement provides much more information about the size of each contribution
relative to the general itemization requirement. The $50 contribution itemization requirement will
force candidates to disclose every donation that has a chance of influencing them.
It would be unwise, however, to test every dependent variable on the $50 itemization
requirements. It may do nothing but create a slew of uninformative insignificant results. Likewise,
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it would produce a more confusing picture of the $50 itemization requirements. Instead, I will
begin by testing the $50 requirement on log total campaign contributions. Previous results
demonstrated that itemization requirements are effective at reducing total donations from business
groups. Logically, the $50 requirement should likewise impact total business group contributions,
making the log total dependent variables the natural place to begin my analysis.
The estimates of the $50 itemization requirement tests are reported in Table 7.9. The results
from these models were somewhat surprising. The added stringency of the $50 monetary level had
no significant impact on log total contributions. Business interest and ideological group campaign
contributions were insignificantly related to the $50 contribution itemization requirement. Because
contribution requirements were completely ineffective at predicting log total donations, there is
neither supporting or contradictory evidence for my hypothesis. Instead, these results put into
question the effectiveness of states enforcing $50 as a trigger for disclosure requirements for
reducing overall donations.
7.8 After Reporting
After reporting within thirty days of an election is the final type of disclosure law that I test
in this chapter on individual campaigns. After reporting requirements are exceptionally
straightforward regulations. They simply require candidates to report all their campaign
contributions after an election in a final report to state officials. After reporting does not require
candidates to show the size of each donation without additional stipulations. The timing of after
reporting varies, with certain states like Kansas not requiring final reports until the January
following the election. Thirty-two states require candidates to turn in all contribution data within
thirty days after the election.
It is very intuitive for states to enforce a strict after reporting requirement. Logically,
candidates should conclude their campaign finance disclosure processes and provide a final report
on their fundraising. Perhaps unexpectedly, not all states have an after reporting requirement,
including Mississippi, South Carolina, and West Virginia. Instead, these states require some form
of report closely before the election concludes, but nothing in between. For this study, this
variation among states is enough to compare candidates’ fundraising with and without after
reporting requirements.
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After reporting only provides information once the election has concluded. Considering
that the public has short memories of candidates and elections (Achen and Bartels 2008) after
reporting would logically not dissuade donors from contributing to candidates. There may be some
concern that candidates can use prior data on contributions against opposition campaigns, possibly
putting negative pressure on business interest donations. Of my dependent variables, after
reporting will most likely reduce the total amount of campaign contributions from business interest
groups. As an isolated regulation, after reporting does not provide information on individual
donations, so it would not be useful to test it with average donation size.
I report the results of the after reporting requirements in Table 7.10. After reporting has no
significant discernable effect on log total donations from either ideological or business groups.
This result is not very surprising since after reporting does not inform voters about the relationship
between state legislative candidates and donors before an election.
7.9 District Models
I now move away from investigating campaign contributions at the individual level and
toward legislative districts. Here, I use the standard deviation of campaign contributions provided
to individual candidates within specific races as the dependent variable. A value of zero signifies
that all candidates in the election running for the same seat raised the same total amount of
campaign contributions. All individual level control variables were dropped, including party ID,
number of terms served, challenger status, chamber leadership, and elimination before the general
election. This left statewide party competition, presidential year elections, off-year elections,
multimember elections, legislative professionalism, and district competition as control variables.
Arguably, the district models are more informative about the effectiveness of disclosure
requirements than my previous tests. While the candidate-centered models only speak to the flow
of money to individuals, the district models tap into relative optics of one candidate receiving more
contributions than the other. Of course, the primary weakness of this measure is the potentiality of
all candidates in a single race receiving very high or low, yet an equal amount, of contributions,
leading to a value of near zero. These races are less critical when testing disclosure requirements.
I am not suggesting that multiple candidates receiving relatively large, yet an equal amount, of
donations, will be uncontroversial among voters. Individuals pay attention to information that
deviates from the norm. When multiple candidates all raise similar levels of contributions, voters
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may think that it is business as usual. A candidate who receives an inordinate amount of
contributions relative to their competition, however, may appear relatively more influenced by
donors.
To avoid reporting a slew of non-significant findings, this section will only concentrate on
two independent variables that will most likely affect the standard deviation of contributions. First,
I will test the full disclosure index. While the sub-index was insignificant in my initial tests, it can
provide a holistic view of disclosure laws’ impact on campaign contributions. Second, I will test
the effects of contribution itemization in each district. Contribution itemization requirements
provide the best information for voters to compare the relationships between candidates and
donors.
I report the estimates of the district models in Table 7.11. The results demonstrate a contrast
between the effects of disclosure requirements on ideological and business group donations. As
predicted, disclosure requirements have no real impact on equalizing donations among candidates
from ideologically leaning groups. The standard deviation of ideological groups was
insignificantly related to the disclosure law sub-index. Similarly, the itemization of contributions
requirement did not affect ideological donations. These results suggest that ideologically
motivated donors have no hesitation in selecting a favorite candidate and providing them relatively
more contributions.
As expected, business group donations were equalized by disclosure requirements, lending
support to the hypothesis. The full disclosure index was only significant at the p .1 level, but the
same was not true for an itemization of contribution requirements. The itemization of contribution
requirements was negatively and significantly associated with the standard deviation of donations.
The effect size was a relatively high $46,602.34. Once again, this result was consistent with my
previous models on the itemization of campaign contribution requirements.
7.10 Discussion
This chapter tested the effects of disclosure requirements on campaign contributions to
state legislative campaigns. I hypothesized that disclosure requirements are more effective on
business group campaign contributions. My theory assumes that the public is more likely to find
business interest donations as a sign of potential corruption between the donor and legislator. On
the other hand, there is less for ideological groups to lose by providing campaign contributions.
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Contributing is an integral part of the political activity of Ideological donors. Thus, there is no
incentive for ideological groups to hold back on donations under strict disclosure requirements.
My models produced mixed results for my hypothesis. The overall sub-index was
successful in demonstrating that disclosure requirements remove unknown donations, but was
wholly unpredictive of log total, ideological, and business interest donations. Instead, the
disclosure sub-index was predictive of average donation sizes for ideological and business interest
groups. The average ideological group donation size was more negatively impacted than business
interest group donations.
These findings were not a fatal blow to my hypothesis. Instead, tests on individual
disclosure requirements provided much more informative results. Rather than primarily affecting
campaign contribution totals, specific disclosure requirements shifted donations away from
business interest donors in subtle and piecemeal ways. Most regulations played a specific, limited
role in discouraging business donations. The individual pieces of disclosure laws were more
meaningful than the sum of its parts.
Almost all disclosure requirements failed to cause business interest to shy away from
providing donations. Aggregate campaign contribution reporting requirements were the only
regulations to have a significant and negative effect on the overall percentage makeup of campaign
contributions from business interest groups. Considering that voters are not particularly informed
about politics, it is unlikely that they are paying attention to the timing and size of each donation.
Instead, if voters (or anyone else) are concerned about contributions, they are likely to only
investigate donations at the aggregate level. This information at the very least allows individuals
to know who is providing contributions to their legislative candidates, though not much else. That
said, my results suggest that business interest groups shy away from seeming too influential over
legislative candidates when their contributions are made public, reducing their overall share of
donations.
The general itemization of contributions variable also produced a couple of surprises and
cast some doubt on my theoretical assumptions about disclosure requirements. General itemization
requirements reduced the log total of both business and ideological group donations by 299% and
85% respectively. These results suggest that purely revealing the source of donations has a
powerful impact on dissuading contributions, even for ideological groups. This result creates some
difficulties for my underlying theory on disclosure laws. I cannot say with certainty that ideological
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groups have no incentive to reduce their financial support under disclosure requirements. Instead,
my results suggest that ideological groups are dissuaded from providing contributions under
certain circumstances, but not nearly as much as business groups. Since business groups are
impacted more so than ideological groups, my hypothesis still stands. The trend shows that
ideological groups are less impacted by disclosure law. The relationship between ideological group
donations and the general itemization requirement will be given more attention in future work.
My analyses revealed three disclosure laws that had no significant effect on campaign
contributions to individual candidates. These regulations are the after reporting, quarterly
reporting, and the $50 contribution itemization requirements. As briefly discussed in my results,
after reporting was likely to have a limited effect on campaign contributions. Donors have no
incentive to restrict their contribution activities if their donations are only publicized after the
election. That said, it would be unwise for states to forgo after reporting requirements, even if they
do not affect contributions. Practically speaking, candidates must provide some final report to
ensure accountability in elections. Without a final report, interest groups could donate right before
an election knowing their contributions will never be publicized.
The ineffectiveness of the remaining two disclosure laws is not as consistent with the
theoretical foundations of this dissertation. If my theoretical assumptions are correct, quarterly
reporting should be among the most effective disclosure laws in my dataset. Quarterly reporting
allows individuals to see the consistency of donor support to candidates across time. Quarterly
reporting had no direct effect on campaign contributions from ideological or business interest
groups. Quarterly reporting only increased the number of reports filed. Arguably, it may be that
quarterly reporting is too frequent for most voters to pay attention to contributions.
It was somewhat surprising that the $50 itemization contribution requirement failed to
predict campaign contributions. I assumed that the $50 contribution itemization requirement
variable is a stronger predictor of campaign contributions because it codes for stricter itemization
requirements. There are two potential reasons why the $50 itemization requirement may be
ineffective. First, the reason for the insignificant finding may lay in the measurement itself, not
because setting itemization requirements at specific monetary levels is an ineffective strategy.
Among the regulations in the sub-index, this is the only variable that codes statutes that are set at
a specific monetary value. As noted by Witko (2005), the $50 threshold has different implications
in each state. A $50 limit is less important in states with expensive legislative campaigns such as
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California or Texas. A $50 contribution is unlikely to phase any voter living in larger states. In
places like New Hampshire, where most candidates raise zero campaign contributions, the $50
itemization threshold is much more meaningful. A $50 contribution may represent relatively more
support to a campaign than in an expensive state. Admittedly, some of this was accounted for by
clustering my observation around each state. That said, there is no way to account for all state by
state variation in campaign costs.
The relatively low level of the $50 limit may also contribute to regulation’s ineffectiveness.
By requiring the disclosure of all contributions above $50, there may be too many reports for the
public to sift through. Donors might realize that their contributions will be reported along with a
plethora of others, helping to conceal their intentions. Of course, this dissertation does not test
either explanation. Thus, I cannot definitively say why the $50 threshold is ineffective.
Arguably, the most revealing findings are from the district models. The disclosure subindex once again failed to predict campaign contributions. Like the individual candidate models, I
credit the inclusion of ineffective regulations in the sub-index for this result. Including a mix of
both ineffective and effective regulations in the same sub-index was likely to have this effect.
On the other hand, general itemization requirements were effective at equalizing the
contributions provided to candidates. This significant finding cannot be overemphasized. This
result suggests that under the right reporting guidelines, disclosure can be a powerful force in
leveling the playing field for all candidates. States do not have to force candidates to surrender
their ability to raise funds to achieve some level of parity among candidates. Instead, disclosure
law can fulfill that role through publicity. Business groups seem unwilling to appear that they are
providing large contributions to their preferred candidates over others. Any hint at doing so might
single out candidates as being beholden to their interests.
7.11 Conclusion
This chapter tests Hypothesis Two: Disclosure requirements will affect business
contributions more than ideological interest group donations. This is predicated on the theory
that ideological groups have no incentive to hold back on contributing to candidates. Business
interest groups, on the other hand, are worried that the public will perceive their contributions as
undue influence over state legislators.
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The results indicate that business interest group donations are relatively more affected by
disclosure requirements. Ideological groups were almost always unaffected by disclosure
requirements. While the analyses above provided some support to my hypothesis, the significant
effects of disclosure requirements and campaign contributions are still perplexing in a few ways.
Indeed, my results have limited backing by earlier studies on disclosure requirements. A limited
amount of work shows that disclosure laws can militate against individuals from donating large
contributions. As disclosure requirements become more stringent, individual donors reduce their
contribution size. Researchers theorized that individuals are concerned that their campaign
contributions might shine a poor light on their activities.
Many political scientists argued that the public pays very little attention to politics. In a
way, business and ideological donors should not be too concerned about their campaign
contributions. Thus, disclosure laws should be relatively ineffective regulations. My results
suggest otherwise. Instead, my evidence shows that disclosure laws impact business groups far
more than ideological donations. Even ideological donations, however, were affected by disclosure
requirements in rare circumstances. Future studies must be conducted to understand better why
disclosure law is effective even when the public is largely uninterested in campaign contributions.
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Table 7.1 Disclosure Regulations and Corresponding Dependent Variables for Models
Regulation
Aggregate contribution reporting
Itemization of some categories of contributions
Itemization of contributions over $50
Requirement of final report within one month of
election
Requirement of reports on at least quarterly basis

Dependent Variable
Percentage Makeup of
Donations
Log Total Donations
Log Total Donations
Log Total Donations
Log Average Donations

Table 7.2 Correlations of Campaign Finance Law Sub-Indexes
Disclosure

Disclosure

Contribution
Limits

Contribution
Public
Limits
Subsidies

1

0.1866

1

0.0002
Public
Subsidies

0.0426

0.3233

0.4042

0

1
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Table 7.3 Correlations of Disclosure Regulations
Aggregate
Cont.
Reporting
Aggregate
Cont.
Reporting

1

Itemization
of Conts.

0.0994

Itemiza
tion of
Conts.

Item. of
Conts.
Over $50

Aggregate
Exp.
Reporting

Item. of
Expends.

Item. of
Expends.
Over $50

Quarterly
Reports

After
Reports

1

0.051
Item. of
Conts. Over
$50

Aggregate
Expend.
Reporting

Item. of
Expends.

Item. of
Expends.
Over $50

Quarterly
Reports

After
Reports

0.2845

0.1935

1

0

0.0001

0.872

0.1382

0.2481

0

0.0065

0

0.0477

0.429

0.0481

0.086

0.3503

0

0.3458

0.0915

0.2037

-0.0515

0.4962

0.3023

0.3217

0.0001

0.3132

0

0

0

0.135

-0.0526

0.2898

0.1121

0.0129

0.1916

0.0079

0.3024

0

0.0277

0.8012

0.0002

0.252

0.081

0.1835

0.1784

-0.0211

0.0437

0.0378

0

0.112

0.0003

0.0004

0.6793

0.3923

0.4595

1

1

1

1

1
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Table 7.4 Disclosure Sub-Index on Unitemized Donations
Model

Disclosure Sub-Index

Term Limits

Folded Ranney

Log Total
Unitemized
Donations

Log Average
Unitemized
Donations

Percent of
Unitemized
Donations

-0.198**

-0.246**

-0.0310*

(0.0729)

(0.0768)

(0.0135)

-0.657*
(0.313)

-0.324
(0.307)

-0.0681
(0.0484)

1.886*

0.457

0.417**

(0.868)

(0.859)

(0.146)

0.170***
(0.0447)

0.105*
(0.0462)

-0.00251
(0.00625)

-0.347

-0.324

0.00902

(0.272)

(0.368)

(0.0790)

Presidential Year

0.0406
(0.0496)

0.0824
(0.0535)

0.0198
(0.0116)

Off Year Election

1.300**

1.050*

0.0306

(0.499)

(0.450)

(0.0582)

Competition

0.00252
(0.0319)

0.0140
(0.0257)

-0.0124***
(0.00363)

Chamber

0.325**

0.151

0.00216

(0.104)

(0.0942)

(0.0141)

0.243***
(0.0666)

0.170**
(0.0558)

0.0179*
(0.00718)

0.0217

-0.00553***

(0.0118)

(0.0128)

(0.00149)

0.199
(0.120)

0.163
(0.107)

-0.0165
(0.0122)

Professionalism

Multimember Districts

Democratic Party

Cumulative Terms Served

Other Chamber Experience

0.0112
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Table 7.4 Continued
Speaker of the House

-0.184
(0.190)

-0.250
(0.141)

-0.0326*
(0.0153)

Senate Leader

-0.0800
(0.167)

-0.149
(0.146)

-0.0367*
(0.0165)

-0.297**

-0.0332

(0.109)

(0.0219)

-0.368***
(0.0619)

-0.166**
(0.0569)

0.0147
(0.00762)

Majority Party Membership

0.0923
(0.0584)

0.0683
(0.0513)

-0.0126*
(0.00589)

Constant

6.580***
(0.914)

6.605***
(0.928)

-0.119
(0.151)

1.787***
(0.0452)

1.500***
(0.0536)

0.249***
(0.0274)

57903

57903

96585

Never Made General
Election

-0.670***
(0.114)

Challenger

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

0.0437
0.0429
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

0.147
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Table 7.5 Disclosure Sub-Index on Ideological and Business Donations
Model

Log Total
Contributions

Log Total
Business
Donations

Log Total
Ideological
Donations

Log
Average
Total
Donations

Log
Average
Business
Interest
Donation

Log
Average
Ideological
Donations

Disclosure Sub-Index

-0.0452
(0.0522)

-0.0667
(0.0593)

-0.0631
(0.0512)

-0.145***
(0.0339)

-0.0945*
(0.0482)

-0.120***
(0.0330)

Term Limits

-0.477
(0.339)

-0.146
(0.298)

-0.386
(0.278)

-0.135
(0.161)

-0.416*
(0.189)

-0.168
(0.179)

Folded Ranney

-0.251
(0.913)

-0.474
(1.072)

-0.295
(0.787)

-0.0205
(0.417)

1.883**
(0.688)

-0.172
(0.485)

Professionalism

0.336***
(0.0669)

0.247***
(0.0610)

0.0836**
(0.0282)

0.0835
(0.0595)

0.136***
(0.0303)

-0.541

-0.396

-0.556

-0.0558

-0.169

-0.262

(0.336)

(0.385)

(0.319)

(0.137)

(0.216)

(0.150)

Multimember
Districts

Presidential Year

0.340***
(0.0523)

-0.0310

0.0547

-0.0205

0.0333

-0.00468

0.00445

(0.0526)

(0.0510)

(0.0473)

(0.0326)

(0.0274)

(0.0307)

Off Year Election

0.913*
(0.429)

1.141**
(0.354)

1.122**
(0.365)

0.882***
(0.217)

0.0424
(0.292)

1.159***
(0.192)

Competition

-0.0199

-0.0379

0.0334

-0.00337

0.0531*

0.0220

(0.0325)

(0.0366)

(0.0313)

(0.00702)

(0.0270)

(0.0146)

0.495***
(0.0880)

0.490***
(0.0987)

0.497***
(0.0820)

0.207***
(0.0364)

0.00521
(0.0571)

0.369***
(0.0447)

0.0302

-0.518***

0.331***

-0.0723**

0.277***

-0.177***

(0.0577)

(0.0473)

(0.0578)

(0.0246)

(0.0479)

(0.0325)

0.0395***

0.0911***

-0.0434***

0.00964

-0.0772***

-0.0337***

(0.0104)

(0.0116)

(0.00538)

(0.0125)

(0.00690)

Chamber

Democratic Party

Cumulative
Terms Served

(0.0115)
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Table 7.5 Continued
Other Chamber
Experience

0.240*

0.00465

-0.394***

-0.0367

(0.116)

(0.0992)

(0.0485)

(0.0628)

(0.0541)

1.307***

1.500***

0.769***

0.428***

-0.138

0.285**

(0.125)

(0.144)

(0.143)

(0.0678)

(0.101)

(0.0959)

Senate Leader

0.574***
(0.149)

0.854***
(0.164)

0.277
(0.142)

0.131*
(0.0576)

-0.179*
(0.0751)

-0.0220
(0.0820)

Never Made General
Election

-0.906***

-1.018***

-0.726***

0.0668

0.902***

0.113

(0.115)

(0.108)

(0.0437)

(0.0720)

(0.0659)

Challenger

-0.901***
(0.0731)

-1.389***
(0.0850)

-0.428***
(0.0616)

-0.0967***
(0.0288)

1.030***
(0.0797)

-0.0946***
(0.0281)

Majority Party
Membership

0.397***

0.372***

0.310***

0.123***

-0.171***

0.179***

(0.0415)

(0.0417)

(0.0409)

(0.0205)

(0.0403)

(0.0259)

10.43***
(0.814)

9.674***
(1.003)

8.987***
(0.723)

6.493***
(0.409)

2.282***
(0.636)

7.090***
(0.450)

1.643***
(0.0741)

1.712***
(0.0544)

1.766***
(0.0559)

0.856***
(0.0390)

1.633***
(0.0365)

1.268***
(0.0333)

96473
0.0805

79218
0.0872

96473
0.0689

78500
0.0534

82678
0.0373

Speaker of the House

Constant

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

0.611***

0.753***

(0.101)

(0.112)

86329
0.0481

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 7.6 Quarterly Reporting Requirements on Donations
Model

Log
Total
Records

Log
Average
Donation
Size

Log Total
Donations

Log
Average
Business
Group
Donations

Log
Average
Ideological
Group
Donations

Log Total
Business
Group
Records

Log Total
Ideological
Group
Records

0.669***

-0.214

0.446

0.140

-0.0532

0.448*

0.410*

(0.197)

(0.257)

(0.354)

(0.189)

(0.254)

(0.204)

(0.171)

-0.381

-0.255

-0.627

-0.497**

-0.291

-0.0332

-0.166

(0.251)

(0.211)

(0.360)

(0.172)

(0.217)

(0.203)

(0.187)

Folded Ranney

-0.304
(0.773)

-0.0998
(0.462)

-0.403
(0.908)

1.812*
(0.709)

-0.266
(0.523)

-0.287
(0.815)

-0.198
(0.590)

Professionalism

0.265***

0.0713

0.333***

0.0752

0.127***

0.166***

0.190***

(0.0504)

(0.0407)

(0.0618)

(0.0514)

(0.0375)

(0.0492)

(0.0446)

-0.318

-0.153

-0.470

-0.245

-0.318*

-0.235

-0.371

(0.363)

(0.148)

(0.348)

(0.235)

(0.151)

(0.368)

(0.249)

-0.0387

0.00616

-0.0294

-0.0217

-0.0165

0.0691

0.0181

(0.0542)

(0.0352)

(0.0599)

(0.0243)

(0.0374)

(0.0379)

(0.0333)

0.0123

0.863***

0.878*

0.0225

1.105***

0.423

0.270

(0.366)

(0.189)

(0.382)

(0.300)

(0.159)

(0.296)

(0.358)

Competition

-0.0162
(0.0327)

-0.00170
(0.00693)

-0.0163
(0.0328)

0.0552*
(0.0279)

0.0244
(0.0153)

-0.0381
(0.0353)

0.0133
(0.0225)

Chamber

0.314***
(0.0745)

0.211***
(0.0453)

0.522***
(0.0859)

0.00708
(0.0570)

0.378***
(0.0525)

0.344***
(0.0712)

0.286***
(0.0682)

0.0963

0.0187

0.273***

-0.183***

-0.385***

0.189***

(0.0512)

0.0726**
(0.0240)

(0.0593)

(0.0474)

(0.0337)

(0.0395)

(0.0479)

0.0291**

0.0126*

0.0415***

-0.0753***

-0.0308***

0.0817***

-0.000858

(0.0106)

(0.00602)

(0.0110)

(0.0119)

(0.00729)

(0.0110)

(0.00950)

Quarterly
Reporting

Term Limits

Multimember
Districts

Presidential
Year

Off Year
Election

Democratic
Party

Cumulative
Terms Served
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Other
Chamber
Experience

0.615***

-0.00703

0.604***

-0.401***

-0.0472

0.704***

0.457***

(0.0779)

(0.0487)

(0.0947)

(0.0612)

(0.0554)

(0.0856)

(0.0796)

0.887***

0.414***

1.297***

-0.146

0.271**

1.007***

0.733***

(0.101)

(0.0707)

(0.129)

(0.0991)

(0.0989)

(0.114)

(0.128)

Senate Leader

0.427***
(0.125)

0.122*
(0.0611)

0.551***
(0.152)

-0.183*
(0.0721)

-0.0385
(0.0849)

0.604***
(0.129)

0.438**
(0.135)

Never Made
General
Election

-0.998***

0.0826

-0.900***

0.916***

0.120

-1.108***

-0.880***

(0.0947)

(0.0488)

(0.117)

(0.0733)

(0.0693)

(0.0900)

(0.0685)

-0.817***

-0.894***

1.025***

-0.0899**

-1.293***

-0.499***

(0.0683)

0.0936**
(0.0320)

(0.0737)

(0.0809)

(0.0312)

(0.0757)

(0.0500)

0.279***

0.116***

0.388***

-0.175***

0.172***

0.311***

0.235***

(0.0356)

(0.0219)

(0.0416)

(0.0410)

(0.0274)

(0.0333)

(0.0321)

4.358***
(0.593)

5.885***
(0.367)

10.25***
(0.717)

1.905**
(0.594)

6.587***
(0.422)

3.260***
(0.640)

2.326***
(0.491)

1.421***
(0.0382)

0.884***
(0.0380)

1.636***
(0.0676)

1.640***
(0.0364)

1.282***
(0.0335)

1.425***
(0.0413)

1.268***
(0.0271)

96654
0.0882

96473
0.0451

96473
.0825

78500
0.0515

82678
0.0308

79305
0.1045

88919
0.0669

Speaker of the
House

Challenger

Majority Party
Membership

Constant

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R
Squared

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 7.7 Aggregate Reporting Requirements on Business and Ideological Donations
Model

Log
Business
Donations

Log
Ideological
Group
Donations

Percent
Business
Donations

Percent
Ideological
Donations

Percent
Unitemized
Donations

-0.197

0.0132

-0.0889**

0.0190

0.00641

(0.307)

(0.264)

(0.0326)

(0.0281)

(0.0556)

Term Limits

-0.211
(0.294)

-0.458
(0.273)

0.0529
(0.0359)

0.00437
(0.0215)

-0.104
(0.0558)

Folded Ranney

-0.541

-0.351

-0.137

0.0531

0.390*

(1.095)

(0.802)

(0.139)

(0.0744)

(0.152)

Professionalism

0.248***
(0.0676)

0.335***
(0.0546)

-0.00411
(0.00883)

0.00417
(0.00457)

-0.00510
(0.00995)

Multimember Districts

-0.410

-0.581

-0.0108

-0.0454

-0.00773

(0.381)

(0.314)

(0.0571)

(0.0256)

(0.0862)

Presidential Year

0.0421
(0.0559)

-0.0308
(0.0540)

0.00993
(0.00683)

0.0288***
(0.00711)

0.0152
(0.00994)

Off Year Election

1.102***

1.093***

0.0402

0.0180

0.0295

(0.324)

(0.320)

(0.0313)

(0.0332)

(0.0775)

Competition

-0.0348
(0.0355)

0.0347
(0.0314)

-0.0190**
(0.00705)

0.0185***
(0.00495)

-0.0113**
(0.00370)

Chamber

0.496***

0.503***

0.00347

0.0204*

0.00447

(0.0997)

(0.0838)

(0.0125)

(0.00964)

(0.0145)

Democratic Party

-0.521***
(0.0476)

0.328***
(0.0589)

-0.115***
(0.0113)

-0.0360***
(0.00882)

0.0162*
(0.00715)

Cumulative Terms Served

0.0921***

-0.0418***

0.0267***

-0.0207***

-0.00481**

(0.0120)

(0.0114)

(0.00377)

(0.00199)

(0.00151)

0.754***
(0.112)

0.234*
(0.0976)

0.116***
(0.0139)

-0.0667***
(0.0116)

-0.0188
(0.0127)

Aggregate Contribution
Reporting

Other Chamber Experience
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Table 7.7 Continued
Speaker of the House

1.498***
(0.145)

0.762***
(0.144)

0.101***
(0.0195)

-0.0275
(0.0160)

-0.0357*
(0.0151)

Senate Leader

0.851***
(0.166)

0.269
(0.143)

0.0567**
(0.0182)

-0.0581***
(0.0148)

-0.0408*
(0.0173)

Never Made General Election

-1.018***
(0.105)

-0.721***
(0.112)

-0.145***
(0.0244)

-0.00313
(0.0274)

-0.0291
(0.0207)

Challenger

-1.387***
(0.0867)

-0.426***
(0.0622)

-0.239***
(0.0268)

0.103***
(0.0104)

0.0149*
(0.00737)

Majority Party Membership

0.371***
(0.0416)

0.305***
(0.0418)

0.0601***
(0.0121)

0.000743
(0.00711)

-0.0145*
(0.00621)

Constant

9.570***

8.712***

0.464***

0.106

-0.254

(0.907)

(0.669)

(0.115)

(0.0707)

(0.136)

1.714***
(0.0557)

1.769***
(0.0565)

0.462***
(0.110)

0.658***
(0.195)

0.254***
(0.0289)

96585
0.0123

96585
0.0945

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

79218
86329
96585
0.0865
0.0473
0.1122
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 7.8 General Itemization of Contributions on Business and Ideological Donations
Model

Itemization of
Contributions

Log Total
Business
Donations

Log Total
Ideological
Donations

-1.098***

-0.543*

(0.316)

(0.267)

-0.159

-0.423

(0.247)

(0.259)

Folded Ranney

0.0872
(0.877)

-0.0613
(0.703)

Professionalism

0.269***

0.349***

(0.0627)

(0.0519)

-0.388
(0.366)

-0.572
(0.311)

Term Limits

Multimember Districts

Presidential Year

Off Year Election

Competition

0.106**

0.00343

(0.0338)

(0.0412)

1.332***
(0.308)

1.197***
(0.332)

-0.0575

0.0223

(0.0408)

(0.0310)

Chamber

0.514***
(0.0852)

0.510***
(0.0757)

Democratic Party

-0.521***

0.332***

(0.0433)

(0.0577)

Cumulative Terms Served

0.0915***
(0.0117)

-0.0428***
(0.0115)

Other Chamber Experience

0.699***

0.208*

(0.114)

(0.0981)
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Speaker of the House

1.522***
(0.143)

0.774***
(0.145)

Senate Leader

0.857***
(0.158)

0.271
(0.142)

Never Made General
Election

-1.062***

-0.733***

(0.113)
Challenger

-1.384***

(0.117)
-0.421***

(0.0881)

(0.0634)

Majority Party Membership

0.368***
(0.0402)

0.304***
(0.0423)

Constant

9.814***

8.947***

(0.742)
Sigma
Cons

1.677***
(0.0472)

N
79218
Pseudo R Squared
0.0966
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

(0.590)

1.760***
(0.0553)
86329
0.0497
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Table 7.9 Itemization of Contributions Over $50 on Business and Ideological Donations
Model

Log Business
Donations

Log
Ideological
Donations

Itemization of Contributions
Over $50

-0.274

-0.409

(0.265)

(0.222)

Term Limits

-0.169
(0.284)

-0.371
(0.249)

Folded Ranney

-0.647
(1.147)

-0.547
(0.872)

Professionalism

0.238***
(0.0643)

0.331***
(0.0567)

Multimember Districts

-0.415
(0.403)

-0.577
(0.348)

Presidential Year

0.0538
(0.0533)

-0.0159
(0.0490)

Off Year Election

1.063***
(0.314)

1.018**
(0.324)

Competition

-0.0381
(0.0378)

0.0315
(0.0338)

Chamber

0.475***
(0.0951)

0.470***
(0.0790)

Democratic Party

-0.520***
(0.0486)

0.334***
(0.0567)

Cumulative Terms Served

0.0910***

-0.0444***

(0.0121)

(0.0122)

0.760***
(0.116)

0.254*
(0.0996)

Other Chamber Experience
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Speaker of the House

1.492***
(0.144)

0.762***
(0.142)

Senate Leader

0.849***
(0.164)

0.272
(0.144)

Never Made General
Election

-1.006***

-0.709***

(0.110)

(0.117)

-1.391***

-0.431***

(0.0855)

(0.0617)

Majority Party Membership

0.373***
(0.0424)

0.313***
(0.0408)

Constant

9.608***

9.057***

(0.952)

(0.714)

1.710***
(0.0550)

1.758***
(0.0522)

Challenger

Sigma
Cons

N
79218
Pseudo R Squared
0.0876
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

86329
0.0503
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Table 7.10 After Reporting on Business and Ideological Donations
Model

After Reporting

Term Limits

Log Total
Business
Donations

Log Total
Ideological
Donations

-0.369
(0.260)

-0.222
(0.222)

-0.133

-0.404

(0.273)

(0.253)

Folded Ranney

-0.248
(0.965)

-0.160
(0.708)

Professionalism

0.242***

0.336***

(0.0554)

(0.0518)

Multimember Districts

-0.297
(0.380)

-0.501
(0.317)

Presidential Year

0.0279

-0.0414

(0.0533)

(0.0541)

1.195**
(0.375)

1.143**
(0.371)

Off Year Election

Competition

-0.0344

0.0359

(0.0359)

(0.0311)

Chamber

0.509***
(0.101)

0.510***
(0.0843)

Democratic Party

-0.516***

0.331***

(0.0483)

(0.0588)

Cumulative Terms Served

0.0943***
(0.0117)

-0.0410***
(0.0119)

Other Chamber Experience

0.758***

0.241*

(0.113)

(0.0973)

1.484***
(0.142)

0.757***
(0.144)

Speaker of the House
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Senate Leader

0.862***
(0.166)

0.279
(0.143)

Never Made General
Election

-1.023***

-0.726***

(0.107)

(0.110)

Challenger

-1.382***
(0.0841)

-0.424***
(0.0603)

Majority Party Membership

0.370***

0.307***

(0.0412)

(0.0427)

9.324***
(0.815)

8.666***
(0.589)

1.707***
(0.0514)

1.766***
(0.0535)

Constant

Sigma
Cons

N
79218
Pseudo R Squared
0.0885
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

86329
0.0481
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Table 7.11 Disclosure on the Standard Deviation of Donations
Model

Disclosure Index

Log Standard
Deviation of
Business
Contributions

Log Standard
Deviation of
Ideological
Contributions

0.0530
(0.0910)

-0.0493
(0.0655)

Itemization of
Contributions

Log Standard
Deviation of
Business
Contributions

Log Standard
Deviation of
Ideological
Contributions

1.424**

0.684*

(0.462)

(0.306)

Presidential Year

0.0615
(0.0701)

-0.0278
(0.0460)

0.121*
(0.0497)

-0.000785
(0.0396)

Off Year

1.316**
(0.426)

1.145**
(0.440)

1.559***
(0.392)

1.260**
(0.402)

-0.640

-0.806*

-0.615

-0.819*

(0.576)

(0.340)

(0.576)

(0.342)

0.782***
(0.102)

0.636***
(0.0805)

0.779***
(0.0900)

0.636***
(0.0736)

Folded Ranney

-1.879
(1.494)

-0.532
(0.970)

-1.231
(1.292)

-0.236
(0.881)

Competition

-0.0632
(0.0560)

0.162*
(0.0777)

-0.105
(0.0553)

0.142
(0.0755)

Professionalism

0.369***
(0.0948)

0.289***
(0.0709)

0.398***
(0.0959)

0.302***
(0.0724)

-0.141
(0.455)

-0.305
(0.355)

-0.116
(0.397)

-0.318
(0.331)

Constant

10.81***
(1.400)

8.463***
(0.886)

11.27***
(1.075)

8.578***
(0.714)

Sigma
Cons

1.637***
(0.105)

1.759***
(0.0610)

1.579***
(0.101)

1.748***
(0.0612)

Multimember
Districts

Chamber

Term Limits
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Table 7.11 Continued
N
Pseudo R Squared

33226
0.0577

33167
0.0394

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

33226
0.0755

33167
0.0425
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CHAPTER 8: PUBLIC FINANCING

8.1 Overview of Hypothesis Three.
This chapter tests Hypothesis Three: Public finance laws will affect business interest
donations more than ideological donations. This hypothesis may seem lackluster to most
researchers. Methodologically speaking, the effects of public financing on private donations
should be relatively straightforward. Under public financing programs, it is mandatory for
candidates to forgo most private campaign contributions. A statistical model should not reveal
much about public financing programs. Once a candidate receives public financing, their campaign
contributions from private donors should automatically decline. I should not find any major
difference in contributing patterns between ideological and business interest groups. If public
financing programs are functioning correctly, I can assume that my model estimates will show that
campaigns rely solely on subsidies when they accept public financing. Any result that deviates
from this assumption may signify that my measure is inadequate and does not reflect state statutes.
The functions of public financing and their relationship to donors are far more complex
than what I just described. Public financing programs have two fundamental features that contrast
with campaign contribution limits and disclosure requirements and that make this research
warranted. First, participation in public financing programs is voluntary. Unlike campaign
contribution limits and disclosure regulations, nothing forces a candidate to accept public
financing. Each candidate must decide if he/she will forego private donations for government
subsidies. The extra feature of voluntary participation in public financing programs has important
theoretical implications for the interpretation of my results that did not exist in the previous two
chapters. It is not sufficient merely to explain whether state public financing programs directly
reduce private donations to state legislative candidates. Instead, these models also must test
whether public financing programs are strong enough to entice participation by candidates, thus
removing private donations from the political process. An overall reduction in private campaign
contributions to candidates in states with public financing can only occur if candidates enroll in
the program. If public financing programs are not well designed or funded, it is likely that
candidates will refuse to accept campaign subsidies. Indeed, previous research shows that some
candidates refuse to participate in public financing due to administrative complexities involved
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with enrolling (Malhorta 2008). Further, data from the Institute on Money in State Politics show
that very few candidates in most states accept public financing when it is available.
Second, public financing has suffered from a relatively more tumultuous legal history than
campaign contribution limits and disclosure requirements over the past two decades. Thus, I cannot
develop a theory about the effectiveness of public financing programs without putting their unique
political development into historical context. As noted in Chapter 3, the historical development of
public financing programs at the federal level is rife with political party bias. Public financing
programs were initially designed by congressional Democrats to hinder the ability of Republicans
to receive campaign contributions from businesses (La Raja 1998). Democratic policymakers
expected unions to pull more weight through indirect campaign support when public financing was
enacted under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) (La Raja 1998).
Of course, just because the federal statutes were designed to hinder Republican fundraising
does not mean that state policies had the same objective. Indeed, these programs had little in
common with federal law except for the checkoff provisions (Noragon 1981). Early state public
financing policies were highly diverse statutes, varying by funding mechanisms, mode of
allocation, participation rates, and which elections they subsidized (Jones 1981). Only eight of the
state public financing programs provided direct financial support to candidates. All but four states
had checkoff provisions, which allow taxpayers to donate funds to public financing programs. Yet,
in states with checkoff provisions, Democrats were the clear beneficiary of the public financing
systems in all states except Utah (Noragon 1981). Modern public financing has much in common
with these early programs. Four of the five remaining programs use checkoff provisions to support
legislative candidates. As will be discussed in more detail below, the latest “wave” of public
financing program systems introduced Clean Election Laws.
I find broad support for Hypothesis Three. My results show that legislative public financing
programs reduce campaign contributions across all contributor categories. The reduction in
campaign contributions suggests that public financing programs are sufficiently designed to entice
candidates to forgo private donations. I also find that group differences exist between contributor
types. As predicted, business interest group donations are more negatively impacted by legislative
public financing programs. That said, I find that campaign contributions are not always affected
by variations in the design public financing programs. I find an indication that Clean Election Laws
are more effective at removing private donations from state legislative campaigns. Current
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checkoff provisions are weaker than Connecticut's program, which is the sole program that raises
funds through the sale of surplus state property. Further, I show that accepting subsidies increases
candidates’ chances of winning in states with public financing programs. These findings have
important practical implications for states wishing to design public financing programs that
comply with Supreme Court precedent.
This chapter follows a path like the previous two. First, I discuss my methods and analyze
general trends in public financing programs. Second, I run a series of tests on public financing
programs to ensure that the measure captures state public financing regulations. Third, I
demonstrate that candidates that accept subsidies in states with public financing are more likely to
win their elections. Fourth, I test the effectiveness of legislative public financing programs on
private donations to individual campaigns. Finally, I provide a discussion of my analysis and
conclude.
8.2 Methods and Trends in Public Financing Laws
State legislative programs are currently divided into two types of programs. These are
matching funds and Clean Elections programs. Under Clean Election Laws, candidates must first
receive several small contributions from private donors (NCSL 2018). Once these donations are
collected, the state provides a subsidy to the candidate equal to the voluntary expenditure limit.
Only Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine use Clean Elections Programs. Matching funds programs
provide subsidies up to a certain amount based on the candidates’ private campaign contribution
levels. Public financing programs are currently the rarest type of campaign finance law in the
United States (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016). Fourteen states use public financing for
statewide candidates. In New Mexico and West Virginia, these funds are available for state
Supreme Court alone. Only Arizona, Hawaii, Maine, Connecticut, and Minnesota maintain a
public financing program for legislative candidates. Public financing programs were not always
so uncommon.
This is not to say, however, that there is insufficient variation in my public financing
measure to conduct my study. My analysis covers an exceptionally precarious time for state public
financing programs. As noted in Chapter 3, most public financing programs began to retreat in the
early 2000s due to hostility by state legislatures and federal courts (Kulesza, Miller, Witko 2017).
Arguably, the most damaging moves came from the United States Supreme Court in Arizona Free
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Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011). The United States Supreme
Court struck down Arizona’s trigger provisions, which provided additional subsidies to candidates
to match their opponents’ private contributions. Faced with court action, Maine quickly repealed
its trigger provision, gutting the most comprehensive public financing program at the time. The
Nebraska program was ruled unconstitutional by its state Supreme Court, along with the state’s
campaign contribution limit regulations. A few states, such as New Jersey, enacted small pilot
programs that failed to expand into full public financing programs. Other state legislatures
defunded legislative programs. Today, arguably only Connecticut, Arizona, Minnesota, and Maine
operate solvent legislative public financing programs. Other programs, such as Hawaii and
Nebraska, provide so little support that very few candidates accept public financing.
To demonstrate the discrepancy in participation, I report the percentage of candidates that
accepted public financing in Table 8.1. As can be seen, while most programs saw a substantial
portion of candidates forgo private donations, all states suffered a steep decline in participation by
2014 except Connecticut. Overall, Minnesota enjoyed the highest rate of candidate participation
at 73%, but this sharply declined to 7% by 2014. The lowest was Nebraska at a meager 1%. Today,
the Hawaii legislative public financing program has the lowest rate at 3%. As will be discussed in
more detail below, the drop in participation rates in public financing programs is integral to the
integrity of my results.
While public financing program statutes are rare (and even most of the surviving programs
are relatively weak), it is still interesting to understand the trends in their development. The statelevel correlations between each public financing program are reported in Table 8.2. The
relationship between public financing programs is relatively low in comparison with the disclosure
regulations and contribution limits. Naturally, the highest correlation is between statewide and
legislative public financing at 0.62. In almost every election year, each state with a legislative
public financing program also provided subsidies to statewide candidates. Statewide public
financing programs were nearly two times more common than legislative programs. An average
of six states provided public financing to state legislative candidates from 1999-2014. Thirteen
states provided statewide candidates with public financing. The equalizing funds variable was
correlated at 0.4228 with legislative financing programs. This is consistent with the ratio between
Clean Election Programs and matching funds programs. The lowest correlation was between
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independent revenue sources and political party financing at 0.011. Unfortunately, I do not have a
specific explanation of why this may be the case.
I will need to overcome a few theoretical and methodological hurdles that are unique to
this chapter. My conclusions from the public finance models will be less straightforward than
campaign contribution limits or disclosure requirements. As noted, the success of public financing
programs is a function of choice of state legislative candidates and the design of the underlying
statute. Participation in public financing programs is not automatic. Candidates must enroll for
public financing on their own accord. Thus, any reduction in private campaign contributions
signifies that candidates are sufficiently enticed to forgo donations. On the other hand, if public
financing programs are not removing money from campaigns, it will be more difficult to assess
the reason why. I will not be able to determine with certainty if public financing is effective
because candidates are unsatisfied with funding levels provided by public financing or if they are
administratively onerous.
The potential vagueness in my results is not to say, however, that my model estimates will
be meaningless. At the very least, a reduction in campaign contributions indicates that the
fundamentals of public financing operate as intended. If the underlying mechanisms of public
financing programs work, then private donations should fall. It should be no surprise that
candidates with access to public financing programs raise less private campaign contributions.
Public financing programs directly remove contributions by making a portion of private donations
illegal to campaigns that accept subsidies. Public financing programs replace these contributions
with direct financial support from the state government.
As with the two previous chapters, I primarily rely on Tobit to test my hypothesis. Tobit is
best used when the dependent variable cannot assume a negative value. In this case, campaign
contributions typically do not take on a negative value. Campaign contributions only take on a
negative value when campaigns rely on loans, which accounts for less than .01% of my dataset.
Each of my models will use the full set of control variables outlined in Chapter Four. To recap,
Tobit estimates describe the latent, not the observed, campaign contribution dependent variables.
The public financing sub-index will be used differently than the campaign contribution
limit or disclosure sub-index. The updated Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg (2016) public
financing sub-index is not as adaptable to my research question as the other two sub-indexes.
Legislatures design of public financing statutes to impact specific races while leaving others
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uncovered by the program. For example, far more states have public financing for statewide than
legislative elections. Campaign contribution limits and disclosure regulations impact all state
elections. This makes it inevitable that any valid measure of public financing programs must
account for which offices subsidies are available. Thus, only one variable in the Kulesza, Witko,
and Waltenburg (2016) directly deals with legislative public financing programs27. The checkoff,
independent revenue source, expenditure limit requirements, and trigger provision variables are
attributes of public financing laws. They are not full statutes in themselves. The statewide
financing variable captures statewide elections, such as governor, attorney general, state supreme
court, and secretary of state. The final component of the public financing sub-index is the financing
of political parties, which is not relevant for this study. Thus, the statewide and political party
financing variables will be excluded from this analysis.
It would be a mistake to exclude all the remaining public finance program attribute
variables without reason or explanation (matching funds, checkoff, independent revenue source,
and voluntary expenditure requirement). Incorporating some of these variables will add to the
generalizability of my findings. While the basic premise of public financing is the same, the states
devised unique public financing systems. Previous work suggests that the design of public
financing programs may impact their effectiveness in removing money from state legislative
elections (Jones 1981, Nogoron 1981). Thus, I cannot make meaningful claims about public
financing programs without accounting for some of their differences.
It is unwise, however, to include all four of the attribute variables in my analysis without
sound theoretical justification. Of the four attribute variables, only the voluntary expenditure
requirements and checkoff options are likely to affect campaign contributions. Thus, the total limit
and checkoff funds variables will be used with the legislative program dummy to account for
differences in public financing programs. I shall provide more detail on how I predict these two
attribute variables will affect private donations in their respective sections below. I shall provide a
quick explanation of why I think this is the case here. Naturally, expenditure limits are the most

27

Estimates from an unequal variance model suggest that the legislative public financing variable accurately
captures state financing programs. Unsurprisingly, there was a significant difference in the average subsidy to
candidates running under legislative public financing programs raised $6,708.703 as opposed to $3 for those who
did not27. This result signifies that the sub-index of public financing programs is a workable predictor of
contributions. I now move on to testing my hypothesis.
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likely to stifle private donations. These expenditure limits are imposed with additional contribution
limits, barring donors from providing much private support to donors.
The predicted relationship between campaign contributions and the checkoff provisions is
not as straightforward as with expenditure limits. Checkoff statutes provide voluntary taxpayer
contributions to public financing programs. As Witko (2005) states, the checkoff provisions show
a commitment by state governments to maintain funding for public financing programs. The
checkoff provisions indirectly allow taxpayers themselves, not the legislature, to decide on an
individual basis the funding levels of public financing programs. Thus, there is some buffer for
these programs to withstand political headwinds. That said, I will need to adapt the checkoff
variable for this analysis. The updated Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg (2016) index codes for all
checkoff programs, regardless of which candidate they are funding. Most states with checkoff
programs use the revenue to help support political parties, not legislative candidates (NCSL 2018).
Presently, Hawaii, Arizona, Minnesota, and Maine use a checkoff provision to help fund their
legislative candidates. The Connecticut program is funded primarily through the Citizens’ Election
Fund which receives most of its funding from state abandoned property sales (Connecticut State
Elections Enforcement Commission 2016). I will ensure that the variables only capture state
legislative public financing programs in my models.
I control for one additional dimension of legislative public financing programs that is not
included in the updated Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg (2016) index. Legislative public
financing programs are bifurcated into matching funds and Clean Election laws (National
Conference of State Legislatures 2018). The differences between these programs are likely to have
significant impacts on campaign contributions. As will be discussed in more detail below, Clean
Elections laws place more stringent requirements on campaigns and should reduce campaign
contributions more than matching funds programs. Both types of programs, however, have
suffered legal difficulties during the period of this study. The Supreme Court weakened Clean
Election Laws when the Arizona Free Enterprise (2011) decision ruled Arizona’s trigger
provisions unconstitutional. Matching funds programs, including Wisconsin and Hawaii, suffered
from inadequate funding.
I will not be able to use the same number of campaign contribution dependent variables as
in the previous two chapters. Rather, the only two dependent variables I will use in this chapter
are log total campaign contributions and the log standard deviation of campaign contributions in
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each district. The percentage dependent variable will be inappropriate to use in these analyses. The
inclusion of a public financing program may cause the percentage makeup of all donation
categories to fall, regardless if there is any true impact on contributions. Public financing adds
another category of income to state legislators’ campaign contributions. This will cause the portion
of other categories to inevitably decline since the total amount of campaign contributions
increased. Average campaign contribution size is also irrelevant for this analysis. There is no
theoretical reason why public financing may change contributor behavior in a way that
significantly reduces the average size of their donations, even under more stringent contribution
limits. To recap Chapter 6, campaign contribution limits had no real effect reducing average
donation sizes. Public financing alone does not bring more publicity to private donations. Thus,
there is no expectation that public financing will reduce average contribution sizes.
Before testing my hypothesis, however, I will examine if public financing programs affect
the chances of candidates winning their election. I predict that candidates are not harmed in their
election chances by accepting public financing. Candidates that accept public financing must have
an incentive to surrender private donations. Indeed, if my models show that private campaign
contributions fall due to public financing programs, there must be a reason why candidates are
compelled to forgo contributions. The most logical reason why candidates accept public financing
is that they feel it will improve their election chances. As discussed in Chapter 2, I assume that
candidates wish to be elected (Mayhew 1974). The desire for election will drive their decision to
accept public financing. Candidates will be more enticed to enroll in public financing if they feel
it will improve their election chances. If public financing harms candidates’ chances at election,
they will rely on private donations instead.
Testing the election chances of candidates that accept public financing is relatively
straightforward. This analysis will rely on a probit model that includes only candidates running in
states with public financing programs, leading to 14,128 observations. The dependent variable is
a dichotomous measure that codes “1” if the candidate won the election and “0” if they did not.
The primary independent variable is similarly a dichotomous measure that codes “1” if the
candidate accepted subsidies and “0” if they refused. Accepting subsidies should be significantly
and positively associated with winning the election if public financing programs improve
candidates’ election chances. I use all individual and state level controls in this model used in
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other parts of the analysis. I also included logged total campaign contributions as an independent
variable.
8.3 Election Model
This chapter tests if public financing removes private donations from state legislative
campaigns. That said, it is prudent to better understand why candidates accept public financing.
As previously discussed, I assume that candidates hope to get elected (Mayhew 1974). In most
instances, candidates will not act to sabotage their own campaigns intentionally. If public financing
was associated with losing elections, candidates would not enroll in these programs. There would
be little need to conduct my other analyses if public financing directly harms campaigns. Thus, I
predict that candidates who accept subsidies in states with public financing are not more likely to
lose their election.
As noted, I rely on a probit model for this analysis. I only include candidates running in
states with public financing. The dependent variable is the outcome of winning the general
election. The primary independent variable is a dichotomous variable that signifies that the
candidate enrolled in public financing. I included all control variables from the individual models.
I also control log total campaign contributions.
The results from the election model are reported in Table 8.3. As predicted, accepting
public financing is positively related to winning general elections. The accepting public financing
variable is significantly associated with successful campaigns at the .01 level. This model suggests
that public financing programs provide a strong incentive to give up the ability to raise private
campaign contributions. I will discuss the implications of this result further in the conclusion,
along with a brief comparison of public subsidies and campaign contribution total averages.
8.4 Legislative Financing Programs
The most logical first step for testing my hypothesis is to examine the legislative financing
program variable on log total campaign contributions without the expenditure limit independent
variable or controlling for program type. As noted, severe funding problems plague modern
legislative public financing programs. A few public financing program statutes are unenforceable
with current funding levels, including Hawaii, Minnesota, and Vermont. Some states, including
Massachusetts and Wisconsin, had legislative public financing statutes that were defunded by the
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state legislatures but left the legal frameworks intact for a time. Of course, without funds, these
programs cannot provide campaign assistance to candidates.
Even if public financing programs are well funded, candidates should not always
immediately enroll for campaign subsidies. Public financing is not beneficial for all state
legislative candidates. For some, public financing may unnecessarily restrict candidates’ ability to
accept private donations. The median public financing award form 1999-2014 to legislative
candidates was a relatively meager $7,763. The median amount provided by private donors to state
legislative campaigns was $16,255 during the same timeframe. That said, well-funded public
financing programs are quite lucrative for state legislative candidate. According to the Institute on
Money in State Politics, the highest amount given to a state legislative campaign through public
financing was $657,694 to Linda R. Greenstein of New Jersey in 2007. The New Jersey pilot
program still allowed candidates to collect private donations. Thus, campaigns must weigh the
benefits of accepting public financing with their cost. The candidates that are most likely to accept
public financing are those who have difficulty fundraising or bend to public pressure. Candidates
who successfully raise funds through private donations are likely to ignore their state’s public
financing programs. Thus, these candidates would be relatively less competitive by taking
subsidies.
Considering the history of public financing programs detailed in Chapter 3, it is likely that
business groups will be more affected by public financing programs. Federal public financing
programs were developed mainly to remove Republican corporate backers from politics (La Raja
1998). State programs largely emulated the federal program. That said, it is still conceivable that
ideological and business interest groups will be negatively impacted by public financing at
relatively the same levels. As I showed in Chapter 5, businesses do not discriminate between
Republican and Democratic candidates, save for the financial services industry. That said, business
interest groups have more resources to donate than ideological groups. Thus, candidates who forgo
private donations are most likely surrendering more contributions from business interest groups
over ideological groups.
I report the results from the legislative public financing program models in Table 8.4. All
donor groups were negatively and significantly impacted by legislative public financing programs.
Consistent with the hypothesis, legislative public financing programs negatively impacted log total
business campaign contributions relatively more negatively than ideological groups. The log total
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business interest donation estimate is -1.16. My estimates show that union, political party, and
single-issue group donations are less impacted by legislative public financing programs.
Interestingly, the legislative public financing program models also did a much poorer job at
predicting single-issue and party donations than business and union contributions. The pseudo R
squared is approximately .03 for the log party and log single-issue donations, showing the inability
for these programs to be a reliable predictor of these contributions.
The results above only show the impact of legislative public financing programs alone. The
legislative program variable does not account for variation in the design of public financing
programs. Thus, I do not yet know if differences between public financing programs have an
impact on campaign contributions. As demonstrated in the previous two chapters with disclosure
law and campaign contribution limits, the underlying blueprint of campaign finance laws
determines their effectiveness. For example, contribution bans had different impacts on business
interest donations than limits. Thus, it is logical to assume that variation in the design of public
financing programs may also be consequential.
In the next three sections, I will continue my analysis by investigating total limits, checkoff
options, and Clean Election laws to further understand the effects of public financing programs on
donations to legislators. Each of these attributes of public finance law should decrease the total
amount of private donations provided to state legislative candidates. They should reduce private
campaign contributions, however, in slightly diverse ways. The total limit variable should have
the highest probability of reducing private donations. Logically, placing a direct limit on donations
should reduce campaign contributions. I predict that Clean Election laws will have a stronger effect
at reducing private campaign contributions than matching funds programs. As mentioned, Clean
Election laws bar candidates from raising private donations once they clear a fundraising threshold.
In lieu of donations, candidates receive a subsidy from the state up to an expenditure limit.
8.5 Total Limit Public Financing Systems
I now test how variation in the design of public financing programs affects campaign
contributions to state legislative candidates. These analyses only differ from the previous models
in one aspect. All subsequent models add an interaction term between the legislative public
financing dummy and an attribute variable (total limits, checkoff, and matching funds). The
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interaction term estimates the effectiveness of legislative financing programs, given that the
program also includes one of the three variables as a part of the statute.
I begin by testing legislative public financing programs with total limits on expenditures.
Expenditure limits are the most likely to impact donations among the attribute variables.
Consistent with my hypothesis, I expect that total limits will impact business interest groups
relatively more than ideological groups. The reason why I expect total limits to affect business
interest groups more than ideological groups is relatively straightforward. If candidates cannot
spend funds by accepting public financing, private donations to candidates will be cut off. As
discussed in Chapter 2, public financing will impact business interest groups to most. If a sufficient
number of candidates accept public subsidies, there will be less campaigns for business and
ideological groups to donate to. Business interest groups provide relatively more campaign
contributions than ideological groups. Thus, business group donations will fall more than
ideological group donations.
The results from the total limit models are reported in Table 8.5. Inconsistent with my
predictions, legislative programs with expenditure limits were insignificantly associated with
donations from any group. The expenditure limit interaction term was insignificantly related to log
business interest, single-issue, political party, and union donations. Thus, total limits within public
financing programs do not seem to be an efficient way to remove campaign contributions to
legislators.
The results in this section neither support nor refute my hypothesis. Neither ideological
and business groups were unaffected by the total limit interaction term. Expenditure limits are only
one small part of most public financing systems. Of course, I am not finished testing the attribute
variables. I will still test checkoff provisions in addition to my investigation on Clean Election
Programs and matching funds statutes. I may get results that show significant differences in group
donations in these analyses. The next section will investigate checkoff provisions, which seek to
maintain adequate funding levels for candidates to accept public financing.
8.6 Checkoff Programs
Checkoff programs are an integral part of most modern public financing regulations. As
mentioned, four of the five remaining state legislative public financing programs use checkoff
provisions. These provisions found their beginning in federal statutes. The federal government
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first enacted checkoff provisions with FECA in 1971. Most states with public financing programs
soon followed with checkoff programs of their own (Noragon 1981). Checkoff programs serve
both political and practical ends. First, checkoff programs help reduce political controversy
surrounding public financing programs. Lawmakers design checkoff programs to minimize the
need for taxpayers’ dollars to support public financing programs. Instead, checkoff programs
provide a source of resources that are independent of the general budget (Noragon 1981).
Second, checkoff programs should help public financing programs stay afloat even when
general budget funds are not forthcoming. That said, most checkoff programs have not been
particularly successful for raising funds for public financing programs. The federal tax checkoff
program enjoyed a 28.7% participation rate among all taxpayers. By 2013, participation fell to a
mere 6% (Flowers 2015). In the 2012 and 2016 presidential race, neither major party candidate
accepted public financing. Checkoff options have not fared much better in most states. For
example, only around 6% of funds for Maine’s public financing program came from tax checkoffs
for the 2008 election (Jenkins 2010). Arizona was relatively higher at 39% for the same election.
Wisconsin’s checkoff provision only raised approximately $200,000 per year for the state’s
Supreme Court races before the program was defunded (Lueders 2011).
As noted, Connecticut is the only state with a legislative public financing program that
does not currently use a checkoff program. Instead, Connecticut relies on the sale of abandoned
property to fund the public financing program. This ensures that no taxpayer money directly
contributes to the program. Arguably, this is a less reliable way to raise funds than the checkoff
program. Both systems, however, hardly make funding a guarantee for public financing programs.
Connecticut can only fund their public financing program if there is a sufficient value of properties
to sell. Checkoff programs require a commitment of individual taxpayers to help keep the program
afloat. If taxpayers do not voluntarily provide funds, it is on the state legislature to provide
sufficient funds from the general budget.
The results from the checkoff models are shown in Table 8.6. Interestingly, public
financing programs with checkoff provisions are less effective than Connecticut’s system for
reducing campaign contributions. The estimates were consistently higher under checkoff
provisions across all groups of donors. That said, business interest group donations are once again
relatively more affected by public financing than ideological groups. Unions were the most
affected group under Connecticut’s program with an estimate of -1.911. Both political party
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donations and single-issue group donations were less impacted than business interest groups under
matching funds programs.
8.7 Clean Elections Laws vs. Matching Funds Programs
As noted, modern public programs are mostly separated into two types of statutes. These
are Clean Election and matching funds programs (NCSL 2018). This division in programs makes
including an analysis on matching funds and Clean Elections Programs particularly relevant.
Currently, Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine use Clean Elections Programs. The Massachusetts
program was also a Clean Elections Law, but it was never funded, and thus is not coded for in this
analysis. Under these statutes, candidates must demonstrate through small campaign contributions
that they have sufficient public support to qualify for funds. Arizona and Maine also used matching
funds features through trigger provisions before they were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court.
If a candidate outraised their opponent, the opponent receives additional funds to help keep their
resources on equal footing. For this analysis, however, they were coded strictly as Clean Election
Laws. Currently, Hawaii and Minnesota use pure matching funds programs. Candidates that sign
up for this program must adhere to expenditure limits but receive public financing as they raise
donations from private donors. Nebraska’s program was also a matching funds program before it
was struck down by the state Supreme Court.
I include both a Clean Election Law and matching funds variable in my models for these
analyses. For both dichotomous variables, the value of “1” denotes that the state employs the
program. Thus, for these public financing programs to be effective, the Clean Election Law or
matching funds program dummies should be negatively and significantly associated with log total
campaign contributions.
Even though I predict that both will be negative, this analysis tests if Clean Election laws
or matching funds programs are more effective. I expect that the Clean Election Laws will be more
successful at removing donations to state legislative campaigns than matching funds programs.
Even though Clean Elections programs have suffered strong legal challenges, they still enforce
more restrictions on private financing than matching funds statutes. So long as the Clean Election
Law is still able to function, the remaining requirements on campaigns should place relatively
more strict restrictions than matching funds programs. As mentioned, the difference between the
programs is relatively simple. Matching funds programs allow candidates to raise private campaign
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contributions while Clean Election Laws do not. Indeed, as candidates raise campaign
contributions, the state matches donations with public subsidies. This allows campaigns to have
some free reign to raise private campaign contributions.
Depending on the estimates, it may be difficult to make meaningful conclusions from the
results from these models. Trigger provisions, which provided additional campaign contributions
to candidates to match their opponents’ fundraising were fundamental parts of Maine’s and
Arizona’s Clean Elections systems. Both programs function to this day without the trigger
provisions. Arizona passed a severability clause in 2007 in case any section was declared
unconstitutional by the courts (Arizona Senate Staff 2016). The Maine State Legislature quietly
repealed the trigger provision to comply with the Supreme Court ruling. This may lessen the
estimate for the Clean Election Laws variable since they were weakened by federal courts.
I report the results of the matching funds models in Table 8.7. The results are much clearer
than the history of public financing laws might suggest. Consistent with predictions, my results
indicate that Clean Elections Programs are more successful at reducing donations to candidates.
Further, business group donations are relatively more affected by both matching funds programs
and Clean Election Laws. For business interest groups, the Clean Election Law variable shows a
coefficient of -2.03. That said, both programs are highly effective at reducing the flow of private
campaign contributions to state legislative candidates. The matching funds estimate for matching
funds with business interest donations is -.95. Business groups do not need to contribute as much
under matching funds programs since the state will provide subsidies to candidates. The trend is
the same for ideological groups. Matching funds programs underperform relative to Clean Election
Laws in reducing campaign contributions from ideological groups. The effect sizes of ideological
groups are relatively smaller than for business groups, except for unions, providing support to my
hypothesis. Indeed, log total union donations are completely unaffected by matching funds
programs. The matching funds variable was insignificantly related to log union campaign
contributions. This is consistent with my framework that ideological groups seek to be an active
part of the political system.
8.8 District Level Models
The individual level models were relatively supportive of Hypothesis Three. I
demonstrated that business interest group donations are relatively more impacted by public
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financing laws. Further, my analyses suggest that there are significant differences among different
program designs and how contributions are affected. I am not ready to declare that my hypothesis
is confirmed without conducting the district level models. As described, the underlying success of
public financing is dependent upon the choices of the candidates to accept subsidies. If all
candidates in the same race accept public financing, their total amount of contributions should be
about the same. Thus, relative to disclosure and contribution limits, public financing should be the
most useful policy to even the fundraising playing field between candidates.
The district models also use Tobit analyses. The dependent variables are the log standard
deviation of total campaign contributions in each district for a given election. As with all district
models, the individual level variables are excluded from the analyses. It is impossible to include
variables that describe specific candidate attributes at the district level. The omitted variables are
party membership, terms of service, service in the other legislative chamber, challenger status,
chamber membership, speaker, Senate leadership, member of the majority party, and elimination
in the primary/nominating convention. I only use the legislative program dummy for this analysis.
I do not further test differences among programs in this section.
I report the results of the district level models in Table 8.8.28 As predicted, business interest
group donations are more equalized than ideological groups. State legislative programs are
negatively and significantly associated with both the log standard deviation business and party
donations. The effect size for the log standard deviation of business interest group donations is
-1.764 versus -1.212 for political parties. Union donations are also significantly related to state
legislative public financing programs with an effect size of -1.11.29 This final analysis further
supports my hypothesis that ideological group donations are consistently less affected by state
legislative public financing programs.
8.9 Discussion
This chapter tested Hypothesis Three: Public finance laws will affect business interest
donations more than ideological donations. Testing this hypothesis proved to be less difficult
than I expected. Initially, I was concerned that the rarity and legal history of public financing
28

Like previous chapters; the single-issue group district model fitted too poorly to report meaningful results.
The left censoring was particularly high for the district level union contribution model (6,305 of the 8,017). If left
uncensored, the result becomes negative and significant, but the effect size is smaller than the business interest
group contribution model. This conforms to my hypothesis
29
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requirements could weaken my analysis. As mentioned, public financing programs are far from
widespread. Only 6,598 candidates accepted public financing out of the 112,921 candidates in my
dataset. Further, participation rates in public financing programs dropped in all states by 2014
except for Connecticut. My results ran the risk of returning insignificant results due to the chiseling
away of public financing programs by state legislatures and courts.
My models produced favorable results for my hypothesis. Indeed, legislative public
financing programs reduced log total donations across all contributor groups, not just business
interest donors. As predicted, business interest donations were more negatively impacted by
legislative public financing programs than ideological groups. While my theoretical framework
focuses on donor behavior, it still has important implications for the decisions of the candidate to
accept public financing. This finding suggests that candidates are voluntarily forgoing private
donations for public financing when it is available. Candidates use public financing programs as
an attractive alternative rather than relying on upon providing donations, so long as the program
is functional. More broadly, my analyses suggest that public financing programs have not been
sufficiently dismantled by federal courts that they were wholly inoperable between 1999-2014.
While all groups were negatively impacted by public financing, my initial legislative public
financing model demonstrated strong group differences in the effectiveness of public financing
programs. Business interest groups are relatively more impacted by the presence of legislative
public financing programs, regardless of their design. In some ways, this could be viewed as a
hollow finding. Business interest groups provide far more campaign contributions than ideological
groups. Naturally, if candidates are unable to raise private funds, business interest group donations
should be relatively more impacted. This is the same line of logic that could be used to contradict
my results on the effectiveness of state campaign contribution limits. This reasoning is not
applicable with my public financing program models as it may have been with campaign
contribution limits. Even though my emphasis is on donor behavior, I must address candidate
decision making since public financing is voluntary. Unlike campaign contribution limits,
candidates are not forced to adhere to public financing programs. If candidates felt that they could
rely on private donations without subsidies, they would not enroll in public financing. Thus, if
candidates did not enroll for public financing, there would be no relationship between campaign
contributions and public financing programs. Candidates must find public financing as an
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acceptable alternative to private donations for the negative relationship between contributions and
financing programs to show in my models.
Consistent with my hypothesis, as candidates voluntarily sign up for these programs, my
results show that business interest group donations are more negatively impacted, independent of
the size of business group donations. As discussed in Chapter 3, state public financing programs
followed federal statutes, which were designed to reduce campaign contributions from businesses.
The federal program was designed to impact business interest donations. State regulations, while
diverse and not always directly modeled after federal statute (Jones 1981), should have the same
effect. Since business groups have more campaign contributions
My analyses also investigated statutory differences among public financing programs and
how these differences affected campaigning contributions. Specifically, I analyzed the impact of
voluntary expenditure limits, checkoff provisions, Clean Election Laws, and matching funds
programs. The voluntary expenditure limit programs did not affect campaign contributions. Each
interaction term was insignificant across all donor groups. This result does not discredit my
hypothesis. Neither group was affected by voluntary expenditure programs more than others.
Rather, it means that voluntary expenditure limits do not strength public financing programs.
Interestingly, my results suggest that Connecticut’s program was exceptionally successful,
even though the program is funded through the sale of state property, not through separate checkoff
options. In a way, this result is counterintuitive. One could assume that a statewide checkoff
program should be more successful in raising funds for the public financing programs. On its face,
relying on the sale of state property seems like an unorthodox and unreliable way to support
legislative campaigns. In some ways, however, these results are not particularly surprising. At both
the federal and state levels, checkoff provision failed to raise a meaningful amount of funds for
public financing programs. Checkoff provisions are plagued with severely low taxpayer
participation, leading states to prop their public financing up with their general budget. Citizens
are not always supportive of public financing at the state or federal level (Moore 2001, Hunt 2015,
La Raja and Schaffner 2011). Voters are not usually comfortable using tax dollars to fund political
campaigns (La Raja and Schaffner 2011).
My results also showed apparent differences in the effectiveness of Clean Election Laws
versus matching funds programs. My models suggest that Clean Elections Laws negatively impact
private donations relatively more than matching funds programs. In some ways, this is not a

190
surprising finding. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2018), matching
funds programs allow candidates to collect some level of campaign contributions when they accept
subsidies. Even when candidates take public financing, they are not entirely cut off from
contributions. Thus, it is understandable that the effect size of matching funds program is not as
large as Clean Elections Laws.
Matching funds programs arguably provide more flexibility to candidates. With the right
design, matching funds programs could be a better alternative than Clean Election Laws for state
legislative public financing. The ability to raise campaign contributions while receiving additional
public subsidies under matching funds programs could be attractive to many candidates who wish
to fundraise on their own. Even though they traditionally provide fewer funds over Clean Election
Laws, matching funds programs could be more effective with higher levels of enrollment in the
program.
Instead, both history and my models show that matching funds programs are the weaker
public financing system. In many ways, current matching funds programs are the worst of both
worlds for candidates. As mentioned, state legislative candidates that accept matching funds are at
a major fundraising disadvantage. These programs enforce additional expenditure and campaign
contribution limits (NCSL 2018) while providing a limited amount of financial support. Also,
candidates must also accept donations from private contributors to remain competitive. They
cannot merely rely on subsidies to run a competitive campaign. These disadvantages are reflected
in the low enrollment of candidates in matching funds programs. As shown in Table 1, matching
funds programs do not attract candidates like Clean Elections Laws. Understandably, candidate
enrollment in matching funds programs has crashed to historic lows. On the other hand, Clean
Election Programs provide a respectable payment to qualifying candidates (NCSL 2018). Once a
candidate qualifies for Clean Election Law financing, they no longer must concern themselves’
with raising private contributions. Thus, even though candidates surrender their ability to raise
private campaign contributions under Clean Election Laws, they have enough resources to mount
a serious campaign. Indeed, Clean Election Laws provided candidates with an average of
$21,346.87 in public financing versus $9,166.169 in matching funds programs. Candidates who
accepted matching funds raised more on average in total funds than their Clean Election Law
counterparts. Candidates that accepted matching funds programs raised an average of $36,480.93.
The average candidate in the matching fund program states, however, raised $41,318.42.
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Candidates that accepted matching funds candidates raised less money than their peers. In Clean
Election Law states, the average in total contributions was $20,515.33. Without including
subsidies, the average total of donations in Clean Election Law states was a relatively meager
$8,258.97. Thus, accepting public financing in Clean Election Law states put candidates at a
fundraising advantage, but not so for candidates in states with matching funds programs.
The results from my hypotheses tests reflected the differences in subsidies demonstrated
above. My models showed apparent differences in the effects of Clean Election Laws and matching
funds programs on ideological and business group donations. Both systems impacted business
interest donations more than ideological group donations. Logically, as subsidy support increases,
candidates will accept public financing at a higher rate. Business groups provide more funds, so
their contributions will decline further than ideological groups.
Interestingly, matching funds programs had no impact on union donations. This is
consistent with the intention of federal statutes to leave union activity relatively unhindered (La
Raja 2008). If unions can provide a high amount of support to candidates, there is no need for a
candidate to enroll in a matching funds program. Since contributions are a fundamental part of the
political participation of unions and other ideological groups, there is no risk for candidates to rely
on their donations rather than public subsidies.
The district models showed the same trends as the individual candidate models. Business
interest group donations were more equalized by public financing programs than ideological
groups. This result suggests that public financing programs place candidates on an equal
fundraising playing field. Once again, the results from the district models are not surprising when
taken in conjunction with the individual models. The ultimate purpose of public financing is to
ensure that candidates are unable to raise significantly more funds than their competition. This
way, no candidate has a messaging advantage over others.
On a side note, the effect sizes for public finance programs are much higher than campaign
contribution limits or disclosure requirements. No other campaign finance regulation negatively
impacts campaign contributions like public financing programs. Even bans on direct donations
from unions and corporations had effect sizes of only -.44 and -.59 respectively. Union donations
bans were insignificantly associated with log total union donations. These results speak to the
strength of legislative public financing programs as a means to remove donations from campaigns.
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The success of public financing programs in reducing private donations is not too
surprising. Briefly revisiting the election model, my analyses show that candidates that accept
public financing are more likely to win their elections. A question arises from these models: why
do not all candidates accept public financing if they are more likely to win their election? As
discussed in Chapter 2, there are a few reasons why candidates may refuse subsidies, even if their
chances of winning are improved. Some candidates find public financing requirements too onerous
to understand or have no idea that they exist in their state (Malhorta 2008). Further, not all
legislative public financing programs are fully functional. Participation in states like Hawaii and
Minnesota is quite low due to the lack of funding for public financing programs. That said, if states
put resources into these programs, they can be a powerful motivator for candidates to forgo private
donations, thus removing contributions from campaigns.
8.9 Conclusion
This chapter tests Hypothesis 3: Public finance laws will affect business interest
donations more than ideological donations. Consistent with this hypothesis, my models show
that state legislative public financing programs affected business interest group donations more
than ideological group donations. This result was independent of the design of public financing
programs. Business interest group donations were more impacted by programs with Clean Election
Laws, matching programs, checkoff provisions, and sale of state property mechanisms. Only
voluntary expenditure limits did not impact donations.
These results have important implications for public financing programs. My results show
that public financing programs, in general, are an effective way to reduce private donations, even
under the legal challenges these statutes faced over the past two decades. In certain states,
programs are still sufficiently strong to entice candidates to forgo private donations. The
enrollment of candidates into these programs has dramatically reduced the flow of money into
state legislative campaigns where public financing is available.
The effectiveness of public financing programs may not last much longer. Arguably,
Connecticut has the only remaining healthy public financing program. The Maine and Arizona
programs still function but do not enjoy the same utilization rates as they did before Arizona Free
Enterprise (2010). Again, my results suggest that public financing programs are a reliable tool for
campaign finance reformers to remove money from politics, regardless of their source. That said,
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these programs will impact the donations of business interest groups more than ideological groups
and potentially leave union contributions unhinged.

Table 8.1 Public Financing Program Utilization Rates
STATE
ARIZONA
CONNECTICUT
HAWAII
MAINE
MINNESOTA
NEBRASKA
WISCONSIN

PROGRAM
TYPE
Clean Elections
Clean Elections
Matching Funds
Clean Elections
Matching Funds
Matching Funds
Matching Funds

USE
RATE
43%
68%
5%
60%
73%
1%
10%

2014
26%
77%
3%
45%
7%
N/A
N/A
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Table 8.2 Correlations of Public Financing Regulations
Regulation

Total Limit

Ind. Rev. Source.

Total
Limit

Ind. Rev.
Source.

Checkoff
Provision

Statewide
Financing

Legislative
Financing

Party
Financing

Equal
Funding

1

0.2351

1

0
Checkoff Provision

0.4956
0

0.1052
0.0388

1

Statewide Financing

0.5579

0.2903

0.5179

0

0

0

0.3096

0.2821

0.3522

0.6248

0

0

0

0

Party Financing

0.1373
0.0069

0.0114
0.8237

0.6712
0

0.1494
0.0033

0.1462
0.004

1

Equal Funding

0.2996
0

0.2593
0

0.4404
0

0.3193
0

0.4228
0

0.4112
0

Legislative
Financing

1

1

1
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Table 8.3 Election Chances of Candidates that Accept Public Financing
Model
Accepted Public
Financing

Won Election
0.236**
(0.0914)

Folded Ranney

-0.121
(0.605)

Professionalism

-0.120
(0.0620)

Multimember
Districts

0.991***
(0.170)

Presidential
Year

-0.00341
(0.0326)

Off Year

-0.256**
(0.0952)

Competition

-0.279***
(0.0401)

Chamber

-0.340***
(0.0922)

Democratic
Party

-0.00749
(0.0762)

Cumulative
Terms

0.290***
(0.0539)

Other Chamber
Experience

0.746***
(0.165)

Challenger

-1.332***
(0.119)
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Table 8.3 Continued
Majority Party

0.0476
(0.0696)

Log Total
Donations

0.175***
(0.0418)

Constant

N

-1.365
(0.703)

14128
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 8.4 Legislative Programs on Private Campaign Contributions
Model

Log Total
Business
Donations

Log Total
Single
Issue
Donations

Log Total
Party
Donations

Log Total
Union
Donations

-1.165**
(0.361)

-0.940***
(0.172)

-0.860**
(0.309)

-0.924***
(0.278)

Term Limits

-0.159
(0.255)

-0.286
(0.209)

-0.295
(0.232)

-0.299
(0.188)

Folded Ranney

0.0755
(1.049)

0.718
(0.843)

0.426
(0.769)

0.0465
(0.623)

Professionalism

0.223***
(0.0653)

0.157**
(0.0509)

0.179**
(0.0619)

0.356***
(0.0427)

Multimember Districts

-0.458
(0.368)

-0.525*
(0.243)

-0.756**
(0.279)

0.0168
(0.278)

Presidential Year

0.0165
(0.0499)

-0.0750
(0.0614)

0.0385
(0.0333)

-0.0486
(0.0589)

Off Year Election

0.974**
(0.304)

0.598*
(0.249)

1.340***
(0.270)

0.548
(0.370)

Competition

-0.0405
(0.0355)

0.0178
(0.0261)

0.0211
(0.0341)

0.0138
(0.0224)

Chamber

0.500***
(0.0961)

0.331***
(0.0972)

0.473***
(0.0899)

0.415***
(0.0925)

Democratic Party

-0.512***
(0.0528)

-0.131
(0.0696)

-0.131
(0.0724)

1.084***
(0.0962)

Cumulative Terms Served

0.0877***
(0.0125)

-0.0527***
(0.00898)

-0.0946***
(0.0150)

0.0160
(0.0107)

Other Chamber Experience

0.788***
(0.110)

0.0865
(0.0933)

-0.00137
(0.104)

0.303**
(0.0927)

Legislative Programs
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Table 8.4 Continued
Speaker of the House

1.510***
(0.143)

1.049***
(0.155)

0.00264
(0.174)

0.811***
(0.136)

Senate Leader

0.848***
(0.160)

0.645***
(0.143)

0.0859
(0.159)

0.618***
(0.123)

Never Made General
Election

-1.048***

-0.133

-1.191***

-0.638***

(0.0956)

(0.101)

(0.148)

(0.0964)

-1.373***

-0.0707

-0.0857

-0.502***

(0.0867)

(0.0726)

(0.0445)

(0.0730)

Majority Party Membership

0.367***
(0.0427)

0.114*
(0.0451)

0.273***
(0.0651)

0.0657
(0.0704)

Constant

9.092***

6.454***

7.517***

7.068***

(0.864)

(0.751)

(0.635)

(0.528)

1.668***
(0.0471)

1.460***
(0.0605)

1.899***
(0.0766)

1.473***
(0.0504)

47685
0.0297

48436
0.0855

Challenger

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

79218
36539
0.0992
0.0333
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 8.5 Total Limits on Campaign Contributions
Log Total
Business
Donations

Log Total
Single
Issue
Donations

Log Total
Party
Donations

Log Total
Union
Donations

Legislative Program

-0.830
(0.932)

-0.867*
(0.417)

-0.894
(0.932)

-1.668
(0.871)

Total Limits

0.0592
(0.336)

-0.0426
(0.276)

-0.0468
(0.255)

-0.181
(0.228)

Legislative Total Limits

-0.497
(1.018)

-0.0647
(0.511)

0.0732
(0.992)

1.068
(0.919)

Term Limits

-0.172
(0.256)

-0.292
(0.213)

-0.297
(0.236)

-0.253
(0.206)

Folded Ranney

0.0139
(1.039)

0.702
(0.816)

0.421
(0.773)

0.0953
(0.607)

Professionalism

0.222**
(0.0767)

0.161**
(0.0590)

0.182**
(0.0707)

0.362***
(0.0512)

Multimember Districts

-0.456
(0.366)

-0.529*
(0.237)

-0.757**
(0.277)

0.0209
(0.276)

Presidential Year

0.0208
(0.0521)

-0.0766
(0.0626)

0.0366
(0.0338)

-0.0576
(0.0594)

Off Year Election

0.984***
(0.298)

0.595*
(0.246)

1.340***
(0.276)

0.537
(0.394)

Competition

-0.0407
(0.0347)

0.0196
(0.0243)

0.0230
(0.0310)

0.0166
(0.0194)

Chamber

0.498***
(0.0964)

0.329***
(0.0935)

0.473***
(0.0904)

0.428***
(0.101)

Democratic Party

-0.515***
(0.0511)

-0.130
(0.0692)

-0.131
(0.0721)

1.090***
(0.100)

Model
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Table 8.5 Continued
Cumulative Terms Served

0.0876***
(0.0125)

-0.0525***
(0.00891)

-0.0943***
(0.0147)

0.0169
(0.0104)

Other Chamber
Experience

0.789***

0.0909

0.00156

0.304**

(0.109)

(0.0877)

(0.0995)

(0.0971)

Speaker of the House

1.514***
(0.140)

1.049***
(0.155)

0.00201
(0.172)

0.797***
(0.136)

Senate Leader

0.853***
(0.159)

0.647***
(0.143)

0.0861
(0.159)

0.598***
(0.126)

Never Made General
Election

-1.052***

-0.132

-1.191***

-0.622***

(0.0952)

(0.0997)

(0.148)

(0.0961)

Challenger

-1.371***
(0.0880)

-0.0692
(0.0711)

-0.0844
(0.0443)

-0.510***
(0.0727)

Majority Party
Membership

0.362***

0.115**

0.273***

0.0976

(0.0424)

(0.0442)

(0.0648)

(0.0606)

9.130***
(0.847)

6.478***
(0.718)

7.530***
(0.661)

7.044***
(0.528)

1.666***
(0.0462)

1.460***
(0.0611)

1.898***
(0.0766)

1.466***
(0.0457)

79218
0.0998

36539
0.0333

47685
0.0297

48436
0.0881

Constant

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 8.6 Public Financing Program Type on Campaign Contributions
Log
Business
Donations

Log Single
Issue
Donations

Log Party
Donations

Log Union
Donations

Clean Elections

-2.028***
(0.478)

-1.152***
(0.316)

-1.931***
(0.337)

-2.132**
(0.778)

Matching Funds

-0.953**
(0.347)

-0.877***
(0.255)

-0.707*
(0.318)

-0.483
(0.283)

Term Limits

-0.105
(0.242)

-0.297
(0.231)

-0.265
(0.233)

-0.212
(0.218)

Folded Ranney

-0.0880
(1.029)

0.572
(0.846)

0.319
(0.760)

-0.175
(0.626)

Professionalism

0.222***
(0.0633)

0.161**
(0.0513)

0.178**
(0.0615)

0.357***
(0.0419)

Multimember Districts

-0.375
(0.389)

-0.498*
(0.252)

-0.729**
(0.277)

0.140
(0.292)

Presidential Year

0.0374
(0.0498)

-0.0635
(0.0629)

0.0495
(0.0335)

-0.0283
(0.0609)

Off Year Election

0.975**
(0.297)

0.615*
(0.248)

1.343***
(0.263)

0.556
(0.339)

Competition

-0.0394
(0.0350)

0.0189
(0.0265)

0.0206
(0.0343)

0.0117
(0.0222)

Chamber

0.527***
(0.0949)

0.342***
(0.0985)

0.486***
(0.0901)

0.440***
(0.0917)

Democratic Party

-0.527***
(0.0496)

-0.138*
(0.0702)

-0.138
(0.0712)

1.068***
(0.0972)

Cumulative Terms Served

0.0912***
(0.0121)

-0.0513***
(0.00916)

-0.0912***
(0.0145)

0.0199
(0.0103)

Model

202
Table 8.6 Continued
Other Chamber
Experience

0.791***

0.0846

-0.0115

0.321***

(0.110)

(0.0945)

(0.105)

(0.0898)

Speaker of the House

1.493***
(0.144)

1.052***
(0.155)

-0.00959
(0.170)

0.816***
(0.138)

Senate Leader

0.832***
(0.162)

0.646***
(0.141)

0.0942
(0.159)

0.629***
(0.120)

Never Made General
Election

-1.062***

-0.130

-1.192***

-0.636***

(0.0969)

(0.101)

(0.147)

(0.0980)

Challenger

-1.340***
(0.0853)

-0.0686
(0.0726)

-0.0764
(0.0431)

-0.488***
(0.0718)

Majority Party
Membership

0.354***

0.110*

0.271***

0.0785

(0.0427)

(0.0451)

(0.0643)

(0.0632)

9.187***
(0.850)

6.551***
(0.755)

7.578***
(0.632)

7.169***
(0.532)

1.643***
(0.0485)

1.462***
(0.0607)

1.888***
(0.0783)

1.461***
(0.0462)

79218
0.1063

36539
0.0326

47685
0.0324

48436
0.0898

Constant

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 8.7 Checkoff Programs and Campaign Contributions
Model

Log Total
Business
Donations

Log Total
Single Issue
Donations

Log Total
Party
Donations

Log Total
Union
Donations

Checkoff Program

-1.499***
(0.367)

-0.752***
(0.135)

-0.666*
(0.293)

-0.613**
(0.219)

No Checkoff Program

-1.865***

-1.241***

-0.960***

-1.911***

(0.161)

(0.156)

(0.151)

(0.154)

Term Limits

-0.197
(0.232)

-0.309
(0.218)

-0.319
(0.235)

-0.337
(0.201)

Folded Ranney

-0.146

0.486

0.226

-0.156

(1.034)

(0.872)

(0.778)

(0.624)

Professionalism

0.216***
(0.0653)

0.160**
(0.0523)

0.180**
(0.0601)

0.355***
(0.0438)

Multimember Districts

-0.458

-0.520*

-0.734**

-0.00280

(0.376)

(0.251)

(0.284)

(0.279)

Presidential Year

0.0341
(0.0491)

-0.0566
(0.0626)

0.0456
(0.0338)

-0.0395
(0.0597)

Off Year Election

0.919**

0.595*

1.334***

0.536

(0.295)

(0.250)

(0.253)

(0.344)

Competition

-0.0404
(0.0351)

0.0175
(0.0261)

0.0200
(0.0337)

0.0134
(0.0224)

Chamber

0.505***

0.340***

0.487***

0.413***

(0.0944)

(0.0997)

(0.0946)

(0.0873)

Democratic Party

-0.508***
(0.0493)

-0.129
(0.0695)

-0.122
(0.0720)

1.103***
(0.0937)

Cumulative Terms Served

0.0929***

-0.0482***

0.0207*

(0.0120)

(0.00940)

0.0888***
(0.0147)

(0.00995)
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Table 8.7 Continued
Other Chamber Experience

0.779***
(0.111)

0.0677
(0.0970)

-0.0206
(0.107)

0.279**
(0.0893)

Speaker of the House

1.488***
(0.145)

1.031***
(0.157)

-0.0116
(0.173)

0.779***
(0.143)

Senate Leader

0.838***
(0.167)

0.644***
(0.143)

0.0848
(0.159)

0.620***
(0.121)

Never Made General
Election

-1.095***

-0.142

-1.230***

-0.657***

(0.0952)

(0.100)

(0.157)

(0.0937)

Challenger

-1.331***
(0.0883)

-0.0658
(0.0726)

-0.0739
(0.0421)

-0.489***
(0.0721)

Majority Party Membership

0.356***

0.122**

0.274***

0.0937

(0.0440)

(0.0468)

(0.0647)

(0.0658)

9.275***
(0.856)

6.595***
(0.765)

7.631***
(0.636)

7.177***
(0.532)

1.643***
(0.0481)

1.467***
(0.0607)

1.905***
(0.0771)

1.469***
(0.0462)

Constant

Sigma
Cons

N
Pseudo R Squared

79218
36539
47685
0.1062
0.0304
0.0280
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

48436
0.0869
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Table 8.8 Legislative Programs on the Standard Deviation of Donations
Model

Standard
Deviation of
Business
Donations

Standard
Deviation of
Party
Donations

Standard
Deviation
of Union
Donations

Legislative Program

1.764***
(0.466)

-1.212***
(0.282)

-1.114***
(0.326)

Term Limits

0.0154
(0.0615)

0.0428
(0.0386)

-0.0813
(0.0612)

Folded Ranney

1.069**
(0.398)

1.236***
(0.311)

0.493
(0.475)

Professionalism

-0.810
(0.564)

-0.841**
(0.315)

-0.102
(0.347)

Multimember
Districts

0.802***

0.471***

0.464***

(0.108)

(0.103)

(0.0798)

Presidential Year

-0.959
(1.388)

0.277
(0.937)

0.973
(0.686)

Off Year

-0.0738

-0.00605

-0.0489

(0.0552)

(0.0329)

(0.0345)

Competition

0.323***
(0.0959)

0.182*
(0.0713)

0.396***
(0.0551)

Chamber

-0.103
(0.345)

-0.290
(0.276)

-0.344
(0.220)

Constant

10.13***
(1.098)

7.234***
(0.741)

7.102***
(0.535)

1.514***

1.892***

1.501***

(0.0719)

(0.0766)

(0.0559)

Sigma
Cons

N
33226
26305
Pseudo R Squared
0.0963
0.0311
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

8017
0.0857
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION

The research presented in this dissertation asked if state campaign finance regulations are
effective in meeting their objectives at reducing the flow of money to state legislative races. This
question has vexed state policymakers for over two centuries. Indeed, the American states are in a
seemingly constant political struggle over campaign finance regulations. Under modern campaign
finance regulations, money continues to pour into state legislative races to give donors influence
over redistricting (Bush 2016) and state policy (Powell 2012). Still, calls by the public to enact
stricter statutes to curb the influence of donors in elections remain strong (Desilver and Kessel
2015: Zogby Analytics 2012).
As discussed in Chapter 3, the push for campaign finance reform is relatively more
tumultuous at the state level (Balcerzak 2017). Many governors and state legislators were quite
hostile to campaign finance regulations throughout much of the 2000s and 2010s. Some
noteworthy examples demonstrate this point. The Missouri Legislature removed all state campaign
contribution limits in 2008, but limits were later reinstated in a 2016 ballot initiative. The
Massachusetts General Court refused to fund an initiative enacted Clean Election program in 1998.
The General Court eventually repealed the Clean Election law in 2003. Similarly, Wisconsin
pulled all funding from their public financing program, which historically enjoyed success.
State campaign finance regulations are also under renewed pressure from state and federal
courts. The United States Supreme Court struck down Arizona’s public financing trigger provision
in Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011). These
trigger provisions provided additional subsidies to candidates based on their opponents’
fundraising levels. Following Citizens United, challenges to campaign contribution limits and
disclosure became more common. Montana’s campaign contribution limits were in legal limbo
due to constant disagreements between the district and Ninth Circuit Courts. Various state
disclosure requirements were declared unconstitutional in North Carolina, Arizona, and Minnesota
in district and appeals court decisions for being administratively onerous and violating the exacting
scrutiny standard (Kulesza and Fisher 2018). The Supreme Court has been very supportive of
disclosure laws, rebuking lower courts for misinterpreting precedent set under Citizens United
(Kulesza and Fisher 2018). The Nebraska Supreme Court struck down most state campaign finance
regulations in 2012 (O’Hanlon 2012).
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Of course, there was not a universal weakening of campaign finance laws in all states from
1999-2014. State campaign finance regulations slightly strengthened during the timeframe
included in this study (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016). Certain states, like Connecticut and
Illinois, passed comprehensive reform packages that dramatically bolstered their campaign finance
laws. Most of the change towards stricter campaign finance laws, however, was relatively
incremental. These slight changes were most noticeable with campaign contribution limits.
The research presented here investigated the impacts of campaign finance laws from a
novel angle. This dissertation argued that the effectiveness of campaign finance regulations is
dependent upon the source of donations. Specifically, I proposed that there is a significant
difference in how business interest or ideological donors respond to campaign finance laws. This
dichotomy in donor groups is based upon the theoretical framework of campaign contributions
presented by Welch (1982) and Snyder (1992). As demonstrated in Chapter 4, business interest
groups consistently provide campaign contributions throughout a legislator’s’ tenure. Business
group campaign contributions are consistent. They seek long-term relationships with incumbent
legislators to receive economic benefits from the legislature. Ideological groups, on the other hand,
predominately provide campaign contributions to new or endangered legislators. Assuming that a
legislator’s ideological attitudes do not change while in office, ideologically centered groups do
not need to build long-term relationships with members. Instead, they need to get like-minded
legislators elected to office.
I organized this concluding chapter of my dissertation into three parts. First, I will provide
a broad overview of the results of my hypothesis tests on contribution limits, disclosure, and public
financing. Second, I will provide the theoretical implications of this work. Finally, I offer some
concluding remarks on my results and where research on campaign finance laws can be expanded
in the future.
9.1 Overview of Hypotheses and Results
My three hypotheses anticipated that business interest groups are relatively more impacted
by campaign contribution limits, disclosure laws, and public financing programs. First, I argued
that contribution limits should impact business interest donors relatively more than ideological
donors since they consistently provide financial support to incumbents. Since business interest
groups consistently provide donations to candidates, I predicted their contributions would run
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against contribution limits more frequently. I expected that ideological donors, which provide
donations to new candidates and endangered incumbents, would only rarely run into campaign
contribution limits. Thus, campaign contribution limits should be less effective at deterring
ideological group donations.
Disclosure only provides information on the relationship between contributors and
legislators. Nothing in disclosure law forces donors to stop contributing. Thus, my hypothesis on
disclosure is based upon differences in negative publicity for business and ideological groups.
Public polling consistently shows that American voters are concerned with corporate influences
over policymaking (Harris 2012). Business groups may face a voter backlash if they provide
inordinate financial support to candidates. Donations from ideological groups will not likely
receive the same repercussions for contributing. Indeed, a majority of the public does not feel that
nonprofits and other ideological donors have too much influence in our political processes (Harris
2012). Campaign contributing is a fundamental political activity of ideological groups. Disclosure
should have no negative impacts on ideological group contributions. Finally, I assumed that public
financing laws should cause business interest donations to fall more than ideological group
donations. Business interest groups provide more donations to candidates. Naturally, their
campaign contribution levels should experience a larger decline under public financing. Of course,
this prediction comes with an important condition. A high number of candidates must opt into
public financing programs to reduce private donations. Once a large number of candidates enroll
in public financing, there are not many options for donors to influence state legislative elections.
I tested my hypotheses with an exceptionally large dataset that included 112,921
candidacies for State Houses/Assemblies and Senates from 1999-2014 across all fifty states. I
measured state campaign finance statutes using an updated form of the Witko Index (2005), which
captures twenty-two specific regulations. The inclusion of the Witko Index (2005) allowed my
research to test particular facets of campaign contribution, disclosure, and public financing laws.
My estimates were calculated with a Tobit model with the errors clustered around the states to not
overstate the impact of campaign finance regulations on donations.
Broadly, my results provided mixed support for my three hypotheses. Still, this analysis
produced a very insightful look into the effectiveness of campaign finance regulations and
demonstrated that groups react differently to campaign finance regulations. Indeed, several
revelations paint a very compelling picture of campaign finance regulations. The most surprising
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finding was the widespread lack of support for hypothesis one, which predicted that business
interest group donations are more impacted by campaign contribution limits. Instead, my models
showed that ideological group donations, not business group donations, were relatively more
impacted by campaign contribution limits. Bans on direct donations from unions were the only
ideological group focused contribution limit that was less effective than their business targeted
counterpart. Political Action Committee, party, and union limits (not to be confused with bans).
The corporate campaign contribution limit models also produced unexpected results.
Interestingly, corporate campaign contribution limits were most effective at limiting business
donations to non-incumbents. Corporate campaign contributions were insignificantly associated
with business interest donations for legislators seeking re-election. The explanation for this seems
to be incumbent reelection goals. Mayhew (1976) first argued that incumbents primarily wish to
get reelected. This narrative fit well into how incumbents craft campaign contribution limits to
their advantage. As shown by Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006), campaign contribution
limits reduced the winning vote totals for successful challengers. Campaign contribution limits
had a negligible effect on changing the vote totals for the legislators that originally enacted them.
The finding by Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006) is consistent with the results here.
Incumbents may design corporate campaign contribution limits in a way that does not hinder their
fundraising abilities. There is minimal incentive for sitting legislators to enact campaign finance
laws that will hurt their reelection chances.
While my analysis failed to confirm my first hypothesis, it is important to note that my
results showed that campaign contribution limits could be an effective tool for equalizing
donations in state legislative races. Campaign contribution limits reduced campaign contributions
for all groups. Unions, however, were unaffected by their contribution ban regulations. I can only
speculate as to why this may be the case. Unions are unique among the donor categories as they
straddle economic and ideological groups. Unions fundamentally exist to negotiate contracts for
their workforce; yet, they maintain a strong political advocacy tradition. This dual mission may
create a unique dynamic that lessens the impact of campaign contribution limits. I do not have
direct evidence of this, however. It is a question subject to empirical tests that can be followed up
in future studies.
My second hypothesis on disclosure laws received mixed support from my analyses.
Disclosure is arguably the least effective of the three forms of campaign finance regulations at
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reducing donations to state legislative races. Three of the five tested disclosure regulations were
wholly unrelated with campaign contribution levels for all donor groups. These were quarterly
reporting, after reporting, and the itemization of contributions above $50. There are very logical
reasons why after reporting and the $50 itemization contribution requirements were insignificantly
associated with contributing. After reporting requirements provide donation records once the
campaign concludes. There will not be an electoral backlash for the candidate until the next
election. By this time, most voters will not likely pay attention to campaign contributions from the
previous election cycle. The insignificance of the $50 itemization requirement may be due to
methodological issues. The $50 limit may be less meaningful in states with expensive elections.
The insignificant result may reflect that my dataset includes candidates across all fifty states with
very different campaigning costs. The reasons why quarterly reporting was ineffective are a bit
less obvious. Quarterly reporting should reveal significant information about the relationship
between the donor and the legislator. The problems with quarterly reporting may be the same as
after reporting. It is unlikely that voters consistently pay attention to donations provided to their
state legislative candidates over the course of an election cycle.
Business interest donations were relatively more affected by general itemization and
aggregate contribution reporting than ideological contributions. Both of these disclosure
regulations are relatively simple regulations. Aggregate reporting provides broad information
about how much funds candidates raise in an election. While not particularly sophisticated,
aggregate reporting requirements offer basic information on the relative sizes of contributions. The
aggregate reporting requirements led to a reduction in the percentage of donations originating from
business interest groups. Itemization requirements give details about the source and size of each
contribution, but nothing about timing. Still, both ideological and business interest donors were
dissuaded from contributing under itemization requirements business groups just more so.
Public financing was highly effective at drawing private donations away from candidates.
As expected, business interest donations fell more than ideological donations in the presence of
public financing programs, consistent with my third hypothesis. In some ways, this is not a
particularly exciting finding. Candidates must surrender much of their right to raise private
campaign contributions when they accept public financing. So long as the public financing
program is operating correctly, and my measurement adequately captured these statutes, my
models should show a decline in donations from private contributors. As will be discussed in
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further detail below, these results signify that public finance laws are strong enough to entice
candidates to enroll in the programs.
The various public financing programs were not equally strong, however, in removing
private campaign contributions from state legislative elections. Clean Election Laws outperformed
matching funds programs in reducing campaign contributions. My results also indicated that
Connecticut’s program was the most robust public financing program in the nation, even though
it is funded through an unorthodox method: the sale of surplus state property.
9.2 Implications
The results clearly show that no perfect campaign finance law will dissuade contributions
from all donor types. While not all my hypotheses held up, it is quite apparent that donor groups
are impacted by campaign finance laws differently. This difference was true for campaign
contribution limits, disclosure laws, and public financing. Admittedly, campaign contribution
limits enjoyed relative consistency in stemming donations from most groups. My findings suggest
that campaign contribution limits are not so high that they can be easily worked around by donors.
Further, direct contribution bans for corporations are not so ridden with loopholes that businesses
easily find ways around them.
Unions, on the other hand, tend to do well avoiding their respective campaign contribution
limits. Legislators wishing to regulate the flow of money from unions must consider their unique
status as being in some ways simultaneously an economic and ideological group. Unlike
corporations, unions can mobilize members for political purposes and provide financial help
through membership dues. Policymakers must find ways to account for these attributes in their
campaign contribution limit regulations.
Although disclosure law was arguably the weakest campaign finance regulation, it does
not mean that states should scrap them. My results indicated that aggregate reporting and
itemization requirements shifted donations away from business interest groups. Providing basic
information to candidates can be a strong deterrent for donors to appear that they are unduly
influencing state legislative elections. Policymakers and the public must be aware, however, that
it takes multiple forms of disclosure regulations to have an impact on campaign contributions.
Further, disclosure regulations very rarely impact ideological group donations. Aggregate
reporting simply reduced the overall percentage of money coming in from business groups. Only
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general itemization requirements had a discernable impact on contribution totals from both
ideological and business interest groups.
There is also a significant concern with how disclosure requirements can be useful in the
face of voter apathy. Quarterly reporting, the $50 contribution reporting threshold, and after
reporting arguably provided the most information to the public about contributions. All three of
these disclosure requirements failed to affect donation strategies of either ideological or business
interest groups. State governments may not need regular reporting intervals as it appears that the
public is not paying attention. Further, policymakers must be careful to set disclosure triggers at
levels that reflect the costs of campaigning in their respective state. If not, disclosure requirements
run the risk of providing confusing and inadequate information to voters.
The results from the public financing models were particularly telling. Matching funds
programs appear to be deteriorating quickly. States do not provide enough funds to entice
candidates to enroll in these programs. Even when they are fully operational, however, there is still
a healthy flow of private donations into state legislative campaigns. The Clean Election programs
were the most potent deterrent of campaign contributions for both ideological and business group
donations. Of course, Clean Election programs mandate that candidates must forgo all private
contributions to enroll. Still, the strong effects demonstrated in the models show that the Clean
Election programs are attracting enough candidates to reduce the amount of money in state
legislative elections significantly. Business and ideological groups do not seem interested in
merely funding candidates that did not accept public financing. So long as public financing is ruled
as a constitutional means to eliminate private donations, they can remain a strong choice for state
governments to reduce donations.
9.3 Conclusion
This dissertation showed that groups are affected differently by campaign finance
regulations. Disclosure requirements and public financing relatively more negatively impacted
business group donations. Contrary to predictions, ideological group donations fell further under
campaign contribution limits, except for unions. Unions were mostly unaffected by campaign
contribution limits. This dissertation only showed that there is a difference in how contributors
respond to campaign finance laws. It did not directly isolate the exact reasons why. Future research
should explore why donors change their strategies in the presence of campaign finance law. This
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work should be conducted through both large N and survey research designs to better determine
the exact motivations for the behavior of donors. This new research will shed insight that will
allow states to craft more effective campaign finance regulations, potentially improving the
responsiveness of state legislative policy to constituents.
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